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Abstract 
Distributed virtual environments (DVEs) have been an active area of research and engineering for 
more than 20 years. The most widely deployed DVEs are network games such as Quake, Halo, and 
World of Warcraft (WoW), with millions of users and billions of dollars in annual revenue. Deployed 
DVEs remain expensive centralized implementations despite significant research outlining ways to 
distribute DVE workloads.  
This dissertation shows previous DVE research evaluations are inconsistent with deployed DVE 
needs. Assumptions about avatar movement and proximity - fundamental scale factors - do not match 
WoW’s workload, and likely the workload of other deployed DVEs. Alternate workload models are 
explored and preliminary conclusions presented. Using realistic workloads it is shown that a fully 
decentralized DVE cannot be deployed to today’s consumers, regardless of its overhead. 
Residential broadband speeds are improving, and this limitation will eventually disappear. When it 
does, appropriate security mechanisms will be a fundamental requirement for technology adoption.  
A trusted auditing system (“Carbon”) is presented which has good security, scalability, and 
resource characteristics for decentralized DVEs. When performing exhaustive auditing, Carbon adds 
27% network overhead to a decentralized DVE with a WoW-like workload. This resource 
consumption can be reduced significantly, depending upon the DVE’s risk tolerance.  
Finally, the Pairwise Random Protocol (PRP) is described. PRP enables adversaries to fairly 
resolve probabilistic activities, an ability missing from most decentralized DVE security proposals. 
Thus, this dissertations contribution is to address two of the obstacles for deploying research on 
decentralized DVE architectures. First, lack of evidence that research results apply to existing DVEs. 
Second, the lack of security systems combining appropriate security guarantees with acceptable 
overhead. 
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1 Introduction 
Modern distributed virtual environments – DVEs – are typically immersive 3D real-time simulations. 
The most prevalent examples are online computer games, such as Call of Duty: Black Ops [2] and 
World of Warcraft [21] (abbreviated WoW).  
DVEs are commercially successful, but are constrained by the state of the art in networking and 
software: popular deployed DVEs use a client-server model for maintaining the virtual environment 
and propagating simulation state. This design choice greatly simplifies security and design, but has 
scalability ramifications.  
Over the last fifteen years, a significant body of research has emerged exploring ways to improve 
DVE scalability. Many of the research results appear promising, with evaluations showing their ability 
to scale well past the scope of deployed DVEs. Why, then, are these advances not used in any broadly 
deployed DVE? 
1.1 Research statement 
Previous DVE research makes a wide variety of assumptions in terms of message workloads, latency, 
and the importance of security. If these assumptions do not match the needs and behavior of DVEs 
intended for broad deployment, the evaluations are less likely to persuade DVE developers to consider 
adopting said research. 
I hypothesize that assumptions for evaluating previous DVE research are incorrect. This 
hypothesis will be investigated in this dissertation by examining World of Warcraft’s messaging 
model, which is typical for Massively Multiplayer Online Games (MMOGs).  
I also hypothesize that when one takes into account the state of residential Internet connections 
worldwide, a pure peer-to-peer DVE which meets existing DVE messaging requirements cannot be 
deployed. On a happier note, residential Internet access continues to improve, and it should only be a 
matter of time before network resources are no longer a barrier to deploying peer-to-peer versions of 
DVEs similar to those available today. 
Most peer-to-peer DVE research proposals do not include security solutions, but one is absolutely 
required for broad deployment.  
I demonstrate that an auditing solution using trusted auditors can provide good security for 
decentralized DVEs with acceptable overhead, both for the DVE operator and for clients. 
The next section provides details on the contributions my research and this dissertation provide 
towards these research goals. 
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1.2 Research contributions 
This thesis contains contributions across three areas of distributed virtual environment research, as 
described in the previous section. 
Chapter 3 examines assumptions affecting messaging workloads in World of Warcraft. DVE 
Messages are typically propagated based on proximity to message source, so realistic avatar 
movement and grouping models are critical for evaluation correctness. Existing workloads make 
significant incorrect assumptions about avatar movement and clustering. This dissertation provides in-
depth evaluation of avatar movement in World of Warcraft battlegrounds, a player-avatar-driven 
scenario. While it stops short of proposing new movement models, it provides a wealth of relevant 
information for those wishing to do so.  
Chapter 3 details investigation into the feasibility of pure peer-to-peer DVE architectures, given 
the results from chapter 3 and real-world network resource constraints. It provides simulator results 
showing that even with liberal assumptions including perfect information with zero overhead for peer-
to-peer infrastructure maintenance, average and peak message latency would be too high for a pure 
peer-to-peer solution to be viable.   
Chapter 5 proposes a security solution to secure decentralized (i.e. non-client-server) DVEs. 
Although pure peer-to-peer DVEs are not deployable today, hybrid solutions with peer specialization 
may be. I propose Carbon, an auditing system allowing untrusted adversaries to interact within the 
DVE without requiring immediate intervention from a trusted third party. Carbon provides a tunable 
model for choosing the level of protection desired, based upon DVE requirements. Overhead and 
protection are compared to PeerReview [60], a very effective security solution for general distributed 
scenarios.  
Finally, chapter 6 proposes the Pairwise Random Protocol. This is a variation on secure coin 
flipping which allows adversaries to fairly decide probabilistic events. This extension supports an 
important category of DVE interactions vital to most DVEs, yet typically ignored by existing research.  
1.3 Publications 
Some results presented in this thesis have been published elsewhere during the course of research. 
Publications by chapter are listed below. 
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2 General background 
This chapter provides high level description of distributed virtual environments - DVEs - and their 
properties. It also summarizes published DVE scalability and security research. Those interested in an 
overall bibliography for online games and DVE research should consider visiting the bibliography of 
network games research at http://www.iis.sinica.edu.tw/~swc/ngbib.html for a broad set of references, 
including many not cited here. 
I define a virtual environment (VE) as a computer simulation typically involving space and time. 
This definitely restricts our examination to computerized systems, where otherwise it could rightly 
include war simulations going back thousands of years [93]. In addition to military applications, VEs 
are a valuable tool in domains such as engineering. Computers have been used to simulate virtual 
environments since the inception of electronic computers. For example, computers were used in the 
Manhattan Project to model nuclear detonation, implementing a narrowly scoped, non-real-time 
virtual environment. 
In subsequent years computer capacity has grown, and with it the scope and responsiveness of 
virtual environments. VEs are still used for offline numerical simulations, but are now able to simulate 
complex 2D and 3D environments in real-time. 
With the advent of computer networks, virtual environments were adapted to utilize multiple hosts, 
communicating over a network. This category of virtual environment has been known by several 
names, including networked virtual environment, collaborative virtual environment, or more recently, 
distributed virtual environment. “Distributed virtual environment” or DVE, as used in this dissertation, 
refers to any VE with a significant networking aspect. 
A DVE can be differentiated from a centralized virtual environment (VE) by the maintenance of 
state across two or more VE nodes. For this dissertation’s purposes, a simulation run on a single server 
with only raw input and display - such as keystrokes and render frames - sent between the server and 
remote clients is not considered a DVE. A server-based VE which delegates some simulation, state 
calculation, or state storage to remote clients is considered a DVE. A server-based VE which leverages 
multiple cooperating servers is also considered a DVE. 
A DVE can most generally be thought of as a collection of state, and rules for updating that state. 
In World of Warcraft (WoW), state includes the race and class of an avatar, its position, velocity, 
speed, and health. It includes every changeable aspect of the environment, from the status of walls 
which can be broken (whole, damaged, or destroyed) to the time of day and weather in each part of the 
world.  
State management and rendering in DVEs, even client-server DVEs, is extremely tricky. Users 
interact with the DVE in real-time and expect to see their inputs acted upon immediately. Yet it takes 
time for their inputs to be locally processed and vetted, transmitted to the server for validation, and the 
change to be approved and disseminated to other nodes. Network latency and processing delays are a 
2.  GENERAL BACKGROUND 
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serious obstacle for real-time DVE experiences: DVEs use complex strategies to provide the illusion 
of a single, continuous world state, when really perception and rendering of the world state can be 
different at every single node participating in the DVE. These complexities are part of what makes 
DVEs such fertile ground for research. The utility of DVEs is what makes DVE research valuable. 
DVEs have a variety of applications. Some implement large-scale simulations, such as military 
war game training exercises [103]. Others are used as a shared virtual reality for therapeutic or social 
purposes, as in Therapy World [108] and Second Life [86]. And, they can be used for entertainment, as 
in network-enabled games. Spasim [26], released in 1974, was one of the first DVEs, and claims to be 
the first 3D multiplayer game. Spasim allowed up to 32 players to compete with each other in a wire-
frame rendered space setting.  
Most DVE research and implementation in the 1970s and 1980s was based around military 
combat simulations. One of the first large-scale military simulators was the Simulator Networking 
project (SIMNET) [112], started in 1983 and primarily developed up until 1990. At its conclusion, the 
SIMNET environment consisted of a network of 250 simulators across 11 sites [98]. SIMNET 
introduced many concepts still in used today, such as node treatment of simulation entities as objects 
with an authoritative owner providing state updates, and the use of dead reckoning to provide 
smoother simulation behavior between updates.  
The lessons learned in constructing SIMNET evolved into the Distributed Interactive Simulation 
(DIS) protocols, whose first version was completed in 1992 and published as standard IEEE 1278-
1993 [71] in 1993, and revised several times since [69] [70]. SIMNET was a successful demonstration 
of the potential of distributed simulation, but was never intended to provide an open, well documented 
protocol. The DIS effort was implemented to address this shortcoming, by specifying and 
standardizing all aspects of communications between nodes. The architecture was quite similar to 
SIMNET, but more fully specified [121]. In both cases, simulations were restricted to thousands of 
entities, as messages were broadcast from each node to all other participants, and quickly became a 
scaling bottleneck. 
As the personal computer became ubiquitous and computer networks grew together into the 
Internet in the 1990s, consumer applications for DVEs - specifically networked computer games - 
became increasingly common.  
Doom [67], a computer game released in 1993, helped establish the PC as a local network gaming 
platform, introducing millions of people to DVEs. As the Internet matured and consumer Internet 
access become more common, DVE games began to operate over the Internet as well as local 
networks, allowing more DVE instances to be created, and more people to participate in them. For 
example, the Quake [68] and Unreal [6] games allowed players to join games hosted at arbitrary 
servers around the world, or even to host their own game on their own machine. Although millions of 
people were playing these games, most DVE instances remained relatively small, supporting between 
2 and 8 players.  
1.3  Publications 
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In the late 1990s, a new type of network game DVE came into prominence, the massively 
multiplayer online game (MMOG). Rather than providing a short scenario in which only a few players 
could participate, these games provide a years-long experience supporting hundreds of thousands – or 
even millions – of simultaneous participants.  
The first MMOGs - such as Ultima Online [105], released in 1997 - were descendants of pen-and-
paper role playing games, and of multiplayer text adventures, known as multi-user dungeons or MUDs. 
Like MUDs, most MMOGs rely upon a central server or server farm to simulate each world instance 
and maintain consistency within that instance. Unlike MUDs, participating client machines are 
responsible for simulating, maintaining, and rendering portions of the world state.  
MMOGs ushered in a new era of commercial success and economic incentives. Players regularly 
played tens of hours per week, and paid monthly subscription fees for the privilege of playing in many 
of the DVEs. In the earlier small-scale network game DVEs, network gaming was an additional 
feature of the game. With the new generation of MMOGs, the game could only be played over the 
network. Its value and experience were tightly coupled with the servers and the other players involved 
in the game. 
In the twenty years since game DVEs became mainstream, they have evolved into three basic 
game types, each played by millions of people worldwide.  
1. First-person shooters (FPS). The vast majority of FPSs have less than 10 users per instance, 
frequent avatar state updates (e.g. every 40 ms), and high sensitivity to latency. Game state is 
not typically persisted across game sessions, but instead short-lived scenarios are played time 
and time again. Current examples include Call of Duty: Black Ops [2], Medal of Honor [48], 
and Gears of War [94].   
2. Strategy games, especially real-time strategy (RTS) games. Most of these support less than 
10 users per instance, have less frequent updates (e.g. every second), and relatively low 
sensitivity to latency. These games are usually scenario-based, with game state reset after each 
scenario is played. Examples include the StarCraft [20] series and Civilization [53]. 
3. Role-playing games (RPG). RPGs vary from offering a few small scenarios to play through 
such as Diablo II [23], to presenting worlds with hundreds of square kilometers of unique 
terrain, such as World of Warcraft [21]. The focus in these games is on a progressive 
experience, where player state and accomplishments are stored across sessions for anywhere 
from tens to thousands of hours per player. Game session populations can range from a few 
players up to thousands of simultaneous players per server. 
Network-enabled computer games are the most prominent example of DVEs with a wealth of 
technical and usage information available.  They have tremendous value, in both economic and 
entertainment terms.  For example, the release of Modern Warfare 2 - a network-enabled first person 
shooter game - generated more than $550 million USD in sales its first week of release [1]. Its network 
play features were extremely popular, with nearly a million users simultaneously playing on Xbox-
2.  GENERAL BACKGROUND 
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Live three days after its release.  WoW has more than 12 million paying subscribers [22], with 
American and European customers paying approximately $15 USD per month to participate in its 
DVE.  As of June 2010, the average World of Warcraft player logs more than 9 hours per week [106], 
for a total of more than 100 million person hours each week. 
Despite the huge number of players online simultaneously, most deployed DVEs have significant 
scalability limitations. Most modern FPS games limit simultaneous participants in a game to less than 
20. Second Life has a limit of a hundred avatars per region [85], less if they are active. WoW supports 
approximately 4,000 players per copy of the world (“shard”), though a more typical number is less 
than a thousand [130], and mutual interaction is limited to groups numbering in the low hundreds.  
Enabling larger scale DVEs is desirable. In the commercial entertainment arena, it enables a 
vendor to offer more interesting experiences. In the military arena, it allows larger scale simulations to 
be performed, building competence in troop management and battle oversight, something difficult to 
acquire other ways.  
A significant amount of research has been done in mechanisms to increase the scale of DVEs. 
Much of this research involves decentralizing DVE operations. For example, distributing object state 
ownership, changing messaging patterns, and employing novel caching schemes. Speculative updates 
– such as dead reckoning, used to success in SIMNET – are also an area of investigation. 
As DVEs grow, the incentive of participants to cheat – violating the DVE’s rules to gain unfair 
advantage - also grows. For example, a real money market trading in virtual assets – such as virtual 
currency - has evolved around MMOGs. Even ten years ago, this market was worth more than a 
billion dollars a year, with multinational corporations fighting for market dominance [42].  
Cheating is believed to reduce the overall appeal of a game, and can result in players being less 
likely to continue to play that game [73]. Quality of the customer experience is critical to attracting 
and retaining customers. If customer experience is poor, the DVE will not sell well, people will be less 
likely to subscribe (if subscriptions are required), and the distributor will have a harder time selling 
any future DVE offerings.  
2.1 DVE responsiveness and correctness 
DVEs distribute their activities to varying degrees. For game DVEs, the end-user impression of 
efficacy will be related to the accuracy and the responsiveness of the experience. A user needs to be 
immersed in the experience, to feel as though it is responding to their inputs. They need to feel the 
experience is fair and – to the extent the scenario supports – predictable. For example, a user issuing a 
“turn left” command to their avatar’s vehicle should have roughly the same result each time an avatar 
does it, assuming similar starting state. If the vehicle turns immediately some times, turns after a delay 
other times, or simply continues straight, the DVE feels neither responsive nor correct. 
2.1  DVE responsiveness and correctness 
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The lag between proposing a state change and that state change being communicated to or 
accepted by other elements of the DVE is called latency. Different activities can require different 
degrees of consensus before being acted upon. In the example above, if the local node is empowered to 
turn the vehicle, reaction can be immediate and responsive. However, if turning requires agreement 
from a single remote node, then the action is not authoritative until a message has been communicated 
to the remote node, and an agreement returned. Further, a player at a third remote node may not 
perceive the vehicle turning for some period after the state change has been authoritatively made, 
because of network propagation delays. 
Latency is a significant factor in user perception of DVE fairness, responsiveness, and correctness. 
Most deployed DVEs have latency induced by network propagation delay, so network propagation 
delay is the most common type of latency measured. 
Latency sensitivity varies according to the type of DVE [39]. First person shooter (FPS) and other 
“twitch” DVEs are the most sensitive to latency.  Real-time strategy (RTS) games are the least 
sensitive. Role playing games (RPGs) such as World of Warcraft are between these two extremes in 
terms of sensitivity.  
In current generation FPS DVEs, estimates of tolerable latency range between 60 and 200 ms (ms). 
For example, Brun et al. [27] quote a study where player performance was not affected below 60 ms, 
but values above 60 ms had a negative correlation with player performance. Quax et al. [115] quote 
the same starting point for perceived latency. Dick et al. [43] found that Unreal Tournament 
performance is perceived by the player as degraded after 100 ms of latency, and showed significant 
drop in performance at 150 ms and higher latency. Armitage [8] found that Quake 3 performance in 
terms of frags per minute dropped as a function of latency, with a clear downward trend starting 
between 50 ms and 100 ms round trip time. Beigbeider et al. [16] evaluated the impact of jitter, packet 
loss, and latency on Unreal Tournament 2003 performance. They found that reasonable jitter and 
packet loss did not significantly impact performance, but there was a negative correlation between 
latency and performance in terms of frags and deaths, which started at 100 ms and became “annoying” 
at 200 ms. 
Less evaluation has been done for RTS and RPG latency sensitivity. Fritsch et al. [55] studied 
players’ ability to perform navigation and combat tasks in Everquest 2 [122], an MMORPG. They 
found that latency above 250 to 500 ms increased the time required to successfully complete combat, 
reduced avatar resources remaining at the end of each combat, and increased time to navigate a fixed 
course. Claypool and Claypool [39] found that MMORPG players had significantly decreased 
performance at around 500 ms latency, and RTS players at around 1,000 ms of latency.  
Research into collaborative activities outside of game DVEs has confirmed that latency is a 
significant factor in any shared activity. Hikichi et al. [63] performed an experiment with remote 
calligraphy tutoring. Interestingly, they found that in a shared activity where one participant is leading 
the other – such as instruction – both the teacher and instructor perceived some impairment with 
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increasing latency. However, the teacher – who was leading the exercise and then observing the 
student’s reaction – perceived a much greater impairment than the student, who was simply following 
the input stream from the teacher as it came in, regardless of when that stream was originated.  
Latency impacts not only players’ perceived and actual performance, but also the amount of time 
they choose to participate in the DVE. For example, Chen et al. [37] found that Shen Zhou Online 
players who had more than 200 ms of latency on average played less than 2/3 as long as those who had 
latency below 150 ms.  
State update latencies in DVEs are often large enough to be perceivable. Early DVEs required all 
state updates to be validated by the server before they were rendered. This provided a correct state 
delay, but broke the illusion of continuous control.  
Today, DVEs allow client nodes to work speculatively with the local state snapshot. Unimportant 
state decisions are left wholly to the local node, and may not appear consistent between all nodes. For 
example, decorative aspects of the environment may be randomly added at each node, but not 
synchronized between them.  
Moderately important states can have changes proposed and rendered by a local node, but that 
node may have to revert the value if the proposal is denied, resulting in inconsistent rendering at the 
local node. For example, the user could have proposed to pick up an item (changing its “owned by” 
state) and have rendered locally picking up the item, but then when the request is denied, the item 
disappears. 
Finally, critical state may await rendering / update of the local cached value until confirmation of 
the proposed change is received. This provides the worst experience for the user, and so is not often 
used in modern DVEs.  
These three choices show the tradeoff between responsiveness and correctness. Enabling 
responsive behavior in DVEs inevitably affects correctness, as not all state conflict can be easily 
resolved. Mauve [91] gives an example of three DVE participants in such a situation. Player A shoots 
a bullet at player B which will kill player B. Player B shoots at player C after the bullet from A should 
have arrived, but before receiving that update. The bullet from B hits C, but should never have been 
shot. Two common mitigations for this problem are local lag and time warp [92].  
Local lag defers executing proposed state changes for a certain period. Change proposals are 
transmitted with time stamps. Local interpretation of state proposals lags behind the actual time 
slightly. In the example above, B would still send their “shoot at C” message, but would ideally 
receive the “shot by A” message before acting upon that proposed state change, and so would know to 
ignore it. C would also ideally receive both messages in time to correctly resolve the conflict and 
cancel being shot.  
Time warp means rolling back state when conflicting state changes are approved as executed. 
Chains of conflicting changes can be arbitrarily complex, and so rolling them back can be difficult.  
2.2  DVE scalability 
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Note that local lag relies upon nodes being well behaved for success. It can be easily exploited by 
cheaters, as will be discussed in detail in section 2.3, after an outline of DVE scalability research. 
2.2 DVE scalability 
Most DVEs broadly deployed today are online games. These games have significant scalability 
limitations. For example, first person shooters are typically limited to between 8 and 16 mutually 
interacting players, though some (such as Medal of Honor Allied Assault [47]) go as high as 64 players. 
MMORPGs blur this line. World of Warcraft allows thousands of active avatars to share the same 
server, but in practice no more than a few hundred can gather within mutual interaction distance of 
each other without causing performance problems, or even crashing the server. 
Significant effort has been put into investigating resource consumption of game DVEs, and 
devising ways to apply more resources to the DVE. The main dimensions researched are reduction of 
network traffic required, and redistribution of simulation workload.  
2.2.1 Traffic reduction 
Traffic reduction efforts have been focused in two dimensions: reducing the number of parties a 
given message is sent to, and reducing the number of messages required for the same fidelity of DVE.  
DVEs are a collection of state information, and a process for updating those states. Many state 
changes can be localized. For example, a DVE node simulating an avatar only needs to be aware of 
state changes which affect that avatar. If two avatars are interacting, then many state changes resulting 
from that interaction can be determined using only the state of the two avatars. Further, resolution of 
the combat between those avatars is probably not relevant to avatars on the other side of the world.  
Two categories of solutions exploit this behavior: region-based computation and message 
propagation, and area of interest (AoI ) based message propagation.  
In region-based methods, the DVE is divided into regions which act as compartments for state 
and/or for message propagation related to that state. Nodes subscribe to regions they are interested in, 
typically the region they maintain state for, and regions near their avatar. Regions can be fixed – for 
example divided into a uniform grid – or variable in size.  In some cases, discussion of region 
management is treated as synonymous with load distribution. Note that most FPS DVEs can be 
considered as region-based with a single region. Second Life also uses this model, with the world 
divided into a large number of small regions, each owned by exactly one simulation server.  
Yamamoto et al. [133] propose dividing the game world into identically sized regions for 
management of resources and propagation of messages. Lee and Lee [83] divide the DVE into even 
sized regions determined by the number of servers processing data, e.g. 16 grids per server, with 16 
servers, for a total of 256 regions. FreeMMG [32] divides the DVE into fixed regions, requiring nodes 
within each region to agree with each state change before that change is ratified. Jardine and Zappala 
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[74] propose a hybrid architecture using fixed regions to limit propagation of avatar movement 
messages. Chan et al. divide the world into fixed slices – synonymous with regions – for computation 
in their Hydra [35] architecture.  
Sometimes regions are dynamically rather than statically created. Alvic-NG [114] uses a quadtree 
to partition the world and allow subdivision of processing, with new sub-partitions created when a 
given partition load is unacceptably high.  
In area of interest (AoI) based propagation, objects within the DVE which send or receive 
messages have an AoI and an aura. An object sends notification messages to any other object whose 
area of interest intersects its aura. In the degenerate case, an object’s aura is a point centered on the 
object, and so messages are sent to objects based solely on the area of interest of the potential recipient. 
AoI approaches ideally propagate messages only to parties which need them. Boulanger et al. give 
a good overview and comparison of existing AoI schemes in [25]. They experimentally obtain both the 
maintenance overhead and the message propagation properties of the schemes they evaluate, ranging 
from aura / AoI distance to tile-traversal distance for various tiling strategies (which take into account 
obstructions) to Delaunay triangulation, and finally, ray tracing from source to sink, which was used as 
ground truth. The authors found their results varied according to DVE spatial properties and frequency 
of occlusion, but in general tile-based approaches provided a good compromise between accuracy and 
speed of execution.  
 Refinements to reduce unnecessary message propagation are one message-related way to improve 
DVE scalability. However, it may be possible that some of the messages propagated to a node – 
despite being theoretically relevant to that node – are unimportant. In these cases, the unimportant 
messages can be deprioritized, and sent less frequently or with a lower priority than critical messages.  
A couple of notable attention-based schemes have been proposed in literature. Donnybrook [17] 
calculates a focus for a local node, and then adapts the update rate from other avatars based on the 
attention the local node is paying to them. The half dozen most significant avatars send the node 
frequent updates, with others sending updates up to an order of magnitude less often. Avatar 
movement with this lower frequency is smoothed using bot movement patterns. This approach was 
implemented on a modified copy of Quake 3. Experimental evaluation [109] showed that most players 
were satisfied with the experience this approach provides. 
MultiVR [44] uses a different approach. It calculates interest of the user’s avatar in other event 
sources (avatars), and scales the number and kind of updates according to the interest metric. However, 
it does not pursue any specific modeling of the user’s behavior to fill in gaps, assuming instead that 
the user will not notice the less frequent updates.  
SmartCU3D [129] proposes that interest relationships are more complex than just distance or 
observer focus, and that characteristics of both the observer and the potentially observed objects (such 
as category or kind), should help determine whether or not to propagate state information, and how 
frequently to do so. 
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Beeharee et al. measure visual attention, and propose the VABIC [14] model for characterizing 
visual importance of objects, and therefore updates required to appropriately render those objects for a 
given observer. They applied their approach to a city simulation with observers walking around the 
simulated city, and found they could in some cases reduce the number of required updates by 70%. 
2.2.2 Redistributing simulation workload 
Redistribution of simulation workloads runs a broad spectrum ranging from server-based solutions 
to pure peer-to-peer solutions. In broad strokes, these solutions can be roughly divided into three 
categories: server-oriented solutions; trusted third party solutions; and client-oriented solutions.  
2.2.2.1 Server-oriented 
Server-based solutions are centralized solutions where most significant state storage and 
calculation for the DVE is performed on one or more servers owned by the DVE operator. This allows 
the DVE to benefit from operating on a known, trusted configuration, and to apply well-known 
maintenance and security techniques.  
A single server solution does not need to coordinate its maintenance of state and so can always 
provide consistent replies. However, it is limited by the amount of processing it can perform, and the 
number of clients whose messages it can service. One mitigation for this problem is the use of server 
farms – groups of cooperating servers - with many servers working together to meet DVE needs.  
The transition from single server to server farm introduces a host of challenges: server selection, 
load balancing, state transition, and reliable maintenance of state spread across multiple servers to 
name a few. 
Some architectures such as the Butterfly Grid [29] propose middleware to make the division 
between servers transparent to the DVE author. Ploss et al. propose a middleware called Real-Time 
Framework (RTF) allowing multi-server solutions to be implemented several different ways. In [111] 
they describe an implementation of Quake 3 using state replication between servers in a server farm to 
improve scalability. 
Partitioning work in multi-server solutions is one of the key problems to solve to enable server 
farms. Most solutions use properties of the DVE geometric space to divide up state ownership: a 
single server – possibly with a backup server – is responsible for authoritative ownership of state in a 
given region. Each client’s state is authoritatively managed by the region they are in. Clients receive 
events either directly or indirectly from their own region, and the regions near them. Each server 
handles processing and message distribution in one or more regions.  
There are a number of different implementations of this approach in literature. Nguyen et al. [46] 
describe a load migration technique based upon a uniform grid subdivision of the DVE environment, 
and dynamic transfer of responsibility for individual grids based upon server loads.  Lee and Lee’s 
multi-server environment [83] proposes dividing the DVE geometric space into a uniform grid, with 
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each server owning many cells of the grid. When a server’s load gets above a certain threshold, it 
negotiates with an eligible server among a set of candidate neighbors to balance load with, transferring 
ownership of some cells.  
Lui and Chan [89] provide an analytical view of load partitioning, proving exhaustive evaluation 
is NP-complete. They describe a parallel partitioning algorithm comprised of three sub-algorithms 
which can be used to partition large virtual worlds. The initial partition of the world is expensive, but 
subsequent partition updates are two to three orders of magnitude less costly.  
Morillo et al. [102] propose a CPU-based quality metric as optimization criteria for partitioning 
server loads. They indicate that experience quality for clients degrades nonlinearly as servers approach 
saturation, and that the metrics used by most partitioning algorithms do not reflect this fact. The 
authors implemented a DVE ostensibly based upon DIS and HLA standards, and evaluated its 
behavior with synthetic loads, comparing its performance to the Adaptive Region Partitioning 
Technique. They found their system does a better job of minimizing per-server workloads than other 
comparable systems. 
2.2.2.2 Trusted third party 
Trusted third party solutions are those which rely upon significant DVE workload assistance 
outside of the primary server set and the client pool. These solutions afford the external agents – often 
proxies – a trusted status in the DVE. However, the role of these trusted third parties still falls short of 
that enjoyed by the main DVE servers. 
Aggarwal et al. [3] propose a system with additional proxy servers between DVE clients and 
servers. The proxies help with fan-out of messages, and connect to servers on behalf of the clients. 
This results in the proxies potentially having shadow copies of state from all active DVE servers. 
However, it keeps clients from having to connect to different servers as the clients move around, and 
as workload is repartitioned.  
Bauer, Rooney, and Scotton propose development of Booster Boxes [11] to provide improvements 
in quality of service for DVE participants analogous to those provided by web cache solutions such as 
Akamai [4]. They suggest these Booster Boxes can have a pluggable architecture, allowing a variety of 
game providers to support their game protocols.  
Quax et al. propose Alvic-NG [114].  The system defines several independent roles for the main 
servers used in the DVE. In addition, it implements a proxy server layer, which funnels all client 
connections to the main DVE servers. The proxies are allowed to cache and replicate state, and in 
some cases, to resolve DVE state change transactions. They are responsible for maintaining 
appropriate region manager connections on behalf of clients as those clients move around the DVE, 
and the DVE simulation space is repartitioned. 
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2.2.2.3 Client-oriented 
Most recent DVE scalability papers propose solutions based around hierarchical architectures, or 
symmetric peer-to-peer architectures with clever ways of choosing sets of peers to work together, and 
information scoping to reduce the events and sheer traffic which must be processed by each peer.  
HLA [40] and DIS [69] [70] are older U.S. government-sponsored DVE standards efforts which 
detail event generation, subscription models and event contents in excruciating detail.  
SimMud [79] provides one of the most convincing peer-to-peer DVEs, based upon Pastry [117] 
and Scribe [30], and is one of the few scalability solutions to address some aspects of security 
implications in their design. 
ATLAS [84] is a hybrid (client-server + peer-to-peer) system which uses central servers for 
authoritative state change commitment, and a pub-sub broadcast model where participants are 
responsible for propagating their current state to all subscribers.  
Peer-to-Peer DVEs which rely upon virtual “servers” to be chosen out of the pool of peers are well 
represented. Anthes et al. [7] propose specializing some peers as “domain servers” to help manage 
overall topology and fan-out event notifications. Mediator [50] separates peers into a variety of 
specialized roles, formalizing responsibilities of each role for message propagation, computation, and 
state storage. Zone models [72] describes a variety of roles (and participants assigned to those roles) 
for every DVE region (zone).  
Several papers focus on creation of mesh overlay networks for assigning DVE simulation state 
ownership and in some cases propagating events. VAST [66] divides simulation responsibility by 
dynamic regions calculated based on Cartesian position of each participant, and structuring the 
participants in an overlay mesh network matching a Voronoi diagram. Varvello and Diot’s Delaunay 
triangulation approach [128] is similar in spirit, but uses Delaunay triangulation rather than Voronoi 
graphs to create the mesh and assign state ownership. AtoZ [137] divides maintenance responsibilities 
based upon participant location, but uses time to reach each position from a participant's current 
position, rather than pure Cartesian distance to partition ownership. Solipsis [76] formalizes 
requirements and guarantees of an overlay mesh in rigorous mathematical terms. [90] describes 
mechanisms for mesh creation and event propagation. Colyseus [18] uses regions of interest and a 
pub-sub model to limit scope of state update propagation. 
One property shared by most of the peer-to-peer DVEs - with the possible exception of SimMud - 
is a profound vulnerability to attack. Many rely upon neighbors to propagate messages without any 
way of verifying message propagation. DVE state variable is stored and updated by a small set of 
nodes - often a single node - at best relying on “random” choice of that node to provide security. 
Validation of simulation state correctness and state changes is not addressed, implying attackers can 
make any sort of assertion about themselves they please.  
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Several DVE security mechanisms have been separately proposed, some of which can address 
some of these problems. The next section details relevant literature. 
2.3 DVE security 
DVE architectures range from client-server to pure peer-to-peer. Client-server DVEs offer the 
strongest security, as all important state transitions can be verified and safely stored on the server.  
In the most secure client-server DVE all state is authoritatively stored on a single central server. 
The server accepts client input directly, processing that input based upon the server's local state and 
time. The server has total control over how the DVE state is updated, and can take into account any 
factors deemed relevant. Clients are given only the data required to render their current view.  
Even in this relatively secure scenario, there are a large number of vulnerabilities, such as 
timestamp cheats, packet modification, botting, and so on. In most DVEs these weaknesses are vectors 
which enable cheating. Several cheat taxonomies have been proposed to help classify these 
vulnerabilities.  
Yan and Randell propose a cheat taxonomy in [134], culminating in a grid relating the categories 
of cheats to type of vulnerability exploited, damage category for the attack, and the required parties to 
initiate the attack successfully.   
Ki et al. [77] propose another taxonomy, covering similar attacks to those suggested by Yan and 
Randell. However, their taxonomy is organized into layers: client, server, network, and environment 
hacks. In addition, they describe tools and mitigations available today for many of the attack 
categories.  
A pure client-server solution may set the standard in terms of expected security, but we hope to 
improve on overall performance by adopting other architectures allowing load to be more broadly 
distributed. Some distribution of work is required even for server-based solutions: A solution where a 
single server renders and transmits 60 four megapixel frames per second per client will not be scalable. 
A more efficient approach is to allow each client to offload portions of the work from the server. A 
typical solution has client software which accepts user input, performs preliminary validation and 
coalescing, then propagates summaries of state changes to the server. The client renders state locally 
based on its snapshot of global state and its position. The server still verifies the most important state 
updates, and acts as a conduit to pass state changes between relevant participants. This model works 
best for kilobits of data per client per second, rather than gigabits. This model is – to the best of the 
author’s knowledge – that implemented by virtually all commercial DVEs.  
Unfortunately, the moment portions of validation and rendering are delegated to clients, cheating 
becomes significantly easier. A variety of different cheating techniques have been implemented to 
attack games [9], including: 
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 Aimbots, where a local modification to the DVE client automatically calculates optimal firing 
solutions and executes them on behalf of the user. 
 Wall hacks, where walls are made transparent to allow the local client to see other players 
who are intended to be hidden from that client.  
 Map hacks, where the local client obtains information about the map they are not entitled to. 
 Speed and movement hacks, where through a variety of mechanisms, a client enables their 
avatar to move more quickly and in ways not intended by the game publisher.  
Some security systems have been proposed which help to mitigate cheating and general 
unintended behavior in network games. 
ORTS [28] is a security approach for client-server RTS games. It requires all important state be 
stored and updated on the server. It calculates the minimum necessary distribution of state information, 
passing clients only that information required to render their view.  
Fung [56] proposes detecting movement cheats such as speed-hacks by having a trusted third party 
(TTP) - the DVE server - validate legality of each move reported by participants, rather than simply 
accepting those moves without examination. 
Another way to detect cheats is by profiling participant behavior, and noting deviations from 
expected or typical behavior. Central validation of the input stream for DVEs [120]  allows detection 
of player skill augmentation cheats, such as aimbots. RET [36]  is a scheme for profiling a participants’ 
activities, then observing an activity stream and asserting whether or not it is produced by the same 
participant. Chen et al. [38] analyzed Quake 2 traces to show that automated players (bots) can be 
differentiated from human players 98% of the time with a 12 minute trace. This methodology can be 
used to help combat the use of bots in MMOGs, for example those illegally used to gather resources in 
DVEs such as World of Warcraft.  
Laurens et al. [82] profiles aggregate player behavior to categorize a player as cheating vs. non 
cheating. They show an example where wall-hack cheats are detected by examining the fraction of 
time a client aims at an occluded opponent. Players with wall-hacks can see opponents who should be 
occluded by walls, and aim at those opponents more often than non-hacked clients. In a similar vein, 
DeLap et al. [41] propose a scheme for performing runtime validation of transactions in games, 
triggering validation whenever a player’s performance falls outside of typical or expected bands. For 
example, an avatar which earned a disproportionate amount of gold per unit time would have their 
transaction histories audited using this scheme.  
Aggarwal et al. [3] took a step away from server DVE security by empowering proxies to take on 
some of the security load. Their authoritative proxies can cache state and validate some client state 
changes on behalf of the central server.  
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Some DVE security solutions are intended to work with peer communities. They mimic some of 
the properties of client-server DVEs by electing participants into privileged roles, and trusting those 
participants to behave correctly.  
The Public Server approach [33] allows MMO participants to set up their own game servers. 
Centrally issued certificates protect critical state - such as distribution of valuable virtual property - to 
prevent replication cheats. Additional calculations are performed to provide evidence that player 
owned servers are obeying the DVE rules, rather than distributing disproportionate amounts of virtual 
resources. While promising, this architecture has scalability issues in terms of the PKI used as 
evidence and proof of ownership. 
Kabus et al. [75] present a variety of mechanisms for detecting cheating, such as electing auditors 
to verify event streams provided by participants, and using trusted computing bases to protect data 
streams and executable code.  
Some solutions can work in peer-to-peer environments as well as hybrid and client-server 
environments.  
Chambers et al. propose a round-based bit commitment protocol [34]. Warcraft III [19] 
adversaries periodically send hashes of their moves to each other, then exchange full move logs after 
game completion. When the full logs are received, each player can validate that the sequence of moves 
provided corresponds to the hashes received during play, and that the movement sequences are valid.  
Ferretti and Roccetti [52] describe a way for participants to detect a specific class of time-based 
cheating - running the game and wall clocks at different speeds - by including game and wall-clock 
timestamps in update messages, allowing recipients to verify rate of time change.  
FreeMMG [32] uses consensus to detect cheating, with a quorum of participants evaluating each 
state change request, requiring unanimous agreement to commit the change.  
A significant body of peer-to-peer DVE security research is focused on ensuring fair ordering and 
disclosure of events between participants. Asynchronous Synchronization [12] [13] is a lockstep 
protocol which prevents “look-ahead” cheats by requiring all participants to commit to their next 
action before seeing adversaries’ choices. The authors give an example of using this protocol to 
prevent intentional exploitation by time manipulation, for example suppressing updates. This helps 
prevent intentional induction of the “dead man shooting” behavior described by Mauve in [91].  
Ghost [123] improves Asynchronous Synchronization (AS), allowing it to function with less strict 
synchronization requirements. NEO [57] is similar to AS, but rather than committing state changes by 
sending hashes in one round and the state change the next, state changes are transmitted encrypted, 
followed later by the key to decrypt them. SEA [59] asserts that lack of full protocol specification in 
NEO resulted in several security holes, and proposes fixes for those holes.  
Mobile Guards [101] provide replaceable digital rights management (DRM) and obfuscation-style 
protection modules which the DVE author frequently updates to prevent cracking. While practical and 
in general effective, this commits the DVE owner to an arms race they are unlikely to win [113]. In 
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effect, this approach is a trusted computing base (TCB) approach, relying upon portions of the system 
which cannot be undetectably compromised.  
Feng, Kaiser, and Schluessler [51] propose using an embedded coprocessor in gaming systems to 
validate the system has not been compromised, and suggest several attributes of game systems which 
can be protected, for example detecting emulated input, injecting foreign code, and so on. 
The most practical game DVE cheat-prevention mechanisms are targeted at detecting memory and 
executable modification of specific DVEs [104], such as Valves’ VAC technology and Cheating Death. 
Security mechanisms continue to be proposed – indeed, as I do later in this dissertation – 
indicating that the battle to protect DVEs and online games from cheating and exploitation is far from 
over. 
The next four chapters present my work related to DVE scalability and security. Chapter 3 
presents an analysis of avatar movement in part of the World of Warcraft DVE, motivated by the need 
for realistic evaluation workloads. Chapter 1 builds upon this work, and asserts that one of the three 
architectures for network DVEs – peer-to-peer – simply is not deployable in today’s Internet. Chapter 
5 describes Carbon, an auditing system which can detect cheating in MMOG scenarios with 
significantly lower resource consumption than more general auditing solutions for decentralized DVEs. 
Chapter 6 presents the Pairwise Random Protocol, a simple extension to secure coin flipping which 
can enable adversaries to fairly determine the outcome of probabilistic events.  
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3 Towards a realistic DVE workload 
This chapter is based upon the article Group Movement in World of Warcraft Battlegrounds published 
in the International Journal of Advanced Media and Communications. It provides an examination of 
the behavior of player avatars in a commercially deployed DVE. This research shows that assumptions 
about avatar movement and behavior in earlier research are not consistent with certain categories of 
avatar behavior and message flows in a system such as World of Warcraft. This indicates a need for 
DVE scalability research to be evaluated with realistic movement traces.  
3.1 Introduction 
Distributed virtual environments come in all shapes and sizes, from simple turn-based games to the 
more prevalent real-time three dimensional simulations. Performance and scalability evaluations of 
these systems are based upon assumptions about game and player avatar behavior. Often times these 
assumptions are based upon anecdotal experience or the traffic patterns of a game purpose-built to 
evaluate the proposed platform.  
Choices made for evaluating systems can vary by orders of magnitude. For example, does an 
avatar move once per second, or continuously with updates as frequent as the render frame rate, up to 
120 Hz on modern systems? Do avatars move independently with loose synchronization requirements, 
or in groups? Do they navigate using fixed features, or is their movement too complex and varied to 
characterize in this fashion?  
Answering these questions in a convincing fashion is critical to building a case supporting a given 
architecture’s merits. Building a DVE and showing that it can be used in an imagined fashion is very 
different from building a DVE which will be used.  I believe that existing broadly deployed DVEs are 
the best source of models for evaluating DVE research results intended for DVE adoption. 
World of Warcraft (WoW) is by far the world’s most popular DVE, and fertile ground for 
gathering data about actual player avatar behaviors. I instrumented part of one category of the WoW 
experience – player-vs-player (PvP) battlegrounds – to focus my findings. Battlegrounds were chosen 
because of a combination of tractability, and applicability to DVE performance modeling.  
Three common assumptions people make about DVE performance are compared to observed 
behaviors, all related to the way avatars move: 
1. Is a waypoint model a good fit to describe avatar movement? Probably not. This research 
shows that waypoints cannot be easily applied to describe player avatar movement in 
battlegrounds. I demonstrate this by implementing and applying an appropriate existing 
waypoint detection model described by [127].   
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2. Do avatar movement patterns result in significant hotspots? Yes. There is evidence of 
hotspots, with 5% of visited territory accounting for 30% of all time spent in a typical 
battleground. 
3. Do player avatars organize into coherent groups for inter-hotspot journeys? Not usually. 
Surprisingly, player avatars usually make significant journeys within the battlegrounds alone 
rather than in groups, despite clear game incentives to travel in groups. 
The remainder of this chapter provides supporting evidence for these findings. World of Warcraft 
is described for those not familiar with the game, with particulars about the evaluated battleground, 
Arathi Basin. Next, data gathering methods are described for obtaining data on player avatar 
movement within battlegrounds, and accuracy and completeness of that data is discussed. Finally, data 
relevant to waypoint, hotspot, and group movement models for DVE player avatar movement is 
provided. 
3.2 Relevant background 
3.2.1 World of Warcraft 
World of Warcraft (WoW) is the most popular DVE in history. With more than 12 million subscribers 
worldwide as of 2010 [22], World of Warcraft has the majority of market share for all massively 
multiplayer online games (62% as of 2008 [132]). This ubiquity makes WoW especially relevant as a 
DVE user study test bed. Examination of other popular DVEs in this category – such as Aion and Age 
of Conan – shows they support PvP battleground scenarios, making results gleaned from World of 
Warcraft likely to apply to other titles as well. 
3.2.1.1 Types of experiences 
WoW experiences can be divided into five main categories. Those categories, along with a sample 
distribution of time spent in each are: questing (37%), capital cities / trading (16%), instances (25%), 
raids (9%), and battlegrounds / PvP (13%) [124]. This chapter examines data from the last category, 
battlegrounds. Battlegrounds – while not the most popular activity – still have significant avatar 
participation, and so must be supported. 
The game world requires significant resources to simulate and to communicate with DVE clients. 
The game scales by running many simultaneous world copies called shards, with each avatar 
belonging to exactly one shard. A typical shard has between a few hundred and a few thousand active 
players online at any given time [110], out of a population of tens of thousands assigned to that shard.     
Questing describes activities where player avatars wander the game world individually or in small 
groups. The game world is large and detailed – requiring more than an hour of real time for an avatar 
to walk across one of its four continents - and player avatars are relatively sparse. Indeed, player 
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avatars undertaking this activity are usually out of interaction range of one another unless they 
explicitly seek each other out.  
The game world contains ten large cities called capital cities. These offer a plethora of facilities, 
and are densely populated relative to the rest of the world. For example, I found Dalaran, the version 
end-game capital in World of Warcraft when this data was analyzed, could have a quarter of the active 
population on a given shard concentrated in less than 0.1% of the world’s geography. While densely 
populated, capital city interactions tend to be infrequent and lightweight, with most avatars sitting still 
and performing social or character maintenance activities. Some previous research [124] [125] calls 
this category of activity trading. 
Instances and raids are small, self-contained adventures which groups of players play together. 
Just as a shard is one of many copies of the game world, an instance is one of many copies of that 
adventure. These adventures are shared by either a self-selected or a randomly matched set of avatars – 
typically five, though up to 40 are allowed in certain raid instances. Together they solve puzzles and 
fight powerful AI-controlled avatars. An instance or raid can be thought of as a private Player vs. 
Environment (PvE) experience requiring a group of players to complete. Unlike other PvE experiences 
such as questing, players in instances and raids tend to stay together and move in a tight group from 
place to place. 
Battlegrounds are a special type of instance, with a PvP focus – and in fact are referenced as PvP 
in some prior research. Like PvE instances, there can be many identical battlegrounds active and 
reachable from a given world shard. A single battleground instance can be populated by player avatars 
from multiple shards, known collectively as a battle group.  Battlegrounds are characterized by 
scenarios which reward PvP, usually to achieve an objective or dominate a resource. Battlegrounds 
have intense continuous activity with between 20 and 240 mutually interacting participants (depending 
upon the battleground) split into two opposing sides called factions. For comparison, download traffic 
I measured in a capital city with more than 250 player avatars was 40 Kbps for a given client, while 
download traffic in the Wintergrasp battleground with 200 player avatars often reaches 250 Kbps 
sustained for a given client, and can have peak download speeds well over 500 Kbps. 
Battlegrounds, with their high traffic requirements, interaction, and movement characteristics 
make an ideal test environment for DVE research related to player avatar movement. I chose the 
Arathi Basin battleground to measure these behaviors. While it is not the largest battleground, it is big 
enough to be interesting, and small enough to be tractable for measurement and analysis.  
3.2.2 The Arathi Basin battleground 
Battlegrounds are organized around inter-faction – Alliance and Horde – competition. World of 
Warcraft version 3 has six different battlegrounds. Arathi Basin is a 30-person battleground where 
teams compete for control of five stationary flags. Gaining control of a flag requires a team member to 
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use the flag without interruption for ten seconds, and to prevent any enemy team members from using 
the flag for an additional minute. Each team receives points every few seconds based on the number of 
flags they control. The first team to reach 1600 points wins the battle. Both teams are rewarded, 
though winners receive better rewards, incenting each team to participate and to win.   
The battleground environment is approximately 600 yards by 600 yards in size, with flags evenly 
spaced around the center of the map as shown by the circled huts in Figure 1. The circled houses next 
to the crests at the corners of the battleground are the starting point for each faction, alliance at the 
northwest, and horde at the southeast.  In terms of movement, some terrain slows down avatars, or is 
impassable. For example, water slows most avatars down to approximately four yard per second, a 
quarter of normal mounted movement speed. Most cliffs and steep hills cannot be traversed, and 
falling off them can injure or kill an avatar. The view from the lumber mill plateau is shown in Figure 
2. 
 
 
Figure 1: Arathi Basin map 
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Figure 2: Arathi Basin from the lumber mill plateau 
 
Traversing the map requires about one minute mounted, or two minutes on foot, assuming no 
enemy engagements. Avatars typically must be within either melee range (5 yards) or ranged combat 
range (usually 30 yards) to interact. I call the latter distance an interaction interval. The nearest flags 
are between 170 and 250 yards from each other in a straight line, several interaction intervals apart. In 
other words, players halfway between two flags can interact with each other, but not with players at 
either flag.  
Players are rewarded for controlling flags and for killing avatars from the enemy faction. When an 
avatar is killed, it is turned to a ghost and teleported to the graveyard near the closest controlled flag, 
or to the faction base if no flags are controlled. Every 30 seconds all ghosts at a graveyard are 
resurrected, and granted full health and mana.  
Arathi Basin battles are usually less than a half hour long, involving 15 players on each side at any 
given time, with some turnover in participants. Real life and network problems force some players to 
drop out, and they are usually replaced by others waiting to battle. As a result, a given player avatar 
may be in a battleground for as long as the entire match, or as little as a few seconds. 
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3.2.3 Avatar behavior and traffic classification 
Little research has been done on avatar movement patterns.  
[110] provides an examination of World of Warcraft shard populations using WoW’s built-in 
extensibility. Pittman and GauthierDickey found that the workloads used in simulations to evaluate 
DVE infrastructure were unrealistic. User sessions in WoW are on average less than half an hour, but 
can reach 24 hours. Peak populations on a shard are typically five times their minimum population.  
[99] describes a mechanism for detecting automated cheats called “bots” in World of Warcraft by 
using waypoints to characterize avatar movement. They found that many cheats use a scripted form of 
automation where the avatar follows the same path repeatedly. They provide a waypoint extraction 
algorithm and verify that it works to discriminate between player and automated avatars.  
Their waypoint extraction algorithm acts upon a series of avatar movement traces. They apply the 
Douglas-Peucker line simplification algorithm [45] to reduce the traces to simpler lines with fewer 
vertices. They search for clusters of vertices, and label these as waypoints, as they are endpoints for 
many paths. Mitterhofer et al. [99] found that scripted bot movement tended to replay the same 
movement paths, and even with jitter resulted in movement that closely followed detected waypoints.  
This approach is useful for simplifying player avatar movement as well as bot movements. Later I 
describe my efforts to apply the waypoint detection algorithm to characterize player avatar movement. 
[95] analyzes avatar movement in the Arathi Basin battleground. It makes several assertions about 
the existence of waypoints and hotspots, and suggests that group movement is not prevalent. This 
article builds upon the author’s earlier research, quantifying and qualifying issues with waypoint 
detection, and providing precise definitions and metrics for analyzing group movement. 
Some avatar movement models use a hotspot model to describe places avatars are likely to move 
towards and congregate. [127] describes an algorithm for automatically detecting landmarks, and a 
method for predicting movement between landmarks. The authors divide the virtual space into a 
regular grid. They count the number of visits each avatar makes to each cell in the grid, and compute 
the weighted entropy for the distribution of player visits. Cells are designated as landmarks based on 
their entropy, prioritized from highest to lowest entropy. Once a cell has been chosen as a landmark, 
its eight neighbor cells in the grid are omitted from landmark consideration, even if one or more of 
them have the next highest entropy value. 
Evaluation of proposed DVE systems often uses a synthetic workload based on previous research, 
or on a model generated by the evaluators. For example, [80] compares three different categories of 
DVE infrastructure using a synthetic workload based upon an average session time of 100 minutes. 
Avatars in his evaluation are simulated using a combination group and waypoint model, where groups 
of simulated avatars agree on a next point to visit, and move there together. Several other frameworks 
[89] [90] [102] [118]  assume movement and arrival / departure properties of participants without any 
obvious experimental basis. The assumptions appear reasonable in the abstract, but are without firm 
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experimental grounding.  I believe using a model based on actual DVE participant behavior provides 
better insight into actual system performance under load, and is a better basis for comparison between 
proposed solutions. 
Player avatar migration patterns are of critical importance for evaluating geometric routing 
schemes. For example, VAST [66] [10] and Delaunay triangulation [128] organize themselves based 
upon the position of player avatars, and their overhead and efficacy depend heavily upon the density, 
distribution, and dynamics of those avatars. Likewise, region-based DVE architectures [50] [74] [133] 
organize clients by their avatar location, and are affected by the frequency of avatar transitions 
between regions, and any tendency of avatars to cluster in hotspots. 
Understanding the movement of avatars is important for correctly evaluating region-based and 
geometric-mesh based DVE schemes. The remainder of this chapter provides information about avatar 
behavior in a real-world DVE which can be used to inform future DVE framework evaluations. 
3.3 Methodology 
My goal is to capture all movement events for a set of battleground sessions to ground the evaluation 
of waypoint and hotspot presence, and of group movement. This requires an exhaustive trace of all 
movement during the battleground session. Unfortunately, WoW clients only receive avatar movement 
data which is immediately relevant to them. In practical terms, this means movement data for avatars 
which are within avatar visual range – approximately 250 yards – and which are not blocked by large 
obstructions such as cliffs.  
Each WoW client transmits its own avatar movement updates to the server, which the server 
redistributes to other clients. Updates are absolute positions, consisting of a client identifier, three-
dimensional Cartesian position, facing information, and additional information I do not decode. The 
server does not send position information for avatars the client cannot perceive, such as very distant or 
stealthed (invisible) avatars.  
Experimentation confirmed two well-placed observers receive movement updates for most of the 
Arathi Basin map. Moving observer avatars into these positions takes between 1 and 2 minutes from 
the start of a battle, depending upon enemy activity. Battles in my sample set ranged from 4 to 23 
minutes in duration.  
I used Microsoft Network Monitor 3.3 to capture network traffic, and FRAPS [15] to capture 
video from a game client’s rendered view. FRAPS videos enabled the game client view to be replayed 
to answer questions about activity in the game associated with specific times in the network traces.  
The movement data I captured is correct, but incomplete. The two leading causes of missing data 
are an observer being out of position, and stealthed non-observer avatars. Observers started out of 
position, missing some data from the start of the game. Once in position, observers were sometimes 
attacked and killed, moving them out of position for a minute or more. Avatar death results in the slain 
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avatar’s ghost being teleported to the nearest faction-owned graveyard. Resurrection introduces on 
average a 15 second delay, and returning to post takes another half minute to two minutes. I used 
observers with stealth capabilities to reduce the chance of detection, and presumably of being targeted 
by the enemy. My observers’ positions in the map are marked with white X’s in Figure 3. One was at 
the north edge of the lumber mill plateau to the West, the other on top of a waterfall at the south end of 
the mine valley to the East.  
 
 
Figure 3 - Placement of observers in Arathi Basin 
 
My observers avoided combat, effectively filling two of the 15 slots in the Alliance team with 
non-contributors. This biased the results of the battles, but not significantly. My sample set has a good 
mix of battle results, with Alliance winning nearly half the observed games, in one case by a score of 
1600-0. I was able to capture battles with scores ranging from 1600-1590 (the closest a battle can be) 
to 1600-0, the most disparate possible final score, with a good mix of Alliance and Horde victories (6 
and 7 respectively). 
Battles are referred to here by the difference in score between the winning and losing team, rather 
than the overall game score. Thus, the battle which ended with a score of 1600-1590 is battle 10, and 
the battle which ended with a score of 1600-880 is battle 720.   
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Figure 4: Battle 980 movement paths 
 
3.4 Analysis 
I captured approximately 20 traces of Arathi Basin battles, and retained 13 where my observers 
were mostly at their assigned posts. I am a long-time WoW player with more than 5,000 hours of play 
time, and a dozen characters in four realms, and have spent hundreds of hours in battlegrounds. I 
found the recorded battles consistent with my overall battleground experience. Player turnover, 
participation, and the flow of avatars and objectives within the battles were within the range of 
“normal” experiences I have witnessed in the many other battles I participated in. 
13 battles provides a wealth of data for analysis. These traces comprise more than sixty hours of 
individual avatar movements, with 392 unique avatars in 456 avatar sessions. More details are 
presented in section 3.4.1. 
The data captured can be summarized in a variety of useful forms. For example, the rendered 
movement traces for battle 980 is shown in Figure 4. I analyzed captured data to verify its correctness, 
and to provide information for others to evaluate suitability of avatar movement models used for 
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evaluating DVEs. The three main phenomena I wanted to investigate were: appropriateness of 
waypoint models for guiding movement, existence of hotspots for hotspot-based movement models, 
and grouping of avatars for movement. Definitions related to each of these goals are provided below. 
1. Waypoints. Waypoints – if they exist – are fixed virtual navigation markers used through all 
battleground instances. I expected flags and graveyards to be strong candidates for waypoints 
for movement models, along with geographical choke-points. 
2. Hotspots. Hotspots are situational gathering points in a map, where a disproportionate number 
of avatars spend time during a given battle. The map has natural hotspots in the form of avatar 
starting locations and flags. I was curious if other hotspots would show up, and if so, if these 
hotspots were consistent across battles.  
3. Grouping. Logic dictates there should be significant grouping in movement. All avatars for 
each team begin at the same point (their faction base) and are released simultaneously. For 
avatars who die – typically every avatar several times per battle – resurrection is synchronized, 
with all waiting ghosts at each graveyard resurrected every 30 seconds.  Battle dynamics 
incent avatars to group to maintain numeric superiority. 
Before describing my findings, it is worth presenting the characteristics of both avatar 
participation, and the completeness of the captured data.  
3.4.1 Avatar participation characteristics 
I had a series of qualitative questions. First, I wanted to provide an estimate of turnover in the 
battleground population. In other words, were there joiners and leavers? If so, how long was a typical 
session? Also, quantifying missing data is important for framing completeness of the results.  
Table 1 summarizes this information for each of the 13 battles analyzed, excluding the two 
observers. “Lost by” shows the score difference between the winning and losing teams. “Avatars” 
shows the number of unique avatars recorded during the battle. The battleground allows in a maximum 
of 30 simultaneously present avatars, 28 factoring out the observers, but departures can be replaced. 
“Duration” gives the total time of each battle in seconds, from when avatars are released from their 
base to when one team wins and the battle concludes.  “Average play” gives the percentage of the total 
battleground duration an average participant played. Since many enemy avatars were not observed 
until the observers were in position – up to two minutes after the match started - this number is biased 
downwards. “Average recorded” shows the percentage of avatar participation time successfully 
recorded for that battle. Average recorded was calculated by summing the total seconds played by all 
avatars, and subtracting out gaps in the traces for each avatar. 
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Lost By 
(points) Avatars 
Dur 
(s) 
Avg 
Play 
Avg 
Rec. 
10 36 1423 72% 81% 
300 38 1296 67% 75% 
420 46 1208 52% 62% 
720 36 1015 69% 75% 
870 36 957 63% 62% 
950 33 671 71% 69% 
960 37 951 69% 76% 
980 36 891 70% 78% 
1050 33 885 79% 78% 
1180 37 658 61% 60% 
1370 36 765 66% 65% 
1490 32 583 78% 83% 
1600 20 266 76% 82% 
AVERAGE 35 890 69% 73% 
 
Table 1: Avatar participation summary 
 
The data set includes a good sampling of battle scores, ranging from the largest to smallest 
possible difference, with an average difference of 910. The average battle had 35 unique participants, 
each present for an average of 69% of the battle. Participant turnover was on average 25% during the 
course of a battle. 392 unique avatars were recorded. Movement and position information for avatars 
was successfully recorded 73% of their participation time. As mentioned earlier, gaps were caused 
primarily by avatars becoming invisible and therefore undetectable, and by observers being killed and 
temporarily out of range of some avatars. 
I do not believe the gaps in avatar data are significant in terms of overall analysis. The goal of this 
work is to evaluate avatar movement behaviors. Most avatar movement – as supported by the statistics 
– is observed, even ignoring instrumentation issues such as observers out of position. There is good 
fidelity information on the start of one faction in each battle – the side the observers belonged too, as 
well as data for the middle and termination of battles from both factions.  
The remainder of this section describes relevance of waypoint, hotspot, and grouping models to 
DVE player avatar movement. 
3.4.2 Waypoints 
Waypoints are fixed points in the environment used for navigation, specifically resulting in identical 
paths for avatars navigating using the same set of waypoints. Drawn graphically, the path for an avatar 
following waypoints would resemble a series of overlapped line segments passing near or through the 
waypoints visited in the sequence they are visited. Each waypoint would reflect where the path 
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describing an avatar’s movement changes direction. Waypoint navigation is typically accomplished 
with straight movement paths, but nothing prevents waypoint navigation from being described with 
other constructs such as Bezier curves. Whatever the construct, waypoint navigation would provide 
identical path navigation for a variety of different avatar journeys following the same set of waypoints. 
This uniformity of paths traversed is the artifact we search for in our analysis. 
Intuitively, strong waypoint candidates for the Arathi Basin battleground are graveyards, flags, 
and points on the optimal (non-water, non-cliff) routes between graveyards and flags. While such 
waypoints could be manually identified, there is no guarantee that designation would be correct. 
Instead, a more general analytical approach was used, as outlined by Mitterhofer et al. in [99].  
Using this algorithm, waypoints are extracted from movement traces by a combination of two 
strategies:  -means++ cluster analysis and path simplification.  
Avatar movement traces consist of a series of points which can be joined together to form a 
sequence of lines. If avatars are using waypoints for navigation, there should be clusters of line 
endpoints at the waypoints where some avatars change direction: even if navigation paths are 
described with curves, then ignoring operator error, the path followed between two waypoints would 
be identical, and would have identical decomposition into straight line segments. If no avatars change 
direction at a given waypoint, it is not actually a waypoint.  
Assuming waypoints are used for navigation, their presence can be obscured by human error in 
controlling movement. Small diversions as avatar controllers delay turning or move in a non-optimal 
path can confound automatic detection of waypoints. 
To mitigate this variation - and as suggested by Mitterhofer et al. in [99] – traces were simplified 
using the Douglas-Peucker line simplification algorithm [45], with a tolerance of up to one interaction 
interval error in line segmentation. This recursive algorithm reduces line complexity by approximating 
complex polylines with simpler, albeit less accurate lines with fewer points. The algorithm was 
invented nearly forty years ago, and is still considered one of the best general line simplification 
algorithms.  
Lines are simplified as follows: Given an input path      of points           and an error 
tolerance   expressed in the same scalar system as the points: 
1. Find the point    in           which lies furthest from the line        , and call its distance 
from the line       .  
2. If             the line is simplified to two points,         and processing is complete. 
Otherwise: 
3. The line is simplified to the union of the results of applying the Douglas-Peucker algorithm to 
    , and      . This line will consist of at LEAST the points           . 
Line simplification significantly reduces the number of points required to represent an avatar’s 
movement, making it easier to find clusters of points. Indeed, I successfully used this technique with 
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an error tolerance of 30 yards (one interaction interval) to simplify the movement trace shown in 
Figure 5 to that in Figure 6. I then applied  -means++ cluster analysis to try to cluster the majority of 
remaining points into waypoints. 
The  -means++ algorithm chooses clusters as follows: 
First, choose a set of   seed cluster centers. A random point is selected from the data set, and then 
for (k – 1) iterations: 
1. For each data point not in the cluster center set, calculate a probability of being selected equal 
to the square of the distance from the candidate to the closest cluster center set member. 
2. Choose a random point to add to the cluster center set from the candidates, weighted by the 
probability of selection. 
Next, execute normal  -means cluster analysis using this set of k seed cluster centers as the 
starting point. 
Even with dramatic simplification,  -means++ cluster analysis was unable to identify a consistent 
set of waypoints to describe avatar movement. Successive runs on the same data set identified 
potential waypoints, but many of these diverged widely between different runs, depending upon the 
initial waypoints selected by the algorithm. Reviewing the point cloud for both simplified and original 
movement traces battleground revealed the cause. While there are clear asymmetries in point density 
for describing movement traces, no reasonable number of clusters can encapsulate the majority of 
simplified points, even when dramatic simplification tolerances are used (e.g. allowing errors greater 
than an interaction interval).  
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Figure 5: Point cloud for battle 1590 
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Figure 6: Simplified point cloud (+/- 30 yard tolerance) 
 
I conclude that waypoints are not appropriate for characterizing general player avatar movement in 
World of Warcraft battlegrounds. This conclusion supports Mitterhofer et al.’s implication [99] that 
waypoints are not a good fit for characterizing typical player-controlled avatar movement. 
3.4.3 Hotspots 
This section describes efforts to characterize avatar movement patterns using hotspots. Hotspots are 
portions of the battleground where avatars spend the most time. Mathematically, hotspots are 
determined by dividing the map into equal sized cells, summing the number of seconds spent by each 
avatar in each cell, and designating the   cells with the highest totals as the   hotspots. Cells in the 8-
neighbors of an existing hotspot are precluded from being designated as hotspots, to prevent runs of 
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adjacent hotspots. I implemented the technique for hotspot detection proposed and applied by 
Thawonmas et al. in [127]. 
I expected hotspots at each of the five flags because they are game objectives with most activity 
occurring at them, and at the seven graveyards because participants die many times each battle and 
await resurrection in them. Most of the first 12 hotspots contained either a flag or graveyard. However, 
the order of “hotness” of these points of interest varied from battle to battle. In some battles particular 
graveyards and flags were never included in the top hotspots.  Non-graveyard, non-objective hotspots 
were encountered, reflecting battles where significant concentrations of avatar activity occurred away 
from flags and graveyards. Although such hotspots were seen in most battles, no common 
characteristic was found for them. While specific non-objective hotspots were present in more than 
one battle, none were present in the same location for a majority of battles.  
Potential hotspots are shown in dark grey or black in the player time-density maps in Figure 7, 
with the five most active hotspots labeled 1 through 5. The trace on the left shows battle 420 with 
hotspots at the mine, stables, lumber mill, and blacksmith flags. The fifth hotspot is on the path from 
the farm graveyard to the mine flag. The trace on the right shows battle 1600 with hotspots near each 
of the flags. 
.  
 
 
Figure 7: Activity density maps from two different battles 
 
As forecast, hotspots were usually located where there was heavy contention over a flag, or a 
battle which migrated from flags towards arriving combatants. Based on this, an adaptive hotspot-
based model taking into account current populations at hotspots should be useful for gaining insight 
into avatar movement within battlegrounds, possibly allowing a generative movement model. 
One weakness in this hotspot model is the tendency for cells which would otherwise have been 
hotspots to be excluded because of their abutment against a higher-ranked cell. This biased 
calculations, as it prevented hotspots from being correctly located.  
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To compensate for this, I extend the cell-based hotspot model using a centroid which need not be 
aligned on a hotspot boundary. Centroids are circles centered on a hotspot, but without the restriction 
to align at the granularity of cell boundaries. An example showing centroids overlaid on the original 
hotspot map is shown in Figure 8, alongside the density map used to calculate centroids at a resolution 
of 20 yards. 
 
 
Figure 8: 60-yard and 20-yard density maps with centroids 
 
To calculate centroids with a radius of one interaction interval (a diameter of 60 yards) perform 
normal hotspot calculation with cell width one third of that diameter, e.g. 20 yards. Note that using a 
finer grid for hotspot squares may result in different hotspots than result from a coarser grid, or even 
different ordering for similar hotspots. In the example shown above, results are comparable between 
the two resolutions of density maps. 
For each 9-square centered on a given hotspot, calculate the center of mass for avatar movement in 
that 9-square, weighted by avatar dwell time in each cell.  The resulting hotspot centroid does a better 
job of covering the actual hotspot (defined by unit area time-spent density) than a simple cell-based 
designation of the same radius, and better even than the finer grained density map it is calculated from.  
Table 2 shows a comparison of hotspot player dwell density (the metric used to identify hotspots) 
for battle 1600 using a 60-yard fixed grid, a 20-yard fixed grid, and a centroid with a 60-yard diameter. 
The 60-yard grid is used to calculate the dwell density based upon the grid as shown in the left side of 
Figure 8. The 20-yard grid column calculates dwell density using the 9-square centered on the hotspot 
closest to the original 60-yard grid hotspot, to cover the same area. The centroid column calculates 
density based upon the area covered by the large purple circle closest to each hotspot, based upon the 
20-yard resolution 9-square. The higher-resolution 20-yard grid provides on average 25% 
improvement in density over the 60-yard grid. The centroid approach, however, provides on average 
56% improvement over the 60-yard grid, significantly better than the 20-yard grid alone. I interpret 
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this higher density to mean the centroid-based hotspot is doing a better job of describing the actual 
hotspot location than arbitrarily aligned grids.  
HotSpot 
60-Yard 
Grid 
20-Yard 
Grid Centroid 
Farm (1) 0.200 0.311 0.379 
Stables (2) 0.172 0.197 0.250 
Lumber Mill (3) 0.134 0.135 0.167 
Mine (4) 0.132 0.132 0.159 
Blacksmith (5) 0.123 0.191 0.245 
 
Table 2: Avatar dwell time density, seconds per square yard 
 
The reason for this improvement is simple: the centroid is positioned over the actual center of 
mass, rather than defined by a square with arbitrary borders that happens to contain some areas of high 
traffic.  
These revised hotspot definitions and other points of interest enabled deeper analysis of avatar 
movement. The next section evaluates the tendency of avatars to move between points of interest – 
including these hotspots - in groups.  
3.4.4 Group movement 
I define group movement as the coordinated movement of multiple avatars between points of interest 
within an interaction interval of each other. Points of interest in my model include avatar spawn points 
– as many trips start at spawn points – and hotspots, typically flags and the sites of heavy battles. 
There is strong incentive for players to group within a battleground: a lone combatant has very 
little chance of defeating multiple enemies. A fight between parties from the two factions is almost 
always won by the larger force. Success in combat implies success at controlling flags, which in turn 
leads to battleground victory and greater in-game rewards.  
Regardless of the benefits of group movement, two factors provide a disincentive for forming and 
maintaining such groups. First, the difficulty of coordinating group formation and maintenance using 
default communication channels such as text chat. Second, the conflict between group and individual 
goals: without an accepted group leader, these often diverge.  
Even when a group is well coordinated (for example via a voice over IP solution such as Ventrilo 
[54]) and has an acknowledged leader, maintaining group coherence is difficult. If a group member is 
slain, they become a ghost, and must resurrect and travel back to the body of the group. Barring enemy 
interference, this can take up to two minutes, half the battle length in some cases. In the meantime, the 
group typically continues towards its next objective, with subsequent deaths splintering the group 
further.  
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Is group movement a reasonable model to apply to describe the majority of travel between points 
of interest? [95] proposes a general grouping metric called “affinity.” I extend this metric with a more 
precise definition.  
Leveraging the work on hotspot identification above, I define the concept of a journey. A journey 
is a trip between points of interest which are at least two interaction intervals (60 yards) apart. Taking 
a circuitous route between two nearby hotspots does not typically constitute a journey, but travelling 
between two hotspots whose closest edges are 60 yards apart – without passing through a third point 
of interest – does. Two avatars which move between the same two points of interest maintaining a 
distance of no more than one interaction interval for at least half of their trip are considered as having 
affinity for that journey. 
The seven graveyards / spawn points were selected as fixed points of interest, and another seven 
centroids (including hotspots which happen to overlap spawn points) were chosen by the algorithm 
described in the previous section as per-battleground instance points of interest. The centroids 
included at least four of the five flags in every battle, though with the centroid at slightly different 
locations. Most battles had at least one non-flag, non-graveyard centroid.  
As mentioned previously, this analysis is based upon trace data containing approximately 73% of 
overall avatar sessions in the analyzed time period. Movement segments are divided into four 
categories:  
1. Inter-centroid movement, journeys between different centroids. Some are degenerate cases 
(return to the same centroid) or too short to be eligible for these calculations, but still fall in 
this category. 
2. Centroid-anchored movement. These segments typically departed from a centroid, then 
terminated before reaching another centroid. An avatar which spawns at a graveyard and is 
killed before it can reach another centroid would be in this category.  
3. Intra-centroid movement, movement segments within a graveyard or centroid which do not 
leave that centroid. 
4. Extra-centroid movement. These segments are usually artifacts of missing data. The 
battleground start is a special case. If the starting bases are not picked as centroids by 
automatic hotspot detection, then the initial path of any avatars killed or departing the battle 
before reaching a centroid will be in this category.  
Table 3 provides a summary of the percentage of recorded time which falls into each of the four 
movement categories. Of the more than 60 avatar-hours of traces obtained, approximately 32% is 
inter-centroid journey data. This gross figure includes inter-centroid journeys which are too short to 
qualify for further analysis: the actual percentage of eligible inter-centroid journey traces is 40% of the 
inter-centroid journey traces, or 14% of overall captured traces. This resulted in 951 candidate 
journeys for analysis.  
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Lost By 
(points) 
Recorded 
(s) 
Inter 
Centroid 
Centroid 
Anchored 
Intra 
Centroid 
Extra 
Centroid 
10       30,786        9,922          4,499       15,764            601  
300       25,870        7,299          6,367       10,577          1,627  
420       19,470        6,169          3,751         9,024            526  
720       20,056        6,596          3,214         9,397            849  
870       14,314        4,432          3,166         5,935            781  
950       11,100        3,304          3,021         4,333            442  
960       19,531        5,343          3,582         8,641          1,965  
980       18,245        6,642          3,037         7,599            967  
1050       19,000        6,743          4,227         6,890          1,140  
1180       10,409        2,498          1,861         5,045          1,005  
1330       12,285        3,717          3,265         4,221          1,082  
1390       12,431        4,760          2,866         4,584            221  
1600         3,442        1,278            719         1,415              30  
AVERAGE       16,688        5,285          3,352         7,187            864  
      
Table 3: Avatar movement trace categories 
 
Affinity analysis run across all battleground traces are summarized in Table 4. The data in this 
table is for journeys completed between centroids, and affinity is evaluated in a binary fashion: either 
the entire journey is considered as having affinity between two or more avatars, or none of it is.  
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Lost By 
(points) 
Journey 
(s) 
Affinity 
(s) 
Journey 
(count) 
Affinity 
(count) 
% Affinity 
(s) 
% Affinity 
(count) 
10      5,769          735          174            41  12.7% 23.6% 
300      3,296          754            96            24  22.9% 25.0% 
420      2,940          405            95            19  13.8% 20.0% 
720      2,250          331            86            20  14.7% 23.3% 
870      1,205           52            34              4  4.3% 11.8% 
950      1,154           64            44              7  5.5% 15.9% 
960      2,279          519            76            24  22.8% 31.6% 
980      3,250          679          107            30  20.9% 28.0% 
1050      2,663          748            76            26  28.1% 34.2% 
1180         821          239            28            10  29.0% 35.7% 
1330      1,594          274            57            13  17.2% 22.8% 
1390      1,882          304            57            13  16.1% 22.8% 
1600         703           94            21              3  13.4% 14.3% 
AVERAGE      2,293          400            73            18  17.4% 24.6% 
 
Table 4: Avatar journey affinity 
 
The table shows that journeys with affinity make up only a small fraction of overall journeys, with 
the average seconds spent in journeys per battle being 2,293, and the average fraction of that time 
spent in journeys with other avatars being 17.4%. This percentage varies from 4.3% to 29.0% across 
the battles evaluated. I examined features of battles such as distribution and weight of hotspots, 
number of journeys evaluated, and battle length, but was unable to find any correlation between the 
affinity fraction and other characteristics of the battle. This may make an interesting direction for 
future research. 
Some journeys are terminated or truncated before reaching their intended goal, for example 
because of the avatar encountering a battle and being killed. Any pair of truncated journeys in which 
avatars are within an interaction interval of each other for at least 8 seconds (the time required to travel 
two interaction intervals) are considered as having affinity. This ensures two avatars passing each 
other in different directions are not considered as having affinity. However, two avatars which travel a 
short distance then stop within an interaction interval of each other will be considered as having 
affinity.  
Inclusion of truncated journeys in the evaluation of journey affinity more than doubled the number 
of seconds considered as spent in journeys, while only raising the percentage of journeys time spent in 
affinity from 17% to 22%. The disparity between these two metrics I attribute primarily to battles 
fought outside of the top hotspot centroids, where two or more avatars were fighting each other for at 
least 8 seconds, and therefore had affinity for the purpose of this analysis. I believe this result shows 
that the decision to use full journeys for affinity analysis rather than partial affinity is a reasonable 
simplification. 
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These results confirm and quantify earlier findings. Despite incentives, the majority of journeys in 
battlegrounds are made alone, rather than in a group. Only 17% of inter-centroid journeys by time are 
made in a group. The number looks slightly better when viewed in terms of journey counts rather than 
journey durations, but is still less than 25% affinity. Interestingly, the disparity between affinity 
journey seconds and journey count percentages – and the relatively higher truncated journey affinity 
rate - indicate that longer journeys are less likely to be made in groups than shorter ones. 
3.5 Conclusions 
Distributed virtual environment architectures have been evaluated using a variety of criteria and 
loads. These criteria look reasonable, but do not necessarily correspond to the sorts of behaviors seen 
in broadly deployed DVEs.  
I examined validity of three common assumptions using actual behaviors in World of Warcraft: 
waypoints to describe avatar navigation; the presence of hotspots within the movement traces; and 
finally, movement of avatars in groups.  
More than 60 hours of avatar movement traces were gathered from the Arathi Basin battleground 
in World of Warcraft, consisting of 456 avatar sessions with 392 unique avatars across 13 battles. 
I used line simplification and k++ means cluster analysis to show that these avatar traces cannot be 
characterized using waypoints. Waypoints would dictate high-density clusters of endpoints after line 
simplification, but no such artifacts were found.  
I examined avatar movement data and found evidence of hotspots in the data. These hotspots can 
be useful for adhoc avatar navigation models, but cannot be used as a basis for waypoint navigation, as 
they vary from battle to battle: they are an artifact of the battle, rather than of the battleground. I 
proposed a centroid-based method for describing avatar hotspots. The centroid method provides better 
player dwell density than grid-based hotspots of approximately the same area, even when those grids 
have a resolution three times higher than the diameter of the centroid-based hotspot. 
Finally, I examined avatar movement between points of interest and hotspots, and found that most 
avatars do not make journeys in groups, despite clear incentives to do so. More than three quarters of 
avatar journeys between points of interest in battlegrounds are made alone, even though avatars spawn 
in groups. 
Two of the discounted mechanisms, waypoints and group movement, are common in previous 
distributed virtual environment research evaluations. Their lack of applicability to measured data 
suggests that a new way of generating movement traces is needed. Gathering real-world traces and 
using them for testing is of course very valuable. However, gathering traces by hand is expensive, and 
may not generalize well.  
I suggest research be done on ways of synthesizing avatar movements more consistent with real 
data and observed behaviors. Rather than relying upon global algorithms such as group movement 
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between waypoints, generation may benefit from building and simulating simple avatar agent state 
machines. For example, a given avatar could be attracted to some criteria and repelled from others. 
The presence of other avatars – both friendly and hostile – should be considered, as should natural 
terrain, and the impediment to movement or protection it affords. Such a model should also take into 
accounts different classes of avatar sophistication, and various methods of avatar control, such as the 
contrast between high-precision control and low-interaction movement in a series of straight line 
segments. Combining these factors in a supportable way, and comparing the results to analysis of real 
movement traces could provide a useful synthetic workload generator. 
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4 Near-term infeasibility of P2P DVEs 
This chapter is based upon the similarly named paper presented at NetGames 2010, and published in 
the conference proceedings. Chapter 3 dealt with the question of characterizing workload in a subset 
of a deployed DVE, World of Warcraft. This chapter broadens the data capture and parsing initiated to 
encompass all five main areas of World of Warcraft activity.  
Practical experience and literature show that World of Warcraft’s traffic model is the same general 
flavor as that of most contemporary MMORPGs and first person shooters: clients send their updates to 
the server, which then propagates them to other relevant clients. WoW and most MMORPG models are 
less network resource-hungry than typical first-person shooters (FPSs), which are characterized by 
higher message frequency, and therefore more overall network traffic. Also, some of the FPS games 
propagate all updates to all players, whereas the larger scale games such as MMORPGs restrict 
message propagation to clients likely to benefit from the update messages.  If a pure peer-to-peer 
approach cannot work for WoW, then it likely will not work for other RPGs and FPSs operating on a 
similar scale. 
4.1 Introduction 
Nearly every aspect of running a reliable DVE becomes more challenging in P2P architectures. 
Ignoring all other issues, can existing residential network infrastructure support the bandwidth 
requirements of a P2P DVE?  
I gathered and analyzed network traces from the world’s most popular DVE, World of Warcraft 
(WoW). I used these traces as the basis of a workload for simulating client-server and an idealized 
peer-to-peer publisher / subscriber solution. I was able to characterize both absolute and relative 
performance of both types of messaging solutions, and found even an idealized and zero-overhead P2P 
solution performs too poorly to deploy. 
The remainder of this chapter describes this investigation. First, I provide background relevant to 
WoW and the broadband bandwidth model I used. Next I discuss my methodology for creating 
workload traces, and my simulator’s behavior. I analyze the gross attributes of my parsed WoW 
workloads, and apply them to both client-server and P2P pub-sub message schemes. Finally, I present 
conclusions and directions for further research. 
4.2 Background 
This section provides information on World of Warcraft and its main characteristics. It also gives a 
brief summary of the OfCom-provided residential broadband statistics [107] used in my bandwidth 
model.  
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4.2.1 World of Warcraft 
World of Warcraft (WoW) is the most popular Massively Multiplayer Online Game in history. With 
more than 12 million subscribers worldwide [22], WoW has the majority of market share for all 
MMOGs: 62% as of 2008 [132].  
Player avatar activities in WoW can be divided into five categories, as described in [124]: 
1. Questing. The avatar interacts with the game environment and AI-controlled avatars called 
NPCs.  
2. Capitals. This category is a subset of the trading category proposed in [124], and consists of 
time spent in the game’s heavily populated capital cities.  
3. Battlegrounds. Player versus player combat. I use this category for inter-player battles in 
zones called Arenas or Battlegrounds. There are six unique battlegrounds. 
4. Instances. Small, scenario-driven experiences where up to five avatars work together to kill a 
series of powerful NPCs known as “bosses.” There are 56 unique instances. 
5. Raids. A large instance. Instead of 2 – 5 bosses, raids have between 1 and 12.  They are 
designed for 10-40 players and may include hundreds of NPCs. There are 24 unique raids.  
[110] examines WoW server populations using built-in WoW extensibility functionality. The 
authors found DVE simulation workloads were unrealistic. They found peak server populations are 
typically five times their minimum population, underscoring the need to model peak behaviors. 
[95] analyzes avatar movement in the Arathi Basin battleground. It proposes a mechanism for 
obtaining game positions from avatar traces. This section extends that work, parsing several other 
types of messages, and obtaining both player and NPC messages and positions.  
Evaluations of proposed DVE systems often use synthetic workloads based on previous research, 
or on a model generated by the evaluators. For example, [80] compares three different categories of 
DVE infrastructure using a synthetic workload based upon an average session time of 100 minutes. 
Avatars in that evaluation are simulated using a combination group and waypoint model, where groups 
of simulated avatars agree on a next point to visit, and move there together. Several other frameworks 
[89] [90] [102] [118]  assume movement and arrival / departure properties of participants without any 
obvious experimental basis. The assumptions used in all these cases are logical, but without firm 
experimental grounding, and often contradicts actual measurements from real DVEs such as WoW. 
4.2.2 Broadband speeds 
My analysis examines behavior of different topologies involving residential nodes. It requires a 
realistic consumer broadband model.  
Overall speed summaries are available from several sources, such as Akamai’s quarterly State of 
the Internet report [5]. The Q4 2010 report from Akamai includes an appendix outlining average 
download speeds observed by their servers for a half billion unique IP addresses across 45 countries 
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from all six significantly populated continents. Key countries listed include Japan, South Korea, 
Australia, Egypt, the UK, Brazil, and the United States. While peak average broadband speeds 
observed were significantly higher in many countries, it is the average broadband speeds we are 
concerned with. These ranged from 0.6 Mbps in Sudan to 13.7 Mbps in South Korea.  
Unfortunately, no upload statistics are provided in the Akamai report, and large-scale 
measurements of upload and download speeds are difficult to find. I found only one report of 
significant enough scope and reputation for me to rely upon, the 2009 UK Broadband Speeds report 
from OfCom [107]. This report includes profiles of both upload and download speeds observed for a 
variety of users across the ISPs serving 91% of the UK’s broadband customers.  
The UK is in the middle of the pack for download speed listed in the Akamai report, with 4.3 
Mbps average download speed compared to a weighted average (based on number of addresses 
sampled) of 4.59 Mbps download speed. This makes the UK data a good basis for simulation. 
Comparing the average UK download speed listed in the 2009 OfCom report to that listed in the 
Q4 2010 Akamai report, I found them to be within a few percent of each other, 4.1 Mbps and 4.3 
Mbps respectively. This similarity is reassuring when seeking to correlate results back to the Internet 
at large. 
The OfCom report provides a wealth of information about both advertised and observed UK 
broadband speeds at a variety of times. Actual residential broadband speeds are on average 
significantly slower than their advertised speeds. Salient statistics are summarized below: 
 OfCom divided subscriptions into three categories, based upon their advertised download 
speed: 2 Mbps or less, > 2 Mbps and <= 8 Mbps, and > 8 Mbps. See Table 5 for relevant 
statistics. 
 Round-trip latency as measured to UK servers was on average below 55 ms, with peak 
average latencies (at high-traffic times of day) of up to approximately 110 ms.  
 Connections encountered low jitter, typically less than 6 ms (9% of the 55 ms RTT latency).  
 Packet loss averaged less than half a percent. 
This chapter’s evaluation of P2P feasibility does not model jitter or packet loss. However, it makes 
use of the population percentages and upload and download speeds given above, as summarized in 
Table 5. 
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Advertised Speed 
Subscriber 
Percent 
Down 
(Kbps) 
Up   
(Kbps) 
<= 2 Mbps 29% 1700 280 
2 to 8 Mbps 57% 3900 420 
> 8 Mbps 14% 9300 580 
 
Table 5: Client node bandwidth model 
 
The next section describes the overall approach used for analyzing World of Warcraft captures and 
making simulation traces from them.   
4.3 Methodology 
To determine whether a P2P message propagation scheme could propagate the messages required for 
an MMOG to operate, two questions had to be answered about message propagation. First, which 
avatars receive which messages? Second, which network attributes are most relevant to the simulation, 
and which can be safely ignored? 
MMOGs typically strive to propagate messages only to clients affected by the message. For 
example, if player X’s avatar is moving and within visual range of player Y’s avatar, then X’s DVE 
instance needs a copy of Y’s movement messages.  
Most DVE messages reflect a state change initiated by and centered on a single avatar. Some 
messages have a broader effect – such as a command to render rain in a large zone – but these 
commands are relatively rare. Messages are received by a superset of the avatars affected by that 
message. For example, any avatars within visual range of a spell being cast need to know about the 
spell, even if they are not facing the caster. A WoW avatars’ visibility range is usually between 250 
and 500 yards. Interaction range is shorter, about 5 yards for melee and trading, or 30 yards for most 
ranged interactions.  
For an ideal P2P messaging scheme, I make the following simplifying assumptions, to err on the 
side of NOT ruling out P2P feasibility. 
1. All clients can communicate with each other. 
2. Clients have perfect knowledge of avatars (and their associated clients) entering and leaving 
their interaction and visual range. 
3. There is no overhead associated with setting up client network links or with tracking remote 
nodes beyond what is normally propagated by the DVE. 
4. There is no additional security overhead, nor other costs usually associated with P2P message 
propagation. 
5. There is no packet loss or jitter. 
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6. The underlying transport is TCP. The only simulation impact of this choice is message 
framing overhead, and the TCP window enforcing a limit on outstanding bytes for a given 
connection. 
7. The radius of event propagation is 250 yards, close to the minimum for World of Warcraft. 
8. Broadcast and unattributed messages are not included in the computations. If a message from 
our traces cannot be attributed to a specific peer, it is excluded from the simulation. This 
reduces overall message load. 
Most of these assumptions reduce traffic. If the network cannot support this simplified system and 
its requirements, then it certainly cannot support a more realistic (and complex) solution.  
The P2P pub-sub message propagation scheme being simulated here implements a pure P2P 
model. Each message is transmitted by the originating client directly to each subscriber requiring a 
message copy.  
4.3.1 World of Warcraft network attributes 
WoW uses a proprietary client-server protocol to communicate between DVE nodes. Most data 
between a WoW client and its server is exchanged over a single TCP connection. Most traffic results 
from client node actions. The acting client node sends a message to the server, which makes 
appropriate DVE state changes, and then forwards the message or related updates to any other affected 
nodes.  
Each client DVE instance does an advisory check of local user inputs and state change requests 
before submitting them to the server. If the server accepts a request as legal based on its world state, 
the message (or resulting update) is propagated to clients to whom it may be relevant, sometimes 
including the client who submitted the message. If the action was rejected, the server replies to the 
requester, and that requesting client reverts any relevant state. In most cases a DVE state change is 
propagated using an identical message payload to all clients which can perceive that change. 
WoW network messages are small, 36 bytes on average [124], with some as small as 4 bytes. 
During active periods a client can send more than 10 messages per second. Conversely, in idle periods 
the client may go minutes between sending messages. Messages consist of an encrypted header and an 
optional unencrypted body. Messages can be combined within a single TCP packet, and if needed can 
span TCP packet boundaries. During periods of intense local activity clients may receive bundles of 
many messages several MTUs in size. 
Most messages include a globally unique avatar identifier (GUID) identifying the party initiating 
and / or affected by the message. Other common fields include X, Y, and Z position in yards, facing 
information, and game time.  
Since message headers are encrypted, I devised heuristics to identify a few of the more complex 
(easier to identify) and useful message types. Like WoW, the simulation propagates messages based on 
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virtual world proximity, so position messages are the highest priority. After parsing a candidate list of 
move messages, incorrectly parsed messages are identified by comparing their contents against median 
values and reverted. Correctly parsed sequences of messages have similar values in many fields (such 
as position and game time), whereas incorrectly parsed messages are more likely to have divergent 
values.  
Using this strategy, 25% to 42% of the bytes in each capture were successfully parsed. Using 
knowledge of packet format, between 55% and 93% of the bytes in each capture were parsed or 
attributed.  
Any data which could not be successfully parsed or attributed was excluded from use in 
simulation traces. This exclusion reduces overall bandwidth and message requirements for my 
simulations, compared to actual message loads. This in turn means that at worst our simulations would 
show that deployed peer-to-peer DVEs are feasible when in fact they are not. 
This is discussed further in section 4.4. 
4.3.2 Simulation trace generation 
The simulation traces are based upon processed WoW network captures. Each capture is between 5 and 
120 minutes long. In some cases the captures were from a single client instance, while in others a pair 
of clients was used to extend the region of visual information. 
Before parsing messages, TCP payloads of the trace are divided into blobs, aggregating adjacent 
packet payloads which are clearly part of the same blob. For example, two MTU-sized packets 
followed by a third smaller packet would all be combined into a single blob.  
The blobs were iterated over, attempting to parse message types from most to least restrictive. 
After parsing each message type, heuristics were used to revert clearly erroneous parsing. For example, 
if the GUID did not meet structural expectations, or did not appear frequently enough in the parsed 
trace, the message was considered invalid and reverted. 
Once all messages were parsed and filtered, remaining unparsed blobs were searched for known 
GUIDs. Whenever a GUID was found, it was presumed to be at a common offset for GUIDs within 
messages, and the attributed message was set as starting an appropriate number of bytes before the 
GUID. I called this process attribution. The message was assumed to continue to the end of the blob, 
or to the start of the next attribution, whichever was shorter.  
The logic behind this strategy is as follows: identifying a party involved in a propagated 
transaction almost always means the message originated within interaction distance (30 yards) of that 
party. Since interaction between avatars is typically limited to an area much smaller than – and fully 
contained within – the maximum visual AoI, a slight variance in the propagation center should not 
significantly affect the receiving audience. This assumption allows assignment of the majority of 
traffic not successfully parsed. While not strictly correct, this provides a good approximation of 
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message origin and propagation. As data later shows, using this strategy the parser successfully parsed 
or attributed more than 90% of message bytes. 
Earlier I described the five categories of play within WoW. I captured data in all five categories to 
gain a better understanding of difference between them, and to ensure I evaluated the network 
topologies in all styles of play. 
Fidelity of the captures and their overall utility varied by category: 
1. Questing. I captured and parsed solo play with both highest-level characters and characters 
advancing in the game. Solo PvE usually involves significant travel in sparse areas. Captures 
are limited to the solo player’s AoI, and are low fidelity from a simulation perspective because 
of a lack of context. Fortunately, these are also the least interesting to simulate because of 
their low network traffic. 
2. Capitals. Capitals are heavily populated, with a high degree of transience. Most avatars are 
quiescent, performing simple maintenance activities or waiting for game events. Traces were 
captured in Dalaran, the most popular capital city, with two avatars strategically placed to 
capture most of the city’s messages. Dalaran’s population ranges from tens to hundreds of 
players, with turnover as high as thousands of unique avatars per hour.  Dalaran captures have 
good fidelity.  
3. Instances. In instances a player avatar explicitly works with up to four other avatars to 
complete a bounded objective such as killing a series of NPCs. Players stay within interaction 
distance of each other, so the capture contains all relevant information.  
4. Raids. A raid is a special type of instance for 10 to 40 avatars rather than 5. Other than scale, 
they are similar to instances, and have good capture fidelity. 
5. PvP battlegrounds. Data was captured in two of the games’ six battlegrounds, Arathi Basin 
and Wintergrasp. Arathi Basin captures have high fidelity, as the two instrumented nodes were 
sufficient to cover most of the battleground. Wintergrasp is larger, and data was only captured 
at the main hotspots. This is sufficient to characterize the highest activity areas centers, but 
misses smaller battles located away from the hotspots. Despite limitations of the Wintergrasp 
captures, they are interesting because of their scale, often more than a hundred participants, 
with the majority mutually interacting.  
Parsing and processing this data as described above resulted in a series of traces appropriate for 
simulation. The next section describes the simulator’s basis. Summary statistics for data capture and 
parsing can be found in section 4.4. 
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4.3.3 Simulator 
I performed a cursory evaluation of existing simulators, but concluded that none would give the 
combination of simulation resolution, performance, and ease of modification that I desired. I had the 
following requirements: 
1. Scalability. The simulator must scale to up to 1,000 simultaneous active nodes to support 
capital city scenarios. 
2. Latency. The simulation must model inter-node latency and packet latency in a realistic 
fashion. 
3. Throughput. The simulation must accurately model bandwidth constraints in the presence of 
competing streams, and upload and download constrained transfer. It should also model TCP-
style windowing, whose impact on throughput is negatively correlated with inter-node latency. 
4. Overhead. Packet headers are a significant source of traffic in DVEs, which have frequent, 
small messages. The overhead of protocol headers and encapsulation need to be accurately 
modeled. 
5. Performance. The simulator needs to be able to operate faster than real-time against typical 
simulation traces in order to allow several runs against the more than 60 hours of simulation 
traces. 
6. Leavers and joiners. The simulator must be able to realistically handle leavers and joiners, as 
these are a significant presence in DVEs such as World of Warcraft. 
I considered using the WiDS [87] and NS-2 simulators. For logistical reasons I was unable to use NS-
2. The WiDS simulator, while it has good scalability properties, lacked most of the features I felt were 
important for simulation, most importantly the correct handling of throughput, especially in cases of 
link contention.  
I developed a medium-fidelity packet-level network simulator which provides a reasonable 
approximation of Internet behavior for my scenarios.  
 The simulator assumes TCP / IP as the message transport, and uses a packet-based model for 
propagating data. 
 Nodes are assigned “network positions” on a 2D plane. Latency is the Cartesian distance 
between two nodes’ network positions.  
 Messages have framing overhead (TCP and IP). Large messages are divided into packets 
based upon MTU. 
 The simulator accounts for first- and last- hop bandwidth limitations, but as a simplifying 
assumption treats capacity between these two points in the cloud as infinite. 
The simulator propagates messages at three levels: The TCP/IP stack, the network adapter (NIC), 
and the last-hop router.  Each is outlined in more detail below. 
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4.3.3.1 TCP / IP level 
The TCP/IP level mirrors behavior of relevant portions of a typical Windows TCP/IP stack. It accepts 
messages for transmission, applies TCP windowing, aggregates messages, and forwards them to the 
NIC queue to simulate outbound transit behavior. I use a TCP Window size of 17 KB, the default TCP 
Window size for Windows XP.  
Message transmission through the TCP/IP stack is simulated in the following sequence: 
1. Locally originated messages are entered into a srcdest keyed outbound queue. 
2. Every millisecond the state of the srcdest connection is checked to see how many packets 
have left the IP stack at src, but have not been fully received at dest. If the payload bytes 
exceed the TCP window, the messages remain buffered.  
3. Otherwise, the TCP/IP stack transfers enough messages to the outbound NIC level to fill the 
TCP window.  
4.3.3.2 NIC level 
The NIC level of the simulation handles inbound and outbound packets on a first-come, first-serve 
basis. Packet transmission is simulated in millisecond time slices, subject to node bandwidth limits. 
When packets finish transit, they are removed from the NIC-level queue and passed to the next layer, 
either the TCP/IP queue for inbound packets, or the remote “last-hop router” queue for outbound 
messages. 
When a packet is transferred to a “last-hop router” queue, it is time-stamped with the current 
simulation time plus any inter-node latency. In other words, the packet is marked for future delivery.  
4.3.3.3 Last-hop router 
Internet latency and inbound NIC bandwidth are both modeled using the “last-hop router” before the 
destination node.  
The last-hop router has a priority queue with zero or more packets, ordered by their projected 
arrival time. Once a packet’s arrival time passes, the last-hop router moves it from the priority queue 
to a host transmission queue. The packets are moved into the inbound NIC at the destination host on a 
FIFO basis, using the time slice bandwidth budget. Whenever a packet finishes transmission, it is 
passed into the receiving node’s NIC queue, where it then bubbles up the stack as a received WoW 
message, and is processed. 
4.3.4 Topology choices and metrics 
DVE topologies can be divided into three broad categories: 
1. Pure client-server.  The server has “perfect” information about the location of every avatar, 
and uses this as the basis for propagating messages. This model is used by WoW. 
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2. Region-based pub-sub. The game space is divided into regions. A subset of nodes propagate 
messages for each region. This region also includes most hybrid super-node solutions. 
3. Avatar-based “P2P” pub-sub. Avatars subscribe to event streams for other avatars within a 
certain distance of themselves, i.e. within their Area of Interest (AoI).  
The primary goal of these schemes is to ensure every node gets necessary messages in a timely 
fashion. “Timely” depends upon the DVE. WoW defines three latency thresholds: <= 300 ms latency is 
good, <= 600 ms is adequate, and > 600 ms is poor. Other DVEs have documented acceptable latency 
tolerance as low as 200 ms and as high as 1250 ms. Lower latency is almost always better. 
4.3.5 Simulation characteristics 
Three sets of simulations were run, identified by a message aggregation interval. For each set, all 
simulation traces were executed on both a pure client-server topology, and a P2P pub-sub topology. 
For each simulation, the following attributes were set: 
1. Weighted random assignment of client node bandwidth, based upon OfCom statistics, as 
shown in Table 5. 
2. Random assignment of 2D Cartesian network coordinates to model inter-node latency, with a 
maximum inter-node latency of 90 ms and an average inter-node latency of 45 ms. 
3. For client-server simulations, 
a. Symmetric server bandwidth (if a server is present) of 1 Gbps. 
b. Server is assigned the center of the latency modeling space to mimic “optimal network 
placement” of the server. 
4. AoI of 250 yards. All nodes subscribed to events from any other node within their AoI. If 
events originate at a non-node (e.g. an NPC), they are propagated by the closest node. 
5. TCP window size of 17 KB. 
The three simulation sets had a single parameter varied between them, the message aggregation 
interval. For each interval, all messages to be transmitted over a given TCP connection were bundled 
up and an aggregated message – divided into multiple IP packets if required - transmitted. The first run 
had an aggregation interval of 0, meaning messages were immediately processed without aggregation. 
Subsequent simulation sets used aggregation intervals of 1ms and of 50ms. Surprisingly the results 
between 1ms and 50ms were not substantially different from each other, so only the difference 
between the 0 ms and 1 ms aggregation intervals are described here.  
For both client-server models and P2P models, perfect knowledge of subscribers is assumed, 
based upon the actual position of avatars at the message origination time.  
The next section describes simulation results. These include the percentage of messages parsed 
and attributed for each of the WoW activity categories. 
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4.3.6 Simulator validation 
Since the simulator was written from scratch, I performed a variety of tests to verify it behaved as 
expected. Steps taken to validate each desired behavior are as follows: 
1. Verified that leaves and joiners were correctly handled. Packets in flight were dropped upon 
sender or receiver departure. Joiners received all new messages in their AoI radius. 
2. Ensured bandwidth constraints were respected in the single connection case. I tested sender 
constrained, receive constrained, and equal bandwidth allocations. 
3. Tested bandwidth constraints and bandwidth sharing over multiple flows. Single sender 
multiple receiver, single receiver multiple sender, and multiple sender multiple receiver were 
all tested. 
4. Verified TCP fragmentation / reassembly, windowing, and latency (and its impact on 
windowing) were correctly respected. Latency included “cloud” latency modeled by Cartesian 
distance, and transmission and receipt delays caused by congestion, packet queuing, and finite 
transmission speeds at sender and receiver. 
5. For cases where sender message aggregation was implemented, ensured messages on a given 
TCP flow were correctly aggregated.  
6. Ensured message transmission decisions were correctly made as nodes moved into and out of 
message origin AoI, for sender, receiver, and both moving.  
7. Verified instrumentation reported the correct bit transmission and receipt quantities per unit 
time. 
This is not an exhaustive list of validation performed, but is intended to convey the spirit of testing 
done. 
4.4 Results 
Table 6 shows the percentage of payload data successfully parsed and attributed by play category. 
“Parsed” is the data fraction parsed into known message types. “Attributed” is the data fraction 
attributed to a specific origination GUID, but not parsed. “Discarded” is any remaining bytes, since 
their propagation AoI could not be determined.  
Data which could not be attributed was discarded to prevent negative simulation bias. Each byte of 
data omitted is a byte that would have needed to be transmitted at least once in a perfect simulation of 
the DVE. Omitting this data results in a workload which is a subset of the original DVE workload. 
Like our other simplifying assumptions, this policy errs on the side of saying peer-to-peer DVEs are 
possible.  
The largest proportion of unrecognized, unattributed data in traces came from questing. Nearly 
half of all questing data captured could not be attributed or parsed, and so was discarded. The most 
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action-intensive categories, Raiding and PVP, had less than 10% of data discarded, and so provide the 
most realistic simulation traces.  
Table 7 shows the aggregate duration of captured data, in minutes.  
 
 
Parsed Attributed Discarded 
Questing 25% 30% 45% 
Capital 37% 39% 24% 
Instance 31% 58% 11% 
Raid 26% 66% 8% 
PVP 42% 51% 7% 
 
Table 6: Parse success percentages 
 
 
Category 
Total 
Minutes 
Average   
Per Capture 
Questing 1339.07 44.64 
Capital 204.54 29.22 
Instance 1136.80 27.73 
Raid 703.14 31.96 
PVP 310.55 16.34 
 
Table 7: Minutes of data captured 
 
While the traces for Capital may look small from a time perspective (just over 3 hours of data 
captured), it is high fidelity data from a relatively uniformly behaved area (per time of day) and 
contains hundreds of thousands of messages. 
4.4.1 Simulation results 
The simulation turned up two significant results:  
1. P2P pub-sub is not feasible today. For most scenarios nodes occasionally fell behind, in 
some cases receiving messages minutes after their origination. This is unacceptable for DVEs 
such as World of Warcraft. 
2. Message Aggregation reduces P2P pub-sub latency. Common wisdom and published 
speculation says delaying message transmission is always harmful in latency-sensitive 
applications. The simulation found otherwise, especially in bandwidth-constrained scenarios. 
Each of these results is described in further detail below. 
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4.4.1.1 Feasibility of P2P pub-sub 
My goal was to determine whether peer-to-peer MMOGs are possible with today’s infrastructure. My 
conclusion is that they are not. This section provides supporting evidence for that conclusion. 
To evaluate this hypothesis, a subset of recorded World of Warcraft data was run through a 
network simulator. Analysis indicates the WoW protocol is quite efficient. Upload and download 
bandwidth consumption for typical clients in an older version of the protocol was found to be on 
average 2.1 Kbps upload, and 6.9 Kbps download [126]. [124] analyzed a later version of World of 
Warcraft and found that upload bandwidth was usually 10 Kbps or less, and average download 
bandwidth varied from less than 10 Kbps for questing, to approximately 50 Kbps for raiding. My 
observations on WoW version 3 are consistent with these latter numbers.  
As mentioned earlier, simulations were run across traces captured from each of the five categories 
of play, with a message propagation radius of 250 yards, at the lower end of my AoI estimate for WoW. 
Simulations used traces consisting of data whose origin could be attributed to a specific node. Some 
data was excluded, which makes it possible that the simulation could erroneously indicate a WoW-like 
P2P DVE is possible. However, this was not the case in our simulation. 
Running the simulation against a client-server architecture, results were consistent with my first-
hand experience in terms of message latency. These results are summarized in Table 8. The first two 
columns present the average upload and download bandwidth consumed by each client by category. 
The third column shows overall latency in seconds, e.g. 0.046 seconds which is 46 ms average. The 
final column shows the average peak latency. In other words, if you calculate the greatest latency 
during each player session in a given category, then average those values together, that is the “peak” 
value shown in this column. 
Average inter-node latency was set to 45 ms. The server is placed in the center of the “network 
latency” map, making node-server latency on average 22.5 ms.  
 
 
Up        
(Kbps) 
Down 
(Kbps) 
Average 
Lat. (S) 
Peak        
Lat. 
(S) 
Questing 2.7 5.5 0.036 0.079 
Capital 1.8 84.3 0.047 0.269 
Instance 4.1 35.7 0.046 0.342 
Raid 5.2 80.4 0.051 0.658 
PVP 3.2 48.8 0.049 0.150 
Average 3.4 51.0 0.046 0.299 
 
Table 8: Average client-server simulation results 
 
The same simulation was run with a P2P pub-sub scheme. WoW’s message propagation scheme 
adapts perfectly to a pub-sub peer-to-peer topology: message origination is attributed as part of the 
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original trace generation. Message delivery is made to all nodes within the AoI of the message origin. 
This is an optimal message pattern for pure peer-to-peer pub-sub, and would require no modification 
of the WoW protocol to run without security. Note that adapting the protocol to run P2P would require 
additional security overhead, though that overhead is excluded from this simulation. 
P2P pub-sub did markedly worse than client-server topology in terms of bandwidth and latency, as 
shown in Table 9. In the pub-sub model, peers are responsible for uploading not only their own 
messages, but for modeling and transmitting any messages on behalf of NPCs (AI avatars) closest to 
them. This increases peer upload bandwidth requirements, but reduces download bandwidth 
requirements as the closest node is synthesizing some NPC messages rather than receiving them from 
a server.  
Comparing the two tables, the average upload bandwidth required per publisher is a factor of 20 
greater in P2P than client-server overall, and in some cases, a factor of nearly 100. Download 
consumption has dropped slightly, while latencies have risen to unacceptable levels for all scenarios 
except Questing, which requires very little message propagation. In addition to significant latency, 
peak upload bandwidth requirements exceeded capacity in almost all cases, for at least part of each 
trace. Invariably this was caused by a large number of avatars interacting near each other. In raids this 
could consist of 25 player avatars and 100 NPCs simultaneously moving and using special abilities. In 
PVP battlegrounds the peaks were especially obvious in Wintergrasp when a large percentage of 
attackers and defenders fought at one of the objective fortresses’ walls. In the capital, it was simply a 
function of how many users were online at a given time. The more avatars online, the more who were 
actively moving (assuming a fixed percent of idle nodes), and the greater the number of event 
subscribers. 
WoW is – in my opinion – a well-designed game in terms of network efficiency. The experience 
has been carefully crafted to require minimal per-node resources. Even with low per-node network 
requirements, the simple need to exchange information frequently between adjacent nodes makes it 
infeasible to make a responsive pure P2P MMOG, at least with today’s bandwidth limitations. There is 
hope for the future. First, broadband speeds are increasing as new technologies are rolled out with 
ever-increasing speeds. Second, there are mitigation strategies such as avatar behavior modeling [109] 
which can be explored to reduce communication frequency and size requirements.  
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Up        
(Kbps) 
Down 
(Kbps) 
Average 
Lat. (S) 
Peak        
Lat. (S) 
Questing 5.8 4.4 0.033 0.121 
Capital 167.2 79.2 4.467 119.697 
Instance 38.6 32.7 1.163 12.763 
Raid 102.2 77.6 9.070 92.708 
PVP 83.2 48.3 1.420 24.711 
Average 79.4 48.4 3.231 50.000 
 
Table 9: Average P2P pub-sub simulation results 
 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to say precisely when P2P DVEs can be expected to be feasible. 
World of Warcraft is now an old game, mediocre in terms of responsiveness and simulation variety 
(which requires bandwidth to provide). Modernizing these behaviors would require additional 
bandwidth, and so I expect new games will require additional network resources. Peak requirements 
will vary DVE by DVE. Broadband overall will improve in speed, but there will always be pockets of 
subscribers whose bandwidth improves more slowly than others.  
The change which would make P2P DVEs most likely to be deployable is an increase in average 
upload bandwidth. Even an increase to double the current average upload speed would enable DVEs 
like WoW to operate P2P in all but the most strenuous circumstances. However, it is unclear whether a 
new title created with WoW’s modest bandwidth demands would be deemed acceptable by consumers 
looking for a new game. 
I explored other strategies to reduce the latency impact of low upload bandwidth. The most 
promising one is message aggregation. The first simulation run did no aggregation, transmitting each 
message as soon as it was entered into the simulation, incurring protocol overheads for every message, 
such as IPv4 and TCP headers.  Given the small size of transmitted message payloads – 36 bytes on 
average [124] – this results in a message transmission overhead of more than 100% on average. I 
suspected that message aggregation, in addition to reducing bandwidth requirements, might have other 
benefits. 
4.4.1.2 Message aggregation for latency reduction 
Latency is an important metric for online game experience quality. Previous work suggests game 
messages should be sent as soon as they are available to minimize latency. The simulations described 
in this section found the opposite, that message aggregation actually lowered latency.  
The simulator models basic TCP windowing, but not common TCP packet aggregation strategies 
such as Nagle’s algorithm. Instead, I implemented a simple time-based aggregation with a fixed 
aggregation window. These results will apply to TCP with appropriate aggregation algorithms, and to 
“custom” TCP-like IP protocols as proposed elsewhere. 
4.  NEAR-TERM INFEASIBILITY OF P2P DVES 
 
70 
 
Unfortunately, the simulation trace generation algorithm has some inaccuracy in assigning 
message initiation times. Simulation traces were created by instrumenting a small number of clients 
(one or two), recording client-server data streams, and extrapolating message transmission times. 
Avatar movement messages have game timestamps which allows their initiation time to be correctly 
attributed. No other message type has these timestamps, so I relied upon IP packet capture time. 
During busy intervals large numbers of aggregated messages were received. These aggregated 
messages are assigned identical or very similar event times in the simulation trace. These events 
should be more uniformly distributed, and so my analysis is biased towards showing benefits of 
aggregation which may be less prominent in more accurate traces.  
Aggregating messages and transmitting aggregated messages once every millisecond resulted in 
significant reduction in bandwidth consumption, in peak latency, and in some cases in average latency. 
This was true for both the client-server case and the P2P Pub-sub case. 
Earlier statistics were presented for non-aggregated client-server and pub-sub simulations. Below 
are two more tables showing the percentage change in attributes when aggregation is introduced.  
Table 10 shows the changes to client-server traffic and latency attributes when all parties 
aggregate messages in 1 ms windows before transmitting them. This strategy introduces an average of 
1 ms latency (0.5 client to server, and another 0.5 server to destination nodes) in end-to-end message 
delivery from aggregation delay. However, the aggregation allows more efficient transmission of 
messages from client to the server, reducing total bytes transferred.  Even this small aggregation 
interval significantly reduces both average and typical peak bandwidth consumption.  
 
 
Up        
(Kbps) 
Up Peak     
(Kbps) 
Down 
(Kbps) 
Down Peak 
(Kbps) 
Avg 
Lat. 
(S) 
Peak        
Lat. 
(S) 
Questing -9.0% -20.3% -14.3% -26.0% 0.0% -2.2% 
Capital -25.0% -12.1% -31.8% -26.6% 0.8% -4.3% 
Instance -17.6% -22.8% -20.4% -28.4% 0.6% -3.7% 
Raid -6.1% -10.6% -17.7% -12.6% 0.2% -3.5% 
PVP -31.7% -16.6% -38.6% -34.1% -0.3% -3.6% 
Average -17.9% -16.5% -24.5% -25.6% 0.3% -3.4% 
 
Table 10: Client-server, 1 ms aggregation changes 
 
In the client server case there is a small increase in average latency (less than a percent), but 
typical peak latencies are reduced by several percent, meaning performance during very active 
intervals is improved. 
Table 11 shows P2P pub-sub improvements across the board. The most dramatic improvements 
are seen in average and peak latency. Across all scenarios, average latency is reduced by nearly 42 
percent, halving it. For the highest latency scenario – raiding – average latency drops to one fourth of 
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its non-aggregated value, and typical peak latency is reduced to less than half its original value. While 
the results would still provide a poor experience during active intervals, it would be dramatically better 
than the non-aggregated case. 
 
 
Up        
(Kbps) 
Up Peak     
(Kbps) 
Down 
(Kbps) 
Down 
Peak 
(Kbps) 
Avg Lat. 
(S) 
Peak        
Lat. (S) 
Questing -10.2% -8.3% -13.6% -11.7% 2.20% -3.6% 
Capital -6.5% -0.7% -7.1% -7.2% -22.3% -20.7% 
Instance -28.8% -19.4% -29.0% -18.0% -60.2% -55.5% 
Raid -17.5% -8.0% -18.6% -22.5% -52.5% -42.5% 
PVP -34.3% -11.6% -35.7% -12.8% -76.9% -59.4% 
Average -19.5% -9.6% -20.8% -14.5% -41.9% -36.4% 
 
Table 11: P2P pub-sub, 1 ms aggregation changes 
 
One interesting question is the impact of different aggregation windows on latency and bandwith 
consumption. A single simulation run through the data took several CPU days to compute, and more 
time to analyze. As a result, I evaluated the smallest and largest aggregation windows I would consider, 
1 ms and 50 ms. In client-server distribution, the 50 ms client aggregation window resulted in higher 
overall latencies than the 1 ms aggregation, and marginally lower bandwidth consumption. For the 
P2P pub-sub case, the 50 ms window resulted in a mixture of lower and higher latency than 1 ms 
aggregation, interplay between the extra transmission delay and the additional bandwidth savings. I 
believe further simulation of values between these two aggregation windows would find a “sweet spot” 
maximizing latency reduction and bandwidth savings. I believe this sweet spot would vary according 
to typical traffic patterns, which means it would be different between different DVEs, and even 
between major scenario types (such as the five we examined in WoW) within a given DVE. 
Nevertheless, this is an analysis DVE designers would be well-advised to perform. 
Since aggregation provides benefits in both resource-rich (client-server) and resource constrained 
scenarios, it should be an integral part of any messaging strategy for games which are typified by 
small but frequent message exchanges. This approach will ease network and node burdens, and 
provide a better end-user experience. 
Region server and super-node approaches were not evaluated in this work, although they are the 
middle part of the spectrum between client-server and pure P2P solutions.  If practical concerns can be 
overcome, a region server approach is more likely to be deployable than a P2P solution.  
4.5 Conclusions 
Massively Multiplayer online games (MMOGs) are a popular form of distributed virtual environment. 
A significant body of work done over the past ten years studies the behavior of MMOGs, and proposes 
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ways to enhance scalability and performance. However, much of this work is evaluated against 
idealized workloads, vastly differing from researcher to researcher, making comparison difficult.  
I captured a variety of interactions within World of Warcraft (WoW), and created simulation traces 
from messages issued by the game, rather than a logically deduced workload. This allows creation of 
simulation traces consistent with a broadly deployed game, and simulation of projected network 
behavior for today’s games. To help evaluation accuracy, typical residential broadband bandwidth 
characteristics were obtained and utilized.  
A packet-based network simulator was implemented and used to simulate using those bandwidth 
models, modeling key network attributes such as inter-node latency, and TCP windowing. Bandwidth 
consumption and end-user latency of player nodes in client-server and P2P pub-sub message 
propagation schemes were compared and contrasted. 
A client-server topology did a good job of delivering messages to clients quickly and with 
reasonable bandwidth consumption. P2P pub-sub was unable to deliver messages in a timely fashion, 
often saturating client links, despite several favorable simplifying assumptions. I conclude that pure 
P2P pub-sub is not feasible for MMOGs such as World of Warcraft and other similar games with 
current residential broadband.  
Message aggregation for bandwidth reduction was investigated. Surprisingly, not only did 
message aggregation reduce bandwidth consumption, it improved message latency in most scenarios, 
and provided significant latency improvements for P2P pub-sub solutions.  
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5 Trusted auditing of decentralized DVEs 
The previous two chapters established reasons to be skeptical about the performance and near-term 
deployability of peer-to-peer DVE architectures. However, these conclusions do not apply to all 
decentralized architectures – such as super-node models and region server models – and so there 
remains a need for a security solution which meets the needs of decentralized DVEs. This chapter and 
the next explore methods for improving decentralized DVE security.  
The trusted auditing work described in this chapter was published as a technical report [96], and 
pre-dates the detailed measurements presented in the previous two chapters. As a result, the traffic 
figures and terminology may vary slightly. The traffic figures are recorded against an earlier version of 
World of Warcraft, which had slightly lower traffic requirements. These traffic differences are worth 
calling out, but are not significant in terms of the security solution presented in this chapter, nor its 
evaluation. 
Decentralized DVE architectures can improve DVE scalability, but can be difficult to secure.  
Existing security technologies such as Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance [31] provide good 
preventative distributed system security, but at a premium. Unfortunately, BFT-based systems have 
significant bandwidth and latency overhead, reducing their utility in DVEs.  
Auditing is a lighter weight approach which retains good – although deferred – correctness 
guarantees and has significantly lower impact. Auditing focuses on validating prior DVE transactions 
to identify errors in state communication or determination. In game terminology, auditing catches 
cheaters.  Caught cheaters are typically punished, ideally deterring future cheaters from misbehaving. 
This chapter proposes Carbon, an auditing system specifically designed to catch certain categories 
of cheaters in decentralized DVEs. Owing to its specialization for DVEs, Carbon is lighter weight than 
other auditing solutions such as PeerReview [60] while retaining most relevant benefits of those 
systems. A key part of Carbon’s solution is a trusted – rather than untrusted – auditor. This provides a 
compromise between scalability and security, one not onerous to DVE creators already used to 
maintaining centralized infrastructure. 
The remainder of this chapter describes the Carbon auditing system, and illustrates its overhead 
through a detailed example. Section 5.1 provides an overview of DVE research relevant to security, 
such as DVE threat modeling, frameworks with integrated security, and stand-alone security models. 
Section 5.2 provides a threat model with categories based on existing cheat taxonomies. Section 5.3 
outlines the Carbon auditing system, describing its main components and interfaces. Section 5.4 
evaluates Carbon’s attributes and performance, and compares Carbon overhead with the most 
prominent P2P auditing system today, PeerReview. Finally, section 5.5 presents conclusions and 
future work. 
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5.1 Related work 
Distributed virtual environments have been researched for decades, with a significant body of research 
into P2P DVEs and DVE security emerging in the past eight years. Research related to security, 
correctness, and cheating is the most relevant to Carbon. In some cases this work is presented as an 
integral part of a decentralized DVE framework. In others, the work stands on its own, and can be 
applied to a variety of DVE architectures.  
The remainder of this section presents prior art in DVE threat modeling, P2P DVE frameworks, 
and stand-alone DVE security research. Section 5.4.3 makes certain assumptions about DVE behavior 
and traffic patterns, and so DVE behavior is briefly discussed in section 5.1.4 for the benefit of those 
unfamiliar with the domain. 
5.1.1 DVE threat models 
Several DVE cheat taxonomies and threat models have been proposed over the last ten years. Each 
provides insight into the types of threats faced by deployed DVEs.  
Yan and Randell [134] provide a detailed network game cheat taxonomy. Their taxonomy 
classifies most of the cheats encountered in network game DVEs, and includes several practical 
examples. Most of the threats described in section 5.2 are derived from Yan and Randell’s taxonomy, 
though they are represented in other taxonomies as well. 
Webb and Soh [131] present an interesting overview of cheating and their own taxonomy. They 
divide attacks into four categories, based upon their level in the application stack: Game level, 
application level, protocol level, and infrastructure level. Examples are provided of implemented 
cheats in each of these categories, as well as brief discussion of applying significant mitigations from 
recent research to combat those cheats. Most of the salient attacks are similar to those presented in 
Yan and Randell’s taxonomy. 
Yee et al. [136] propose a massively multiplayer online role playing game (MMORPG – a 
particular type of game DVE) threat model, and briefly describe existing mitigations. Their treatment 
– while interesting – is largely focused on human factors rather than those directly addressable by 
software mitigations. This makes their model useful for examining the overall milieu of publishing a 
game, but less so for evaluating software security. 
5.1.2 P2P DVE frameworks 
I am unaware of P2P DVEs and P2P DVE frameworks in broad use, but several are proposed in 
literature. Some frameworks include security measures to help prevent cheating. Two of the most 
notable frameworks which at least reference security for their solutions are SimMud and FreeMMG. 
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SimMud [79]  proposes a DVE framework based upon traditional P2P infrastructure. It uses the 
Pastry [117] DHT to store and retrieve key-value pairs and organize other overlays. The Pastry-based 
Scribe protocol [30] provides application-layer multicast, enabling pub-sub event distribution. In terms 
of security, this architecture relies upon the indifference of randomly chosen parties for correct 
operation. State is described as key-value pairs. Authoritative state for each variable is stored at a 
master chosen by Pastry ID similarity to the variable key. State updates are disseminated to 
subscribers through Scribe trees, again constructed based on Pastry ID. A well-placed attacker can 
authoritatively modify state which does not belong to them, and prevent state from correctly 
propagating to subscribers. I believe this level of security to be insufficient in the face of motivated 
attackers. 
FreeMMG [32] is a DVE framework built upon a combination of servers, peer specialization, and 
replication. Servers oversee division of the simulated world into segments, and monitor membership 
within each segment. Segments are collections of mutually interacting nodes, and are responsible for 
determining simulation state. Objects can only belong to a single segment, and all interactions within a 
segment are calculated by the member nodes of that segment. The primary cheat vector addressed by 
FreeMMG is collaboration among segment participants to subvert DVE rules. FreeMMG mitigates 
this cheat by requiring a certain number of participants (e.g.  ) be present in each segment. However, 
this can be easily subverted by a cheater with sufficient resources, either with control over   nodes, or 
in collaboration with       other cheaters. While a practical approach, this security model relies 
upon the presence of at least one honest node per segment, reducing its efficacy. 
Neither of these frameworks fully defend against any of the threats listed in section 5.2. Both are 
significantly more vulnerable to collusion and inconsistency attacks than client-server architectures. 
Collusion allows an attacker to authoritatively control state, by locating the quorum or node 
responsible for processing state updates, and subverting it. Inconsistency attacks can be mounted by 
any node responsible for storing state. For example, a pastry node in SimMud could return random 
values for each key request made by an external party. 
5.1.3 DVE security work 
There are three main approaches for stand-alone protection of DVEs from cheating: protecting DVE 
software and communications, distributing state ownership to disinterested third parties, and auditing 
schemes.  Kabus et al. [75] provide a good overview of all three.  
Protecting software integrity and some forms of protecting communications is a trusted computing 
base (TCB) approach. Mobile Guards [101] are a recent example of this approach. DVE software is 
modified to integrate a trusted software component – a mobile guard. Portions of the DVE are 
encrypted with keys only available from a functional mobile guard. Likewise, communications and 
data access can have integrity and confidentiality guaranteed with keys either contained within or 
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derived from the mobile guard. As long as the mobile guard is not compromised, the system can 
guarantee its communications byte stream is unaltered, and DVE rules are enforced as coded both 
locally and remotely. Attacker compromise of mobile guards is mitigated by issuing updates more 
frequently than the guards can be compromised. Assuming the mobile guard is not compromised, this 
approach provides strong security guarantees mitigating most of the threats described in section 5.2. 
Unfortunately, mobile guard efficacy is predicated on identifying an interval in which the mobile 
guard cannot be compromised, which must be sufficient for new mobile guards to be distributed. This 
core requirement – that you know when the TCB is compromised – is one of the issues dividing those 
who accept TCBs as sufficient and those who do not.  
Distributing state ownership to disinterested third parties is another security technique. As 
mentioned in Section 5.1.2 above, P2P DVEs such as SimMud and FreeMMG use this method. It has 
been proposed separately as a mechanism for protecting DVEs. A variant presented in IRS [58] allows 
state to be owned by the concerned party, but verifies state update calculations by performing them at 
multiple untrusted nodes, then comparing the results. It assumes a disinterested third party has no 
motivation to break DVE rules in terms of state representation or updates, and that several 
disinterested parties are even less likely to collude for this purpose. Unfortunately this is not 
necessarily the case: third parties can maliciously tamper with data, whether it is relevant to them or 
not. For example, they can exploit their position to broker access to the state, requesting a fee from the 
data owner to keep the data secure. Or, the party with the greatest interest in a given piece of state can 
manipulate the system to ensure that control and auditing of that data falls to itself. The same 
argument holds true for compromising quorums of disinterested third parties, though of course 
compromising a quorum is usually more work than compromising a single node.  
If detecting – as opposed to preventing – illegal state changes is an acceptable level of mitigation, 
then auditing schemes can provide good DVE security. The best example of this sort of protection in 
recent literature is PeerReview [60] PeerReview is an auditing system with good scalability and 
correctness guarantees. State changes and local transactions relevant to state calculations are stored in 
certified append-only local logs. Log contents are committed by peer exchange of signed log digests. 
Audits are performed by auditors called witnesses, who simulate forward from a state through a series 
of logged events to ensure correctness. Based on audit results and behavior, nodes are labeled as 
trusted (correct), suspected, or exposed (incorrect). Audit frequency guidance is provided in terms of 
number of witnesses and the probability of illegal activity. PeerReview offers protection against 
externally observable client misbehavior, external event modification, collusion below a certain 
threshold, Sybil attacks – since it uses RSA-key based identities – and inconsistency. 
Since PeerReview is the system most similar to Carbon, a comparison of salient attributes of both 
systems is provided in sections 5.4.2 through 5.4.4. Carbon provides similar security guarantees – with 
the notable exception of message non-repudiation – but has significantly lower resource requirements 
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in the DVE scenario. Note that this is enabled by Carbon not being as broadly applicable as 
PeerReview. 
5.1.4 General DVE characteristics 
DVE operation is largely characterized by four activities:  
1. Simulation. Evaluating state change and events. This is typically a lightweight activity, for 
example accepting an input and issuing an update equation. 
2. Rendering. Rendering the DVE perspective to present to the participant. This is usually the 
most significant activity in terms of memory, I/O, and processor consumption, by an order of 
magnitude or more. 
3. Communication. DVE nodes exchange messages to determine state changes and to refresh 
shadow (non-authoritative) state copies. In a P2P DVE, this traffic is typically the traffic 
required to describe a state change multiplied by the number of outstanding shadow copies. 
4. Persistence. Storing DVE data, for example saving avatar state for later retrieval. Persistence 
typically involves small amounts of data, infrequently written, for example a few kilobytes 
once per session.  
Auditing should not directly affect a client node’s simulation or rendering: these activities are 
identical at a client node with and without auditing, though additional simulation workload is 
introduced at auditors. 
The remaining activities, communication and persistence, can be characterized by the attributes 
listed in Table 12. 
 
Function Variable 
State snapshot in kilobytes      
Average events per second    
Average outgoing event bandwidth  
(per neighbor) 
 ̅     
Average outgoing payload 
bandwidth (per neighbor) 
 ̅     
Average shadow state copies   
 
Table 12: Sample DVE attributes 
 
Let      be size in kilobytes for a node’s dynamic state description, such as avatar position and 
attributes, and shadow state for objects being tracked by that node. Let    be the number of locally 
initiated events per second. Let  ̅     be the average traffic in Kbps required to describe a node’s state 
transitions to a single neighbor. Since packets tend to be small and frequent, let  ̅     be the payload 
portion of  ̅    , excluding packet framing overhead. Let   be the average number of neighbors 
receiving shadow state updates for a given piece of state.  
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Incoming and outgoing non-audit bandwidth for a P2P DVE will each be at least  ̅      , 
because of shadow state updates. Suppose all clients initiate one event, resulting in a locally 
authoritative state change. Each client transmits   copies of its state change, one to each shadow state 
subscriber. Since each state variable has   shadow copies, this implies each client is subscribed to   
times as many state variables as those it owns, and so it will also receive   updates.  
Persistence load varies depending upon DVE architecture. In some cases dynamic state is 
regularly saved. In others, it is stored only between client sessions. In still others it is never persisted. 
The most relevant attribute for DVE persistence is the state snapshot, and so the dominant factor to 
examine is frequency of state snapshot persistence.  
5.1.4.1 Network game DVE traffic patterns 
Network game DVEs are consumer-grade DVEs intended for home use, and optimized to provide an 
immersive experience with limited resources.  
These immersive experiences require interactive response to inputs. Many of these DVEs are fast-
paced combat simulations, with real-time activity such as aiming and firing weapons, chasing 
opponents, and competing for resources. These applications are extremely latency sensitive, with 
latencies greater than 200 ms significantly degrading the experience [16] [61], and latencies of 100ms 
or less preferred.  
These DVEs need to be able to run on most personal computers, and over most network links, 
which typically means functioning over dial-up connections (56 Kbps). For example, both Quake III 
and World of Warcraft can function over dial-up in most cases. 
 Consumer-grade DVEs are characterized by low packet inter-arrival times (responsiveness), and 
very small packets (low resource requirement). [81] found Quake III  has typical packet sizes of 70-90 
bytes, and typical inter-arrival times between 10 and 50 ms. [126] found that World of Warcraft sends 
frequent, small packets, typically with little or no payload. Typical IP packet size ranges between 50 
and 70 bytes (my measurement), with 220 ms mean inter-arrival time (their measurement).  
There is one notable exception to this behavior in popular DVEs: Second Life. This DVE is a 
cyberspace simulation, not a game. It emphasizes user-created content. This feature consumes 
significantly more bandwidth, between 10 and 1164 Kbps mean download bandwidth consumption, 
and between 13 and 74 Kbps mean upload bandwidth consumption [78]. 
5.1.4.2 Characteristic values: a World of Warcraft-style P2P game 
To help put auditing overhead in perspective, I hypothesize basic requirements of a peer-to-peer 
version of World of Warcraft (WoW). This model is based upon WoW traffic models from Svoboda et 
al. [126], coupled with my own measurements obtained using WireShark and WoW version 3.1.  
WoW clients require on average 2.1 Kbps upload and 6.9 Kbps download bandwidth. The current 
implementation of WoW uses a command / state response model for propagating state changes. I 
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verified this by measuring bandwidth consumed by both an actor node and an observer node, noting 
that each observable action taken at the actor resulted in a small transmission to the server, followed 
by update packets being transmitted to both the actor and observer. The update packets were identical 
in size, and typically larger than the command packet transmitted to the server. 
Most game DVEs send frequent, very small packets, often with little or no payload. For example, 
in WoW 57% of download packets have an empty payload. Analyzing my own packet trace, I found 
that in 821 seconds of activity in a popular end-game zone, 3,881 ethernet packets were received, 
wi1th a total size of 284,246 bytes. My per-packet transport overhead for Ethernet and IP framing was 
54 bytes per packet, which is 209,574 bytes of overhead. My measurement shows 74% packet framing 
overhead, leaving 26% actual event data (i.e.  ̅          Kbps if  ̅         Kbps) in 
communications. This tells me the numbers from Svoboda et al. [126] provide conservative values, 
and are therefore a good benchmark for my purposes.  
Average inter-arrival time for state update packets is 220ms, giving           . The size of a full 
state snapshot as received from the server on initialization depends heavily upon avatar location within 
the DVE. I measured values between 26 KB for a quiet area to 125 KB for a busy one. I choose      = 
62.5 KB, roughly halfway between the two extremes. I assume   is 10, a compromise between very 
busy areas with tens of mutually interacting avatars, and very quiet areas with only enough 
connections to maintain P2P topology. I assume the P2P version of World of Warcraft at a minimum 
needs to propagate state updates to affected parties, which is the basis of my traffic analysis. 
5.2 Threat model 
Carbon is an auditing system intended to provide DVEs a way to identify cheaters (nodes violating 
DVE software rules). To help evaluate its efficacy, this section contains a variety of threats derived 
from game DVEs such as WoW and Quake, typical deployed DVEs. These threats are described in 
terms of the STRIDE [62] [65] model and the relevant categories in Yan and Randell’s cheat 
taxonomy [134]. I believe these represent a significant category of threats, and serve to provide an 
illustration of strengths and weaknesses in the Carbon approach. Many of the example threats outlined 
below are detailed in Hogland and McGraw’s book on cheating in MMOGs [64] and a “state of the art” 
description of cheating by Schloss-Griffin in [119]. 
 
Threat 1: Network packet modification for performance enhancement 
STRIDE: Tampering 
Category: Cheating by exploiting lack of secrecy 
Description: State updates are modified in flight, circumventing user input and local client 
consistency checks. Aimbots use this technique, via a network proxy which 
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modifies “shoot” packets in flight, changing the aim-point to always hit the 
opponent, instead of reflecting the manual aiming normally required. 
 
Threat 2: Local DVE rule circumvention 
STRIDE: Tampering 
Category:  Cheating by exploiting misplaced trust 
Description: Avatar breaks DVE state update rules, for example by casting spells, moving, or 
attacking more quickly than allowed, or without the required skill or materials. 
This is done by either modifying local client code to disable certain checks, or by 
directly modifying system memory holding relevant values.  
 
Threat 3: Collusion for rule circumvention 
STRIDE:  Tampering 
Category:  Cheating by collusion. Cheating by exploiting misplaced trust 
Description: For DVEs where avatar-related state is owned by third parties, colluding with 
those third parties to modify avatar state in a fashion contrary to DVE rules. This 
can be for the advantage of an attacker avatar, or to the detriment of a target 
avatar. One example would be editing an avatar’s current or maximum health to 
be higher or lower than it actually is. 
 
Threat 4: Time stamp forgery 
STRIDE:  Tampering 
Category:  Timing cheating 
Description: When receiving an update which a client wishes to prevent, they can issue a 
conflicting update with an earlier timestamp. This typically results in rollback of 
the undesirable state, and revision of state to reflect the forged message as 
preceding and possibly invalidating the prevented update. Alternatively, a client 
can execute the “delayed update” attack to choose the most advantageous action 
in relation to the received update, and send their update message out time stamped 
earlier than the actual time to exploit this knowledge. 
 
Threat 5: DVE message forgery 
STRIDE:  Spoofing identity 
Category:  Cheating by exploiting lack of secrecy 
Description: The attacker can forge messages, making a node appear to request or authorize a 
state change which it did not. Examples include forging messages indicating an 
enemy avatar dropped its weapons, took off its armor, ran off  a cliff, etc.  
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Threat 6: Inconsistent state representation 
STRIDE:  Tampering  
Category:  (none) 
Description:  The attacker provides a different value for their current state to different nodes. 
For example, the attacker could tell every other avatar that they are located close 
to that avatar so the attacker’s node will be notified of all avatar movement and 
positions, rather than just those near the avatar. 
 
Threat 7: Theft of virtual assets 
STRIDE:  Spoofing 
Category:  Cheating related to virtual assets. Cheating by compromising passwords 
Description: This includes transfer of gold or items in a game such as WoW without the 
authorization of the rightful owner. The most common attack vector is a 
compromised account name and password, coupled with valid in-game 
mechanisms to move the assets to a new account.  
 
Threat 8: Automating behaviors in violation of DVE rules 
STRIDE:  (none) 
Category:  Cheating by exploiting machine intelligence. Cheating by modifying client 
infrastructure 
Description:  Scripting avatar behavior so that it automatically acquires resources and performs 
without the user having to be present. Farm bots and fishing bots are two 
examples from WoW. WowGlider [88] (now defunct) was a commercially 
available cheat utility which implemented this attack. 
 
Threat 9: Unauthorized information access 
STRIDE:  Information disclosure 
Category:  Cheating by exploiting misplaced trust. Cheating by modifying client 
infrastructure 
Description:  Obtaining DVE state the attacker is not entitled to know. For example, position 
and distance of victim avatars outside of avatar’s area of interest, or whose 
position should be obscured (e.g. by a wall using wall hacks), configuration of 
dynamic resources and territories on unexplored portions of a map, or the contents 
of unopened objects such as chests.  
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Many of these threats are mitigated or partially mitigated in a client-server implementation, but 
new mitigations would need to be enacted for a distributed – e.g. hybrid or P2P – implementation of a 
DVE.  
Impact of Carbon in addressing these threats will be discussed at the end of this chapter. 
5.3 Carbon 
Distributed virtual environments (DVEs) are large collections of state, and rules for modifying that 
state. Carbon is an auditing system allowing DVEs to detect illegal state changes.  
DVEs must meet certain prerequisites in order to use Carbon. Section 5.3.1 spells out those 
requirements, and introduces nomenclature for discussing how Carbon interacts with eligible DVEs.  
Carbon consists of two modules: an audit client embedded in each DVE client node, and an 
auditor embedded in DVE code running on one or more trusted nodes. The auditor evaluates recorded 
DVE state, verifying legality of the simulation run as viewed at a given participant node.  
Carbon is DVE-agnostic. It does not understand the intricacies of how a given DVE operates. 
Instead, it provides a set of basic services DVEs use to organize auditable information. In most cases, 
adopting Carbon requires little modification of the DVE. 
The remainder of section 5.3 is divided into four parts. Section 5.3.1 outlines DVE requirements 
and introduces nomenclature. Section 5.3.2 describes Carbon audit client requirements, and the client 
Reporter component in detail. Section 5.3.3 describes the Carbon Auditor component. Section 5.3.4 
provides an example illustrating behavior of a DVE using Carbon. Note: the reader may wish to skim 
section 5.3.4 before reading further, to help motivate nomenclature and design.  
5.3.1 Nomenclature and DVE requirements  
The diversity of DVE types has led to an explosion of different nomenclature. This section provides 
my preferred nomenclature (listed in Table 13), and lists a set of requirements a DVE must meet to 
adopt Carbon. 
 
Symbol Meaning 
  
  State at node   at time   
   Event received at time   
    DVE identity for node   
  
       Audit log for node   from    to 
    
     Message from node   to node    
 
Table 13: DVE nomenclature 
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A node is a DVE instance running on a computing resource, typically providing the view and 
interaction point for a single avatar. State is the collection of all local authoritative and shadow state. 
An event is defined by the DVE itself, but is typically anything except a node state snapshot: it may be 
a state change, a user command, or anything else. A message is a container for DVE or Carbon 
information. It can contain state snapshots, events, audit log extracts, etc. 
Undecorated numeric or variable subscripts refer to a specific node. Subscripts prefixed with   
refer to Carbon auditors. For example,      describes a message from participant node   to Carbon 
auditor     Superscripts refer to a time or time interval. For example,   
     
 refers to an interval of node 
 ’s log from time    to time   , inclusive. 
In order for Carbon to operate, a DVE should be able to simulate forward from state snapshots 
using events, to compare states for similarity, and to determine whether a given event is legal to apply 
to a given state. DVEs which offer recording and replay of games – such as Quake III – already meet 
these requirements. 
Formally, a DVE is a collection of state for the   active nodes   ⋃   
 
    and a set of rules for 
changing that state. The overall DVE state   is a union of individual node state   . Individual nodes 
may have overlapping DVE state. Ideally one copy of a given state variable is authoritative and the 
rest are shadow (non-authoritative) copies, but this is not required. 
An event   is a state change or command which can result in state change for a given node’s state, 
i.e.   
                      
     
   , where            . Given the state of a node at any two 
times in the DVE, it should always be possible to reach the successor state by taking the predecessor 
state and applying a series of ProcessEvent operations with the appropriate events.  
The DVE must be able to communicate state between nodes via messages. A node must be able to 
initialize itself based upon a combination of local state, and received state and event messages. Again, 
these requirements are already met by most DVEs. 
DVE state changes must be deterministic. This does not rule out choosing state changes randomly, 
but a given random choice must induce a deterministic change, and both the choice and change are 
events which should be logged. 
5.3.2 Carbon audit client: “Reporter” 
The Carbon audit client is a small module implementing the DVE participant node portion of Carbon. 
I refer to this code module as the reporter, since it is responsible for taking notes on the client’s 
behavior and interaction, and reporting these to the auditor. The reporter is implemented as a library, 
invoked as required by DVE client code.  
The reporter provides information the auditor needs to perform audits. It is a store for client state 
snapshots and events both generated at and received by the DVE node. Events consist of any 
information material for determining state changes. This typically consists of outgoing and incoming 
5.  TRUSTED AUDITING OF DECENTRALIZED DVES 
 
84 
 
DVE messages, but may include other information such as mouse moves and key clicks, depending 
upon the DVE’s needs. 
From the reporter’s perspective, state snapshots and events are opaque data blobs, stored as simple 
byte arrays. Neither the reporter nor the auditor components have any knowledge of how the DVE 
operates, or what event and state data mean. 
The reporter exposes the interfaces described in Table 14 for the exclusive use of the DVE node. 
 
Function Description 
Startup Initialize the reporter  
Shutdown Shut down the reporter 
Log Add an event or state to the 
log 
Commit Commit to the auditor 
RequestAudit Request an audit  
ProcessMessage Process a Carbon message 
RetrieveNotice Retrieve a Carbon 
notification 
ReleaseNotice Release a retrieved 
notification  
 
Table 14: Reporter functions 
 
The reporter does not have a thread, and does not directly transmit network messages. The DVE 
node calls Startup to initialize the reporter. It provides the local node ID and a trusted auditor ID. It 
calls Shutdown to release any transient reporter data and flush data to storage.  
The DVE node submits auditable events and state to the reporter via the Log function. Log takes 
the log data type (event / state), DVE time, and byte array as parameters. The DVE node periodically 
calls Commit to submit its most recent state snapshot to the auditor.  
Upon receiving a remote message intended for the reporter – typically from a trusted auditor – the 
DVE node calls ProcessMessage with the sender ID and message payload. The two cases where this 
happens today are: 
1. Requesting an audit log extract. 
2. Supplying audit results. 
If the DVE node wants a remote node audited, it calls RequestAudit with that node’s ID, the 
minimum DVE time range to audit, and an optional state snapshot. This function would typically be 
called when a DVE node is informed of state which it doubts, for example with the arrival of a new 
avatar.  
The reporter uses notices to communicate relevant information to the DVE node. The DVE node 
calls RetrieveNotice to retrieve a notice whenever a reporter call indicates a notice is waiting, and 
ReleaseNotice to free it. 
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There are two reasons the reporter returns data to the DVE node via a notice: 
1. To request message transmission, for example in response to a received message, or as the 
result of a call to Commit. 
2. To provide audit results to the DVE node. 
5.3.3 Carbon auditor: “Auditor” 
The auditor is provided as a small library used by the DVE. It runs as a trusted DVE system 
component with the primary purpose of accepting state snapshots and performing DVE audits.  
The auditor is an advisory component. It does not directly make decisions. It provides a 
framework for collecting information the DVE can use to make audit decisions, and for disseminating 
the results to reporters. The DVE controls when an audit should be performed, audit success 
evaluation, and what action to take upon a successful or failed audit.  
The auditor can be embedded within an existing DVE server component. Or, a new purpose-built 
code base can exchange messages and perform audits on behalf of the auditor. Like the reporter, the 
auditor has no thread of its own. 
 
Function Description 
Startup Initialize the auditor 
Shutdown Shut down the auditor 
RequestAudit Require an audit 
CompleteAudit Provide audit results 
ProcessMessage Process a Carbon message 
RetrieveNotice Retrieve a Carbon 
notification 
ReleaseNotice Release a retrieved 
notification 
 
Table 15: Auditor functions 
 
The table above lists auditor library functions. Most fulfill the same function as their namesakes in 
Section 5.3.2. The only new interface is CompleteAudit, used by the DVE server to return audit results 
to the Carbon auditor, along with a list of IDs to notify. 
ProcessMessage can receive three different messages, each of which raises a new notice the 
auditor must retrieve via a call to RetrieveNotice. 
1. StateNotice, a state snapshot message. 
2. AuditRequestNotice, an audit request message. 
3. AuditResultNotice, an audit result message, for example a local audit result. 
4. LogNotice, a requested log excerpt.  
Each time the auditor receives a new state snapshot message, it persists the state, and retrieves the 
immediate predecessor and successor state snapshots for that participant – if any. This provides the 
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basis of a state notice the DVE server can use to determine if it should perform an audit. For example, 
if the magnitude of changes between subsequent state snapshots seems very unlikely, it may trigger an 
audit.  
If an audit is required, the DVE server calls RequestAudit. This call is authoritative since it is 
made by an auditor, and results in a log excerpt request for the audited node.  
When the log excerpt is received and raised as a notice, the DVE server retrieves it, and performs 
an audit based on the earlier state notice and the log excerpt. It notifies the auditor of the result by 
calling CompleteAudit with the final state and the audit success or failure. The auditor sends a 
corresponding audit result notification to the audited party, and to any other participant listed in the 
optional audit notification list, including potentially itself. 
The example in Section 5.3.4 below illustrates the system. 
5.3.4 Carbon system operation 
This section provides a detailed example of a DVE using the Carbon auditing system. I assume a P2P 
DVE with unique participant identities. Participants can connect and disconnect from the DVE at will, 
resuming their activities whenever they have time. For my example, suppose the DVE requires a state 
snapshot every 15 minutes.  
As a reminder, the system has four types of actors: A DVE node is a client instance. It contains a 
Carbon reporter, responsible for Carbon client activities. The DVE server is a trusted DVE component. 
It contains a Carbon auditor, which coordinates auditing. This is illustrated in Figure 9, with two client 
nodes, Alice and Bob. 
 
Figure 9: Carbon system 
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Alice wishes to continue her avatar’s virtual life. She starts up her DVE node. As part of 
initialization, the DVE node code calls Startup(    ,     ), initializing the Carbon reporter with her 
ID and the ID of a trusted auditor.  
The DVE node loads Alice’s avatar and finishes integrating it into the DVE. The DVE node 
serializes a copy of Alice’s avatar state and invokes Log(  ,   
   ), which stores the state snapshot to 
the local audit log. Then it invokes Commit() which packages the latest state snapshot into a message 
for the auditor. Commit() signals the DVE node that a new notice is available for retrieval from the 
reporter. A call to RetrieveNotice() retrieves the message       to send to the auditor. The DVE node 
connects to the appropriate DVE server, transmits the message, and calls ReleaseNotice(     ) to 
release its copy of the network message. 
The DVE server receives the message, and ensures the sender matches the message source ID. It 
notes that the message target ID belongs to its hosted auditor, and invokes ProcessMessage(     ). 
The auditor deserializes the message, and saves the received state snapshot    
   into its state snapshot 
table for Alice. The auditor constructs a StateNotice notification triple      (  
    ,  
  ,  ), and 
notifies the DVE server. The DVE server invokes RetrieveNotice() and receives the StateNotice. It 
evaluates the state snapshots, determines no audit is needed, and calls ReleaseNotice(  ) to return the 
resources back to the auditor. 
Alice participates in the DVE, with her DVE node sending and receiving network messages with 
state changes. Her DVE node also accepts and processes her local input. Each inbound and outbound 
network message – with the exclusion of Carbon messages – is considered an event, and its payload is 
logged to the reporter log via a call to Log( ,  
  ). The DVE can optionally record Alice’s inputs for 
auditing. Input events can be stored in a local event queue. Each time a network message is sent or 
received, the DVE empties the local event buffer contents into a new “user input” event message, and 
logs it. The reporter and auditor do not differentiate between these two categories of events, though the 
DVE server does.  
During Alice’s session, her avatar encounters a new avatar Bob. When Alice’s DVE node receives 
the message describing Bob’s avatar state        
  , it decides to request Bob be audited. Alice’s 
DVE node invokes RequestAudit(  ,    ,   
  ), which creates a new audit request message, which 
her node retrieves from the reporter and sends to the auditor on the DVE server. 
The auditor looks up Bob’s state snapshots which fall within or immediately precede the audit 
interval. In this case, suppose there is a single previous snapshot   
    . An AuditRequestNotice 
(  
                   is created by the auditor and retrieved by the DVE server. The DVE server 
compares the states and timespan, and determines an audit is warranted. The DVE server invokes 
RequestAudit(   ,     ,   ) specifying who and over what interval to audit. The auditor constructs a 
log excerpt request (   ,     ,   ) and transmits it to Bob’s reporter via a notice and DVE-
transmitted message, as explained above.  
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Bob’s reporter constructs a serialized log excerpt   
          
 of Bob’s events between      and   , 
then sends the auditor the excerpt as above.  
The auditor extracts the message and embeds the excerpt in a LogNotice. The DVE server pairs 
this excerpt with the state snapshots it already had, and forward simulates from      to    checking 
the legality of each event as it is processed. Once the simulation time reaches   , the DVE server 
compares      with its calculated version in   
  . If the state variables specified in     match the 
value of the same state variables in   
   then the audit passes. Otherwise it fails.  
If the audit was successful, the DVE server makes a list with Alice and Bob’s IDs. If the audit 
failed, it makes a list which includes Alice, Bob, and any other participants the DVE server wishes to 
notify of the audit failure, such as Bob’s neighbors.  
The auditor constructs a series of audit result messages containing notification of audit results, one 
per recipient in its list, and transmits the notifications to recipients as above.  
When a reporter receives the audit result, it creates an AuditResultNotice (    , 
    ,   ,       ) and passes it to its DVE node. The DVE node code is responsible for performing 
an appropriate action, such as continuing simulation, or disconnecting from Bob. 
5.4 Analysis 
P2P DVEs have more security vulnerabilities than client-server DVEs. State storage and modification 
is performed on untrusted peers, increasing their vulnerability to client misbehavior, collusion, and 
inconsistency attacks. There is no guarantee peers responsible for these activities are executing the 
prescribed code base and obeying DVE rules. A P2P DVE system requires means for correct nodes to 
ensure correctness of other nodes behavior, whether directly or indirectly.  
Participants in large-scale P2P DVEs typically possess only a fragment of the overall DVE state, 
some authoritative, and some cached shadow state. They rely upon other DVE nodes to provide them 
with shadow state updates at appropriate times, for example when another participant moves within 
their area of interest. 
Given a set of trusted audit servers, Carbon allows a DVE to mitigate vulnerabilities related to 
misrepresentation of state, and to detect illegal state modification. More specifically, while the system 
cannot guarantee the represented state is correct, it can at least guarantee that the represented state is 
reachable from an earlier (trusted) state, and that the avatar presenting the state can produce an event 
sequence which reaches the represented state. This provides partial mitigation for client misbehavior, 
collusion, and inconsistency attacks. 
The remainder of this section analyzes the behavior and overhead of Carbon. Since PeerReview is 
closely related to Carbon in terms of intent and behavior, I compare and contrast Carbon’s overhead 
with that of PeerReview. 
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Section 5.4.1 discusses Carbon efficacy in terms of the threats outlined in section 5.2. Section 
5.4.2 provides some details on PeerReview’s behavior, and high-level comparison with Carbon. 
Section 5.4.3 provides finer grained details about Carbon and PeerReview’s client resource 
consumption in the DVE scenario. Finally, section 5.4.4 discusses Carbon auditor resource 
consumption. 
5.4.1 Audit coverage 
DVEs implement deterministic state machines. Given access to a state snapshot and an event, any 
node can determine the resulting state. This principle provides the basis of my auditing solution. 
P2P DVE nodes usually perform similar activities to one another, with similar levels of trust, 
ideally none. In some architectures a subset of nodes are granted additional responsibilities for 
coordinating DVE activities, but such responsibilities are typically based upon node resources rather 
than trustworthiness.  
Carbon provides an auditing framework for detecting invalid state transitions within the DVE. The 
DVE can use Carbon-provided data to perform audits, or more complex analysis, such as detecting 
illegal input devices. 
Carbon’s goal is to enable a DVE to ensure avatar integrity and correctness. It is impossible to 
verify avatar state integrity in isolation: the avatar’s state is affected by its environment. A system 
examining only avatar state lacks context to verify it. For example, suppose avatars have a “money 
carried” property, and Alice violates DVE rules by modifying her avatar to have a million dollars. If 
the auditing system evaluates only avatars, and if there is any non-avatar source of money – for 
example money lying on the street – Alice could claim upon audit that her million dollars was found 
on the street, with no way to disprove her claim. By increasing the audit scope to include Alice’s entire 
DVE node state, the auditor has access to context which can help validate or refute Alice’s avatar state: 
it can review her node’s simulation to learn about any money on the street, and can confirm the 
amount is appropriate. If the provenance of the money is suspect, its source in the DVE can also be 
audited, and so on. 
Section 5.2 presented nine threats against DVE integrity. These threats are listed again below, with 
a brief discussion of Carbon’s efficacy against them for distributed scenarios. 
 
Threat 1, Network packet modification for performance enhancement.  
Mitigated. Carbon can prevent attacks which work by externally modifying events, such as a 
network proxy-based aimbot. If messages are modified outside the client, the client is unaware of the 
value of those messages, and cannot adjust its logged message copy or state accordingly. This leads to 
state inconsistency between nodes, and inconsistent messages, both of which are detectable by Carbon 
auditing. 
5.  TRUSTED AUDITING OF DECENTRALIZED DVES 
 
90 
 
 
Threat 2, Local DVE rule circumvention.  
Partially mitigated. Carbon cannot detect modification or replacement of remote client software, or 
the replacement of values in system memory. However, Carbon does ensure externally observed client 
behavior respects DVE rules. These rules are typically related to faithfully executing network protocol, 
and state storage and transition. Carbon partially mitigates this attack. If the network protocol is 
violated, then clients participating in the protocol will see unexpected messages. These messages are 
logged at both the sender and receiver, and the auditor can detect an inconsistency when either party is 
audited. This in turn can trigger an audit of the compromised node, which reveals its misbehavior. 
Carbon also detects illegal state transitions. Audits evaluate state transitions at each node, ensuring 
they follow DVE rules. If they do not, then the auditor can detect this, and flag the node as violating 
DVE rules. 
 
Threat 3, Collusion for rule circumvention.  
Partially mitigated. The collusion attacks Carbon is concerned with involve nodes collaborating to 
selectively subvert or ignore DVE state transitions. If any DVE state is changed without adhering to 
externally observable DVE rules and both parties log their transactions, auditing can detect and expose 
the parties who illegally changed that state, regardless of how they are colluding.  
Specific categories of collusion require additional checks by DVE clients to detect. For example, 
suppose Alice transfers a million dollars to Bob, then clears that transaction from her state and audit 
log. If Bob retains this transaction, then individually each node’s log would appear correct, but a 
million dollars would have been duplicated. Such attacks can be detected by comparing state 
snapshots of interacting clients during audits. For example, Bob’s auditor could flag the transaction 
with Alice as significant, and from its own audit session request an audit of Alice for the same interval, 
providing its calculated state for Alice’s avatar as the state snapshot to compare against. Alice’s audit 
would fail, because the state provided by Bob’s auditor would differ significantly from the state 
calculated by Alice’s auditor. Note that questions of message authenticity (for example, did Bob forge 
the transaction from Alice, or is Alice lying?) needs to be addressed by the DVE. The PeerReview 
auditing system integrates this protection globally via authenticators, but at a dramatic cost as 
discussed in sections 5.4.3 and 5.4.4. I believe selectively protecting against this attack is a better 
compromise for most DVEs in terms of cost vs. benefit. 
 
Threat 4, Time stamp forgery.  
Partially mitigated. Timing attacks involve forging timestamps on packets. Carbon can defend 
against a subset of this attack. To circumvent Carbon auditing, an attacker would create a message, 
forge the timestamp, and rewrite their local audit log to place the message in the correct location in the 
log. So long as the log was not committed to the auditor in the interim, this attack is undetectable. 
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However, modifications which cross a commit boundary could be detected. It is worth noting that 
PeerReview provides stronger protection against this attack, so long as the attack results in a 
reordering of transmitted messages. 
 
Threat 5, DVE message forgery.  
Partially mitigated. Carbon uses a unique numeric identity for each node, but relies upon the DVE 
to ensure those identities are sufficiently strong, and that transactions between DVE nodes are suitably 
identified and secured. While Carbon does not directly address inter-node communications and 
therefore Sybil attacks, meeting its identity requirements in a reasonable fashion provides a basis for 
the DVE to implement standard Sybil attack defenses. 
 
Threat 6, Inconsistent state representation.  
Mitigated. Nodes periodically commit their logs to the auditor. A state commit can only match a 
single sequence of events. If a cheating node sends inconsistent state representations to two nodes, 
only one of those representations can possibly match the auditable event stream the attacker commits 
to. Each node receiving state from the cheating node can request an audit, including the state supplied 
to them by the cheater. If the resulting audit does not match the provided state – which MUST be the 
case for all but one of the receivers of different state – then the audit fails and the cheater is exposed. 
Note that signing transmitted state snapshots may be required to make assertions of received state 
sufficiently strong. 
 
Threat 7, Theft of virtual assets.  
Not mitigated. The virtual asset theft scenario involves compromise of the system outside of the 
DVE rule set, and does not violate any DVE state change rules. Carbon can be used to enforce internal 
consistency of the DVE, not player compliance.  
 
Threat 8, Automating behaviors in violation of DVE rules. 
Not mitigated. Most automation attacks involve forging user input to the DVE by modifying the 
surrounding operating environment. For example, using WowGlider to inject windows events into the 
Windows version of WoW using the Windows API. It may be possible to log additional auditing 
information which would allow such attacks to be detected, but such defenses are outside the default 
scope of Carbon auditing. 
 
Threat 9, Unauthorized information access. 
Partially mitigated. Mitigation depends upon the attack vector. If the unauthorized information is 
obtained by modifying the execution environment, for example replacing system rendering libraries 
and causing the environment to be rendered differently than specified by the DVE, then this threat is 
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not mitigated. Examples of this sort of attack include changing the names of model files to cause 
interesting objects to be easier to see, and using wall hacks to allow rendering of objects which should 
be obscured.  
If, on the other hand, the attack is mounted by requesting and obtaining information the client is 
not entitled to, then Carbon auditing can detect the unexpected request / response and report the 
violation, mitigating the threat.  
 
Exhaustive auditing via Carbon reliably detects most of the threats specified in section 5.2 with 
reasonable overhead, as discussed in section 5.4.3 and 5.4.4. If less expensive auditing is desired, 
DVEs can leverage participant affinity for their avatar, assigning punishment sufficient to deter 
cheaters who believe they will be caught, and reducing the fraction of total transactions audited. The 
DVE should adjust punishment severity and audit probability until an appropriate deterrence is 
achieved. For example, a 50% chance of having their avatar’s lifespan cut short may be sufficient to 
deter most cheating.  
As mentioned earlier, Carbon does not directly evaluate DVE state correctness. Instead, it collects 
and organizes information for the DVE to determine when an audit should be performed. Likewise, 
performing the actual audit is left up to the DVE code itself. An audit can be as straightforward as 
verifying successive state transitions are legal, or as complex as correlating state transitions between 
multiple DVE views from multiple participants, or performing deep data mining to uncover more 
elusive DVE violations such as account sharing or theft [36] and dependency hacks such as wall hacks 
[82].  
5.4.2 Comparison with PeerReview 
PeerReview is a decentralized auditing system with good scalability and correctness guarantees. State 
changes and local transactions relevant to state calculations are stored in certified append-only local 
logs. Log contents are committed by peer exchange of signed log digests, and periodically uploaded to 
untrusted auditors called witnesses. Witnesses simulate forward from a state snapshot through a series 
of logged events to ensure simulation correctness. Based on audit results and general behavior, nodes 
are labeled as trusted, suspected, or exposed (bad).  
Carbon and PeerReview have many similarities. 
 Both are auditing systems, focused on error detection, not error prevention. 
 Both are asynchronous, with auditing performed out of band. 
 Both systems require client nodes to capture system snapshots and events, and to provide 
those events to auditors. 
 Both use third party auditors who, given a state snapshot and a related log excerpt, forward 
simulate through the log excerpt to ensure behavior over the simulated interval is correct. 
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Carbon and PeerReview have a number of differences, as well.  
 Auditor trust. PeerReview can operate even when some auditors misbehave. Carbon trusts 
auditors to be correct.  
o PeerReview: Does not trust individual auditors, and is resilient to a limited number of 
auditor errors. 
o Carbon: Trusts the auditor, and requires that operating auditors be correct. 
 Client log security. PeerReview constructs tamper-evident logs with per-entry tamper 
protection. Carbon achieves tamper evidence by submitting hashes over large sets of log 
entries to the trusted auditor. 
o PeerReview: Allows log validation between any two events, and auditing forward 
from any state snapshot. 
o Carbon: Allows log validation between any two submitted hashes, and auditing 
forward from any state snapshot.  
 Message security. PeerReview provides a mechanism for securing actual message exchanges 
between clients. It effectively creates a signature (“authenticator”) for each message, and 
requires a signed response. This imposes a specific structure on transactions, but provides non-
repudiation, tamper detection on transmit, and many other desirable properties. 
o PeerReview. Message signing and positive acknowledgement of every packet 
provides message non-repudiation, and enables easy detection of certain classes of 
cheat such as omitting key messages from sender logs, but still reporting them on the 
receiver.  
o Carbon. No network message security is provided. Instead, it is expected the DVE 
will have its own transport security, and if desired, perform message validation as part 
of event auditing. 
 Completeness. PeerReview typically audits all events by all clients in the system. Carbon 
uses application feedback to selectively audit suspected intervals.  
o PeerReview: Exhaustive validation of all system behavior. Probabilistic interval 
selection proposed but not described. 
o Carbon: Selective validation. Validation explicitly guided by the application and its 
clients. 
 Inter-client impact. PeerReview affects every inter-client interaction to provide message 
delivery guarantees. Carbon does not, but I believe it provides sufficient security for DVEs. 
o PeerReview: Requires a signed log commit (authenticator) for each transmitted 
message, and a similar receipt acknowledgement.  
o Carbon: Does not affect inter-client traffic. 
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 Implementation. PeerReview’s implementation uses sub-classing from auditor defined 
classes, with an audit event engine driven by PeerReview. Carbon is implemented as an API 
with audit event engine driven by the application. 
o PeerReview: Has total control over audit process, but significant structural and 
integration requirements. 
o Carbon: Application links to Carbon libraries and calls APIs as it sees fit. Carbon has 
no execution threads of its own. 
The remainder of this section provides quantification of some of the differences between Carbon 
and PeerReview, as they pertain to performance. These sections rely heavily upon my description of 
typical DVE characteristics and my WoW-like example in section 5.1.4. Section 5.4.3 describes client 
resource impact of adopting Carbon, and compares it to the overhead required to adopt PeerReview. 
Section 5.4.4 provides a similar analysis for auditor resource requirements.  
5.4.3 Carbon and PeerReview client overhead analysis 
Adopting an auditing or security scheme can have a significant impact on DVE resource consumption. 
Game DVEs are performance-hungry, and many consumers buy high-powered computers specifically 
to improve their DVE performance. Any DVE considering a security model needs to pay careful 
attention to the overhead that model induces. 
This section describes the client overhead associated with Carbon, and contrasts it to the overhead 
for adopting PeerReview for this scenario. It is worth mentioning that DVE traffic patterns – small, 
frequently sent packets – are a worst-case scenario for PeerReview, and a best-case scenario for 
Carbon. The former is a side effect of the broad applicability of PeerReview to distributed network 
protocols, while the latter is an intentional design criteria for Carbon.  
I divide my analysis of client overhead into four categories: network bandwidth, message latency, 
client persistence workload, and CPU overhead.  
5.4.3.1 Bandwidth 
Auditing typically involves transmission of information to auditing parties, and possibly to other 
clients. The most obvious impact of this activity is on client bandwidth consumption. 
Carbon induces additional client network load consisting of: 
 Copying the payload for non-carbon messages sent or received to the client’s auditor, when 
requested by the auditor. If 10% of all transactions are audited, then 10% of payloads will be 
copied to the auditor. 
 Periodic state commits, uploaded regularly to the auditor 
For DVEs which exchange large amounts of state information, full auditing with Carbon increases 
overall client traffic to roughly double its original amount. For more typical DVEs which have small, 
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frequent exchanges of state, Carbon overhead is partially mitigated by the more efficient framing of 
data sent to the auditor: Whereas small payloads are frequently transmitted for normal DVE 
interaction, auditing can bundle up many payloads before transmitting them to the auditor, resulting in 
reduced packet framing costs relative to the payload size. For my example of a WoW-style P2P game, 
this reduces additional bandwidth consumed for propagating events from 100% additional overhead to 
27% additional overhead.  
A subset of PeerReview overhead is similar to that for Carbon, as it must propagate events and 
state snapshots to auditors. However, PeerReview typically has a quorum of auditors for each client, 
so each client transmits these messages several times. In addition, PeerReview has several additional 
sources of overhead, as described below. 
 A PeerReview authenticator must be included in each DVE message. The authenticator is a 
sequence number / SHA-1 hash pair signed with a 1024-bit RSA key, with a total size of 156 
bytes. This is required for each outgoing event message. The authenticator is acknowledged by 
the recipient with a new authenticator roughly the same size, but which needs no additional 
acknowledgement. 
 Each received authenticator is transmitted to every auditor responsible for the authenticator 
creator.  
Suppose both auditing systems have a state snapshot interval  , and a probability   of auditing the 
interval between any two subsequent state snapshots. For subsequent analysis, let me assume    
     seconds, and      .  
In the terms outlined earlier, Carbon bandwidth overhead can be characterized as             
          . PeerReview overhead, assuming a single trusted witness per client rather than a 
quorum, would be                                        Kbps, or           
    Kbps more than Carbon. Plugging my numbers from the WoW-style game above, this gives me 
Carbon auditing overhead of 37.4 Kbps, and PeerReview auditing overhead of 340 Kbps, nearly an 
order of magnitude difference. 
It is worth noting that auditability of an interval for both Carbon and PeerReview relies upon 
having an initial state snapshot, plus a contiguous series of audit log entries through the audited 
interval. Ideally the audit should include a final state snapshot to compare against audit results, 
although this is not strictly necessary. 
This has significant implications for PeerReview auditing interval selection. Even though 
PeerReview provides a tamper-evident log which can be examined between any two intervals, the 
reality is that other than verifying the sequence of messages matches the authenticators for any given 
sub-interval, no auditing can be performed except for an interval starting at a state snapshot. In my 
example above, this means auditing must be performed continuously from the most recent state 
snapshot preceding the interval of interest, providing no state auditing advantage over Carbon. 
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On the other hand, the extra overhead of PeerReview authenticators enables certain protections 
which are weaker or not present in Carbon. 
5.4.3.2 Latency 
Carbon introduces no latency into most client interactions, as it does not modify existing message 
exchange. The only place where latency may be introduced is when the packets for additional 
exchanges with the auditor collide with other DVE traffic. Since auditor traffic is infrequent – on the 
order of an exchange once every several minutes – the overall effect is negligible. Further, the Carbon 
model allows the application to choose when audit traffic is generated and transmitted, so audit 
transmissions can be delayed until a time the application finds convenient. 
PeerReview adds an authenticator to every inter-client event message, resulting in negligible but 
non-zero delivery latency. Specifically, each packet has an extra 156 bytes of data, which on a 1 Mbps 
circuit requires just over a millisecond of extra transit time before the packet is fully received and can 
be decoded. The authenticator also requires cryptography to create, which according to PeerReview’s 
analysis, can induce another 1.5 ms of latency in circa 2007 hardware. This results in a minimum 
latency impact of 2.5 ms, negligible in most WAN scenarios. 
5.4.3.3 Storage 
Both Carbon and PeerReview induce client storage overhead for client logs, roughly equal to the 
node’s network traffic, plus auditing overhead. In my example, a typical week of WoW usage (614 
minutes) [106] for a Carbon DVE client would consume approximately (614 * 60) s * 37.4 Kbps = 
172 MB of audit client storage per client. A PeerReview audit log for the same time period would 
consume 1.57 GB of audit client storage, a larger but still acceptable amount. The difference in log 
size is because of the authenticator required for PeerReview. Each authenticator is relatively small, but 
with an average event payload measured in tens of bytes, two 156-byte authenticators per payload 
represents significant transfer and storage overhead. 
5.4.3.4 CPU 
Client CPU impact is not significant for Carbon, but may be an issue for PeerReview. 
For Carbon, audit entries are retained in the local reporter log, but no cryptographic operations are 
performed upon them, except for a hash every snapshot interval (once per fifteen minutes in my 
example above).  
For PeerReview, each client event message sent or received results in calculation of two non-
signature hashes, an RSA signature, and an RSA signature validation. While hashing is relatively 
quick, signing time can quickly add up, especially for periods with high event rates. 
PeerReview quotes a signing and validation time of 1.5 ms. Each client must sign and verify 
            messages per second. This consists of the    event messages it originates and transmits 
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to subscribers, and the      event messages it receives from other clients and for which it must 
verify the authenticator and create its own signed acknowledgement. In my example above, this is on 
average 50 messages per second, for a total CPU overhead of 75 ms per second. While not prohibitive 
on average, DVE client load has spikes which can easily be an order of magnitude larger than average, 
for example during a WoW battleground melee. This would raise CPU overhead to 750ms per second, 
or 75% of one core, enough to significantly impact DVE client performance. 
5.4.4 Carbon and PeerReview auditors and overhead 
The Carbon auditor is a trusted component which should be encapsulated within a trusted DVE server. 
If no such component (such as a rendezvous server) exists, then one may need to be built. At a 
minimum, the trusted DVE server needs to be able to exchange network messages with DVE clients 
on behalf of the Carbon auditor. It should also be able to authenticate connections and correlate the 
remote party with Carbon identifiers. 
The PeerReview auditor (Witness) is an untrusted component. Faults are detected by statistical 
guarantees based upon the probability of a given auditor being faulty, e.g. cheating. The quorum size 
of auditors per client is determined by the probability of an auditor being faulty and the risk tolerance 
of the system.  
For my PeerReview analysis, I assume no PeerReview auditors are faulty, and so a single auditor 
is sufficient for a given client. This is the best case for PeerReview overhead. 
Auditor overhead can be described in terms of bandwidth, storage, and CPU. I do not consider 
latency, as auditors do not directly participate in DVE transactions, instead auditing out-of-band. Any 
latency introduced between auditors is largely irrelevant to client and overall DVE performance. 
For both systems, the DVE provisions a number of auditors sufficient for its needs, ranging 
anywhere from a single auditor auditing all clients to one auditor per client. Each audit begins with a 
state snapshot, and forward simulates through a series of logged events, checking each state transition 
for correctness. The audit can optionally conclude by comparing resulting state to another state 
snapshot from the audited client.  
Since the client node was able to simulate its portion of DVE state based upon the event stream 
captured by auditing, a single auditor can replay that client’s view of state and state changes. This 
implies each audit can typically be done without regards to any other audits, and so are fully 
decomposable from one another. In some cases it may be desirable to cross-check a subset of audits, 
which may reduce decomposability.  
In addition to the checks above, PeerReview checks received authenticators to make sure 
messages are accurately logged by both sides of each exchange. This defense prevents attacks where 
one side or the other omits a message from their audit log, but not attacks where both do. Carbon does 
not provide this protection. Instead, Carbon relies upon the DVE to take any action it deems necessary 
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to validate message exchange, for example auditing nodes with significant interactions on the same 
auditor, and comparing intermediate states to ensure no significant differences.  
The remainder of this section describes the bandwidth, storage, and CPU requirements for an 
auditor. For my examples below, evaluation is based on the P2P World of Warcraft example. Analysis 
is done for a DVE population              total players, with a steady-state population of 
          active client nodes. For my analysis I specify       auditors are active, for a ratio of 
auditors to active clients of 1 : 1,000. 
5.4.4.1 Bandwidth 
All Carbon client transactions are exchanges between clients and auditors, and so auditor bandwidth 
originating at clients is the aggregate of reporter bandwidth requirements. At a minimum this consists 
of commits, but may also include client audit requests, submission of requested log excerpts to 
auditors, and notification of audit results to clients. This traffic is detailed in section 5.4.3.1. Average 
auditor server bandwidth is (     times the average reporter client bandwidth. Using the example 
values above, average per-auditor bandwidth required would be 3.14 Mbps to have a 99.9% chance of 
detecting cheaters sometime in their avatar lifetime, or 37.4 Mbps for exhaustive auditing, both easily 
within the capabilities of a low end server. 
PeerReview traffic analysis is more complicated in the general case, but somewhat simplified by 
my assumption of fully trusted, non-redundant auditors. Client message authenticators are created, 
written into logs, and then transmitted to a remote party. Both the sender and receiver log the 
authenticator, and the receiver transmits the received authenticator to the sender’s auditor. Whenever 
an auditor performs an audit, it retrieves the log from the audited party, which contains similar data to 
that used by Carbon, plus the associated authenticators. Upon receiving a log excerpt, the auditor 
forwards any authenticators contained within the log – but not created by the log creator – to the 
auditor for the party who created the log excerpt. In addition, auditors periodically request contiguous 
sequences of authenticators from clients to verify log continuity and commitment. There is also a 
challenge protocol to verify nodes are live and responding to messages.  
Since the continuity check and challenge protocol provide functionality not in Carbon, they are 
ignored for the purpose of comparative bandwidth estimation. State snapshot, log excerpt, and 
authenticator exchanges are the remaining traffic sources for auditors. Calculated traffic numbers can 
be divided into two categories: client/auditor exchanges, and auditor/auditor exchanges.  
Using the examples above, calculations from section 5.4.3.1, and assuming exhaustive auditing, 
the per-client contribution to each auditor is 340 Kbps. An additional copy of each authenticator is 
exchanged between auditors, for an additional per-client overhead of                     Kbps. 
Total bandwidth required per auditor is 567 Mbps for my scenario, approximately 15 times as much as 
Carbon. As is the case for clients, the vast majority of this traffic overhead consists of authenticators.  
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5.4.4.2 Storage 
Carbon auditors are responsible for storing state snapshots    on behalf of each client  , submitted as 
determined by the DVE client, but typically with a frequency  . Based on the example DVE 
characteristics and steady-state population, this would result in an average of              
                 GB of data stored per server per week, a trivial amount of storage for modern 
servers. Audit log excerpts sent from reporters to satisfy audit requests are temporarily retained, and 
then discarded after the audit is completed, so they are not factored into this total. 
PeerReview auditors typically retain a copy of logs submitted to them by clients, and must check 
any received authenticators against those logs.  Only one copy of each authenticator needs to be 
retained by each auditor, but it appears twice: once in the sender’s log, and once in the receiver’s log. 
Total storage required per server per week would be                                  
17.1 Terabytes, more than     times as much data as Carbon. This makes retaining full client logs at 
each of the PeerReview auditors impractical. Indeed there is little value in retaining them after a 
successful audit. 
5.4.4.3 CPU 
Both Carbon and PeerReview auditors would consume CPU performing forward simulation in the 
course of auditing. This workload varies from DVE to DVE, but would be similar between both 
systems. Most DVEs consist of state changes which, given a base state and an event, are 
straightforward to calculate. Most CPU on DVE nodes is applied instead to rendering the DVE scene 
for the client, and as mentioned earlier rendering is irrelevant to auditing.  
For exhaustive auditing, each audit server needs to be able to simulate client state changes at the 
same rate it receives new state snapshots. In other words, for each state snapshot that represents   
seconds of changes, the auditor would need to retrieve the previous state snapshot for that node, 
request and receive the audit log excerpt for that period from the node. It would need to verify the 
audit log hash matches the committed hash for that interval, and then forward simulate through the 
events, checking each event for DVE legality, and comparing the submitted final state with the locally 
simulated final state. If the steady state ratio of clients to servers is        , then each server needs to 
be able to simulate at least         DVE instances in real-time.  
PeerReview auditors have an additional CPU overhead introduced by the requirement to verify 
authenticators. Based on the figures quoted in section 5.4.3.4, real-time verification of authenticators 
contained in the logs received from 14 nodes – at 7.5% CPU per log – would saturate a single core. 
This is probably the biggest single obstacle to assigning multiple clients per auditor in the PeerReview 
scheme. PeerReview mitigates this by not requiring auditors be trusted, hence enabling (for example) 
every client to also be an auditor. Unfortunately, creating a quorum of auditors per client multiplies 
both auditor and client resource requirements. 
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In general, CPU will probably be the limiting factor for audit servers for both Carbon and 
PeerReview. Carbon can compensate for this by reducing audit frequency from exhaustive to guided, 
based on the relative difference between state snapshots, and on audit requests submitted by detectors 
at client nodes. 
5.5 Conclusions 
Carbon is a trusted auditing system designed specifically for P2P DVEs. Running the Carbon auditor 
as a trusted rather than untrusted entity allows a Carbon-enabled system to distribute most operations 
amongst DVE participants, while retaining good error detection guarantees.  
Carbon is able to detect many significant forms of cheating in DVEs, allowing it to serve as part of 
a P2P DVE’s security system. Auditing can detect a variety of common attacks, include illegal state 
transitions, inconsistent representation of state to peers, and tools such as aimbot proxies which 
modify inter-node messages. It also obviates collusion as a way of modifying DVE state without 
detection. 
 
Figure 10: Detection probability and audit bandwidth 
 
Carbon achieves this with a modest amount of client overhead. For example, a P2P DVE which 
followed eventing and player patterns similar to World of Warcraft can have a 99.9% chance of 
catching an occasional cheater sometime in their lifetime with 7% auditing, assuming a player lifetime 
of 1,000 hours and cheating once per hour. This level of protection would induce a bandwidth 
overhead of 3.14 Kbps on total non-audit traffic of 138 Kbps, or 2.3%. Exhaustive auditing would 
require 37.4 Kbps, a bandwidth overhead of 27%, still a reasonable margin. Figure 10 shows the 
relationship between audit probability and chance of catching a cheater, and the auditor bandwidth 
impact of choosing that percentage.  
Client CPU overhead would be negligible, and client latency would be unaffected, as Carbon does 
not modify client-to-client interactions and auditing is performed out of band.  
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Client storage overhead is also reasonable. Considering a P2P version of World of Warcraft as a 
usage model, Carbon requires 172 MB per week to store a typical players audit logs. The system could 
be configured with an audit log horizon (such as a week) to minimize client-side storage. Given that a 
game like World of Warcraft can require 5 GB of storage for basic installation, this is less than 4% 
overhead compared to static installation files. 
Carbon performance overhead and security was compared to that provided by PeerReview. In the 
domain of DVEs, Carbon provides similar protection with less than a tenth of the network traffic, less 
than a hundredth of the storage requirements, and significantly less CPU than PeerReview requires. 
This suggests that Carbon is a better choice for auditing DVEs, as it was designed to be. 
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6 Untrusted collaboration 
The final contribution this dissertation makes for DVE security is a straight-forward extension of 
secure coin flipping, and was presented at NOSSDAV 2009 under the title “Probabilistic event 
resolution with the pairwise random protocol” [97]. 
This algorithm is light-weight to implement, and can be used in any scenario where adversaries 
wish to fairly resolve probabilistic events. 
6.1 Introduction 
Distributed virtual environments (DVEs) are virtual environment (VE) simulations run on two or more 
nodes. Nodes are defined as individual software instances contributing to the DVE, usually running on 
separate computers connected by a network. DVEs usually follow one of two models: client-server or 
peer-to-peer. Client-server DVEs perform important operations on trusted nodes, and so can typically 
trust state representation and state transition calculations. Peer-to-peer DVEs, however, distribute 
more of the state-keeping and transition work to untrusted nodes, requiring additional steps to secure 
the DVE.  
Some DVEs combine deterministic and probabilistic state changes. For example, avatars in World 
of Warcraft (WoW) have an arsenal of skills, spells, weapons, and armor at their disposal. The game is 
balanced so each set of choices – each configuration - is strong against some adversary configurations, 
and weak against others. Further, the selection of the strategy to compete with opponents, depending 
upon those opponents’ configurations and strategy choices, can make a huge difference in the outcome 
of battles. Analysis of these combinations and configurations has spawned an entire arm of 
investigation for WoW, called theorycraft. The damage dealt by a sensible configuration vs. that dealt 
by an optimal configuration can easily differ by a factor of two or more. The choice of avatar skills, 
spells, weapons, armor, and strategy is the deterministic part of competition, and like chess, broad 
strategies and short-term choices both have significant impact on outcome.  
The probabilistic attributes of the DVE also impacts combat outcome. For example, a particular 
attack from an avatar may be assigned a 4 in 5 chance of successfully hitting an opponent. The damage 
inflicted per successful strike may be evenly distributed between 100 and 500 points. Averaged over a 
long combat, the expected value of damage dealt by this attack would be             
      –                  points per attack. In the shorter term, however, a player may be extremely 
unlucky. It is possible – though unlikely - for five attacks to miss in a row, or for attacks which hit to 
do minimum damage, underperforming expected values.  
How can such DVE transactions be successfully resolved between a pair of competitors, when 
both are incented to cheat, for example to claim they always hit, and they always do maximum damage, 
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or that their opponent always misses? There are a variety of solutions which address resolving the 
deterministic aspects of competition, but none which address the probabilistic portions.  
This chapter outlines a pairwise random protocol (PRP) for untrusted nodes to fairly generate 
random bit sequences which can be used to resolve probabilistic events. PRP allows adversaries to 
fairly resolve sequences of actions without requiring intervention from a third party, trusted or 
otherwise.   
The remainder of this chapter presents PRP and analyzes its benefits. Section 6.2 provides a brief 
overview of DVE security research, and the foundation of bit commitment and secure coin flipping. 
Section 6.3 presents two variations of PRP. Section 6.4 discusses PRP’s attributes and performance 
compared to a trusted third party (TTP). Section 6.5 presents a final summary. 
6.2 Related work 
Relevant related work falls into two categories: DVE security research, and secure multi-party 
computation.  
DVE security research covers a variety of different aspects of DVE correctness, but does not 
generally address fair resolution of probabilistic events without a trusted third party. Details on DVE 
security research can be found in section 5.1.  
Secure multi-party computation is a set of techniques allowing adversaries to calculate a 
function’s value without revealing their contributions to that function. This makes it particularly well 
suited for adversaries to create a pseudo random bit sequence: the adversaries want to ensure neither 
can control the values determined by the calculation. If either was able to learn the input of the other 
during calculation, they could modify their own input to create the desired sequence. By keeping the 
inputs secret – at least until after the sequence is calculated - we ensure neither party can control the 
output of a well-formed pseudo-random number generation function. 
6.2.1 Secure multi-party computation 
Secure multi-party computation (SMC) is a field of cryptography allowing two or more parties to 
calculate the value of a function of one or more variables without revealing each of their inputs to that 
function.  
One early example of SMC is secure coin flipping, introduced by Blum in [24]. In essence, Blum 
proposes using a secure one-way function      to enable Alice and Bob to verifiably flip a fair coin, 
even though they are adversaries.  In the simplest case, this is a three step process, where Bob tries to 
guess if a bit sequence   chosen by Alice is even or odd.  If he is correct, he wins the coin toss. 
Otherwise he loses. 
1. Alice chooses a bit vector  , then tells Bob     .  
2. Bob tells Alice his guess as to whether   is even or odd. 
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3. Alice reveals   to Bob.  
At the end of the exchange, Bob can calculate      to ensure Alice did not change   after learning 
Bob’s guess.  
Another example of SMC is Yao’s solution to the Millionaires’ problem [135]. In this example, 
two millionaires Alice and Bob each have between   and   million dollars. They want to find out 
which is richer, without either revealing the actual amount of their wealth. Yao provides a general 
solution for comparing two integer values in a limited domain (e.g.   is an integer between 1 and 10), 
and determining which is greater. Yao’s solution is complex and expensive, requiring a mutually 
agreed table of    integers, calculation and transformation of that table by each participant in the 
calculation, and transmission of a derived table by one of the participants. Using such a protocol to 
create a random bit sequence (for example, a 32-bit sequence which has more than 4 billion unique 
values) would be expensive and impractical in the scenario of a DVE. 
Oblivious transfer (OT) [116] allows Alice to send two messages to Bob, and be assured that Bob 
will only receive one of them, although Alice will not know which one. A refinement to the original 
OT protocol called one-to-two oblivious transfer [49] is a common component to many SMC 
implementations, as it can be used to determine a random bit between adversaries. Like Yao’s solution 
to the Millionaires’ problem, oblivious transfer is expensive in terms of computation and information 
transferred.  
Of these techniques, secure coin flipping is the lightest weight, and so the one chosen as the basis 
of PRP. 
6.3 Pairwise Random Protocol (PRP) 
The pairwise random protocol (PRP) provides a way for two competing nodes in a DVE to fairly 
resolve probabilistic events.  
Consider a DVE with nodes, Alice and Bob. Each node controls an avatar, and those avatars are 
interacting. Given a consistent, verifiable view of the simulation state, the goal is to enable Alice and 
Bob to fairly resolve a set of probabilistic events. For example, Alice and Bob are engaged in combat, 
with a certain probability of each successfully attacking their opponent, and a variable amount of 
damage inflicted per successful attack.  
Each node is incented to cheat to resolve actions in their favor. Alice wants all of her attacks to 
succeed, and all of Bob's attacks to fail. Alice wants each of her hits to inflict maximum damage, and 
each of Bob's hits - should he manage to get any - to inflict minimum damage. PRP ensures that - 
given consistent views of world state - Alice and Bob can fairly resolve probabilistic interactions such 
as determining attack success and selecting the amount of damage inflicted within the specified range. 
As Alice and Bob are participating in the same DVE, several simplifying assumptions can be made.  
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 Alice and Bob each know the correct DVE rules. Even if Alice is running a modified version 
of the DVE software, she has the unmodified code at her disposal for verifying validity of 
Bob’s activities. 
 Alice and Bob have access to identical pseudo-random number generators, and these 
generators provide “suitably random” sequences for the DVE to resolve probabilistic 
sequences of activities.  
 Alice and Bob can communicate with each other.  
Given these assumptions, any probabilistic activity which affects either party can be defined as an 
adversarial activity.  
Before resolving the success or failure of an adversarial activity, Alice and Bob must specify the 
activity to be decided. For example, Alice and Bob must agree that they are performing PRP to 
calculate whether or not Alice succeeds in attacking Bob. This has two benefits: 
1. It ensures that the losing party in a PRP exchange cannot claim the exchange was intended to 
determine outcome of a different activity, e.g. whether Alice gets crumbs on her jacket from 
eating a donut, rather than success in combat.  
2. It allows a cryptographic proof of participation in the activity to be generated. This reduces the 
utility of the loser refusing to continue the exchange.  
This binding can preface the PRP exchange, or be performed as part of it. Discussions of methods 
for doing this are out of scope of this dissertation. 
Section 6.3.1 describes the core PRP protocol to resolve a single probabilistic event. Section 6.3.2 
proposes a refinement for generating a pseudo-random sequence without either adversary controlling 
the sequence.  
6.3.1 Resolving a single action 
Probabilistic actions can be resolved by a series of secure coin flips with a pre-agreed interpretation. 
For example, Alice and Bob can agree that Alice has a 5 in 8 chance of successfully attacking Bob. 
Alice therefore needs to generate a random number between 1 and 8, and if it is 5 or less, her attack 
succeeds. Alice and Bob can generate this number by flipping a fair coin three times to generate a 3-
digit binary number, with heads being a   and tails a  . As long as correct sequencing of flip results 
used as bits is guaranteed, resolving a single arbitrarily scaled probabilistic event – such as this one - 
can be reduced to ensuring a single coin can be fairly flipped.  
The basic protocol for Alice and Bob to determine a random bit without requiring a trusted third 
party is described below, and illustrated in Figure 11. Note this exchange is roughly equivalent to 
Blum’s secure coin flip protocol [24].  
1. Alice and Bob each privately choose a bit vector of length 1,    and    respectively.  
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2. Alice generates a (possibly zero-length) nonce    known only to her, and uses a cryptographic 
hash     to generate a digest           . She sends   to Bob. 
3. Bob makes a note of Alice's digest  , and sends his bit vector     to Alice. 
4. Upon receipt of Bob's bit vector, Alice transmits her nonce   and bit vector    to Bob. Bob 
verifies that the hash of these values          matches the previously received digest  .  
5. Alice and Bob XOR their own bit vector with their adversary's bit vector to determine the 
outcome of the exchange. In the case of a single-bit bit vector, if        then the result is 0. 
Otherwise it is 1. 
As long as each message is eventually received, and Alice chooses a nonce of sufficient size to 
diversify values for , Alice and Bob can be assured that the binary result is fairly determined. It does 
not matter whether Alice and Bob randomly or deliberately select their bit vectors. As long as Alice 
and Bob are not collaborating, there is a 50% chance of the bit being 1, and a 50% chance it is 0.  
 
Figure 11: Single bit PRP exchange 
 
Barring retransmissions, a minimum of three messages comprising one-and-a-half round trips are 
required to complete a single PRP exchange, as shown in Figure 11. If low latency is more important 
than a low message count, latency can be reduced to a single round trip by adding a message and 
making the exchange symmetric, as shown in Figure 12. Note that this optimization may open 
additional attack vectors. 
 
Figure 12: Symmetric single bit PRP exchange 
 
This protocol can be trivially extended to provide an arbitrarily long random bit vector by 
changing the number of bits in    and   . For example, rather than performing three sets of 
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exchanges for Alice to generate her three-bit random number,  she can simply replace     with a 3-bit 
bit vector, and instruct Bob to do the same with   . 
This version of PRP is secure, but requires several network messages for each random value 
provided. Depending upon the security requirements of the DVE, it is possible to obtain acceptable 
results with less overhead, as detailed below. 
6.3.2 Resolving an unbounded random sequence 
Interactions in DVEs are often comprised of long sequences of actions. Requiring a three or four 
message exchange for each action by each participant is secure and fair, but slow and expensive.  
An alternative is to resolve more bits than are required for the current event, and to use the next 
sequence of unused bits for each subsequent activity. While efficient from a protocol perspective, this 
extension suffers from a look-ahead vulnerability in terms of consumption. Once Alice and Bob finish 
the exchange and determine the bit sequence, neither can change the bits. However, they can modify 
their behavior to consume the bits in an advantageous way.  
For example, suppose Alice can execute any of four actions interchangeably: she can tie her shoes 
(random chance of failure), skip a rock (random number of skips), pick a flower (random length of 
stem), or build a house (random number of rooms). Each action has a different cost and benefit for 
Alice. If Alice knows the sequence of bits which will be consumed to determine the outcome of her 
probabilistic actions, she can “look ahead” to determine the most favorable sequence to execute. For 
example, she can pick flowers to consume undesirable bits, waiting to build a house until the next set 
of bits guarantee she builds a house with the maximum number of rooms.  
Another alternative to provide random values for a series of activities is to use PRP to determine a 
random seed for a pseudo-random generator. Alice and Bob agree on how the pseudo-random stream 
will be used, then use PRP to create a bit vector of an appropriate size to seed the generator. Since 
both Alice and Bob have copies of the random number generator, they can each validate the sequence 
generated using the resolved bits seed, and the subsequent results. Note that the idea of using a 
pseudo-random generator to create a sequence of random numbers which can be verified by all 
participants is suggested in [79]. 
6.4 Results  
PRP as described in Section 6.3.1 provides a reliable but relatively expensive source of bits to fairly 
resolve adversarial probabilistic events. Section 6.3.2 describes a less expensive variant of PRP, but at 
the cost of enabling look-ahead cheats, and allowing participants to unfairly optimize the order of 
events which consume those bits.  
DVE authors should carefully examine impact of look-ahead exploitation before using the random 
seed or pre-generation approaches to generating bit sequences. Real-time interactive DVEs such as 
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network games may be so dynamic that the look-ahead vulnerability is of no practical concern, 
especially if the bit stream is refreshed every few seconds. For example, Alice may have only a small 
number of action choices at any given time, and attempting to bias her choice according to attributes 
of the random bit stream may provide less value – even when done via an automatic enhancement 
hack - than selecting the most appropriate action at the time. 
While PRP performance overhead is greater than the overhead of working directly with a TTP, the 
cause is not solely the algorithm itself. Distributing activities normally performed by a TTP to 
unreliable, untrusted nodes can introduce significant overheads to DVE activities, as noted in several 
of the previously cited DVE security works. Still, informed choices can minimized this overhead. The 
performance analysis below is provided to help DVE authors understand trade-offs in different PRP 
usage scenarios. 
DVEs often rely upon congruent random generators running on a TTP to determine the outcome 
of probabilistic actions. For example, Quake III uses calls to their random generator to determine 
variations in projectile direction due to weapon recoil. The random number generator typically used in 
deployed network games is from the ‘C’ standard library, and typically provides a two byte random 
number. 
In a game with trusted third parties, the TTP can often produce and consume random numbers 
locally on behalf of a given client. Alternatively, it can provide the random number to the client for the 
client to consume in its local activities. In peer-to-peer DVEs, the system should not rely upon a TTP 
for common activities. The client should ideally be able to resolve probabilistic events without TTP 
intervention. For the DVE to be fair, this must be done in a way which does not allow the value to be 
chosen by the same client consuming it.  
The following two subsections discuss PRPs security and performance properties, using this 
scenario to illustrate those properties. 
6.4.1 Security 
Most deployed DVEs are implemented as client-server applications. From the client perspective, the 
server acts as a trusted third party (TTP). The server is explicitly trusted to fairly resolve probabilistic 
events on behalf of its clients. In other words, over the course of many trials, the client expects the 
distribution of results to roughly match the probability of each outcome. 
Even in the TTP case, outcome can be biased by many factors, such as the source of random 
numbers for event resolution. Methods for generating suitably random numbers are out of scope of this 
section. Instead, the goal is to support the proposition that given two adversaries, neither adversary can 
predictably bias the resulting random bit vector. As long as appropriate precautions are taken, this 
should provide probabilistic event resolution of a quality no worse than that available from a TTP.  
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Let Alice be a node undertaking PRP to create a random bit vector for her consumption, and Bob 
an adversary participating in that PRP exchange. The goal is to prove that so long as Alice and Bob 
cannot predict the value of their adversary’s bit vector  , neither can bias the result of the PRP 
exchange.  
To do this, four properties must be proven: 
1. Once Alice commits to a choice for    by transmitting a digest   to Bob, she cannot change 
her choice without detection. 
2. Bob cannot ascertain Alice’s choice of    from the digest  .  
3. If Bob has no knowledge of Alice’s choice for   , then Bob cannot choose a    which will 
bias the result. 
4. Given the sequence of messages exchanged in PRP, neither Alice nor Bob can dispute the 
value of the resulting bit vector       .  
P1: Alice transmits the digest  , a SHA-256 hash of an input of length at least 256 bits. In this, 
case input is a 255-bit nonce    and Alice’s 1-bit bit vector   . In order for Alice to change her 
selection of    to     after transmitting   to Bob, she must find a new nonce   
  such that 
             
                  . Since        is not broken, this would require a brute force 
attack, on average         attempts, which means trying every value for the 255-bit nonce. This is 
computationally infeasible. Even if every computer on earth were employed and each was capable of 
testing a million candidates per second, more than      years would be required. Alternatively Alice 
could try to find two 256-bit vectors with a different last bit whose hashes collide, but even this would 
require                  attempts. 
P2. Since SHA-256 is an unbroken cryptographic one-way function, and since Alice has given it 
an input of at least 256 bits, there is no way for Bob to predict the value of the input solely based upon 
its output, or to limit that input to a specific candidate pool other than brute-force attack, which as 
shown above is computationally infeasible. 
P3. For each bit in   , a 1 will invert Alice’s choice for the same bit in the result bit vector, while 
a 0 will leave Alice’s choice intact. Since Bob cannot determine the bit chosen by Alice for each 
position in    at the time he must commit to   , he has no way of choosing a value for    to 
maximize chances of a specific outcome.  
P4. For a given input, XOR is a deterministic operation, so        is deterministic for given    
and   . By the time        can be calculated by either Alice or Bob, both are committed to their bit 
vector values, and cannot change that commitment without detection from their adversary. 
Like most protocols, PRP in its basic form is vulnerable to abort attacks, e.g. Bob refusing to 
acknowledge receipt of Alice’s final PRP message after he determines the resulting bit vector does not 
yield his desired outcome. This can be mitigated by standard cryptographic techniques such as signing 
each message in the protocol, and using anti-replay and sequencing protections to prove message 
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sequence order and contents. Such mitigations are especially important if the PRP variation in Figure 
12 is used.  
6.4.2 Performance 
Suppose Alice wishes to generate a single 16-bit random number for consumption for a pre-agreed 
purpose. Suppose as well that Alice has 100 ms round trip time (RTT) to Bob on the network.   
Table 16 compares the network latency and traffic required for Alice to obtain this random bit vector. 
Assume IPv4 UDP on Ethernet as the transport medium, inducing transport overhead of 42 bytes per 
packet. PRP uses SHA-256 as the one-way hash, and a nonce size equal to (hash length – target bit 
vector size) for bit vectors smaller than the hash value size.  
PRP requires one and a half round trips, with each packet containing 42 bytes of headers. The first 
packet contains the SHA-256 hash of Alice’s 240-bit nonce and 16-bit bit vector. The second packet 
contains Bob’s 16-bit bit vector. The final packet contains Alice’s nonce and bit vector, and completes 
the PRP protocol transaction. 
 
 TTP Adversary Additional cost 
Latency 50 ms 150 ms 300% 
Network Bytes 44 bytes 192 bytes 436% 
 
Table 16: Random number generation cost 
 
The cost in terms of latency and network bytes for the PRP protocol version described in section 
6.3.1 is significant compared to obtaining the random bit vector directly from a TTP. Fortunately there 
are a few ways overhead can be decreased without realistically compromising security.  
First, reduce the number of bytes transmitted in payloads by reducing the size of the transmitted 
hash, and of the nonce itself. PRP uses SHA-256 because SHA-256 is not yet broken, rather than 
because 256 bits of protection are required. Secrets in a PRP exchange are short-lived – less than a 
second in the example above – so the hash value only requires enough bits to prevent an attacker from 
determining Alice’s bit vector before it is revealed in Alice’s second message. The most significant 
threat is a dictionary attack, because of its short execution time. 
In the 16-bit bit vector case, it would be trivial for Bob to create a dictionary with the SHA-256 
hash values for the     possible values for Alice’s bit vector. To prevent this, include a large nonce in 
the hash to make lookup impractical for Bob. Establish a size of lookup table to defeat – for example 
one petabyte – and choose a hash and nonce size to enable that level of protection.  A petabyte is 
approximately     bits. Each entry in a sparse lookup table would include the lookup hash value and 
the expected 16-bit bit vector.  If the hash is truncated to 64-bits, then each lookup table entry would 
consume 80 bits, resulting in a table capacity of about     entries.  With a nonce size of 48 bits (and a 
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16-bit bit vector), this would give Bob a probability of about            = 0.02% of successfully 
looking up Alice’s bit vector from the hash in her first PRP packet with a petabyte index. This 
optimization reduces the network bytes required for a 16-bit bit vector PRP exchange from 192 bytes 
to 144 bytes, dropping the network cost from 436% of TTP transaction cost to 327%.  
Another way to improve both latency and network overhead associated with PRP – though at the 
cost of some security - is to pre-calculate a large bit vector for consumption, and then use successive 
parts of that vector for the next   random contests. For example, suppose Alice needs an average of ten 
16-bit random values per second.  She can request a bit vector with enough bits to satisfy five seconds 
of her requirements, or               random bits. For a request this large, assuming a sufficiently 
random input bit vector on Alice’s side, a nonce is no longer needed. Pre-calculating a series of 
random values amortizes PRP latency across several seconds of bit consumption, reducing its effective 
performance impact. It also reduces the relative overhead of generating the 800 random bits. Total 
PRP network byte cost – assuming 64-bit truncated hash - is 340 bytes, which compared with a TTP-
sent packet size of                  bytes is 236% more, less overhead than the previously 
listed optimizations. 
A slightly weaker choice would be to use PRP to create the 32-bit seed for Alice’s DVE random 
number generator, and have Alice use the resulting pseudo-random sequence for a set interval or 
number of operations. This approach would consume 46 bytes to obtain the seed from a TTP, or 146 
bytes using PRP. While the relative overhead in this case is still more than 300% greater than 
obtaining the seed from a TTP, the absolute cost to the DVE for generating e.g. 800 pseudo-random 
bits is quite low. 
6.5 Conclusions 
This section presented the Pairwise Random Protocol (PRP), based on secure coin flipping. Using PRP, 
adversaries can fairly determine and agree upon the outcome of probabilistic actions. Three different 
variations of PRP were presented, along with high-level performance analysis of the algorithms.  The 
variations range from a perfectly fair approach which requires a three-way handshake per random 
event, to creating arbitrarily long pseudo-random sequences using a fairly determined random seed, up 
to the tolerance of the DVE. 
PRP makes it possible for adversaries to fairly determine the results of probabilistic events in a 
DVE with the same security a trusted third party – such as a game server – could provide. For DVEs 
which do not frequently need random numbers, or which are tolerant of the 2 to 4 times overhead 
required for the most secure versions of PRP, this can be done without loss of fairness or security.  If 
the DVE is performance-sensitive, then compromises can be used such as pre-generating a set of 
random bits to use over time, or seeding a random number generator, which allow reasonable security 
without significant performance impact. 
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7 Conclusions and future work 
As computers increase in power and the world becomes better connected, Distributed virtual 
environments (DVEs) have the opportunity to reach a larger audience. Cyberspace as proposed in the 
80s and 90s is still a long ways away, but the potential is clear in today’s online network games and 
social experience such as Second Life. 
Tens of millions of people use DVEs, but the scope of the experience those DVEs offer has 
technical limitations. The most popular DVEs – such as World of Warcraft and Second Life – limit 
mutual interaction to less than a thousand of their millions of users. Experiences like full-scale virtual 
battles and large-scale performances remain far out of reach. 
Enabling such experiences requires DVEs to scale beyond their current limitations. Decentralizing 
DVE execution – beyond the degree it already has been – is a promising direction for investigation. 
This dissertation provides techniques useful for decentralizing DVE execution, and also provides 
guidance on techniques which are not feasible in today’s Internet. 
 In preparing for this dissertation, I investigated the state of the art in DVE scalability research, 
especially in terms of decentralizing DVE operation. I found many promising approaches, none of 
which have been adopted by broadly distributed DVEs. As I examined the research and its evaluations, 
I identified three possibilities as to why these approaches are not in use today: 
1. Applicability of evaluation. Most of the research proposals include evaluation against 
researcher-proposed workloads, without any clear link to broadly adopted real-world systems. 
Could proof of applicability be the missing key preventing DVE operators from investing in 
developing commercial DVEs based upon the research?  
2. Deployability. Algorithms which work well in numerical simulations and in well-provisioned 
computer labs perform differently in the real world, often failing catastrophically when 
deployed. Does today’s Internet infrastructure allow the possibility of deployment to 
consumers?  
3. Security. Many of the decentralization proposals make the simplifying assumption that 
security will be handled separately. However, there is no obvious system available to meet 
security needs, even for something as simple as fair resolution of probabilistic events between 
adversaries. And, as online game providers have found, security is paramount for DVE 
adoption and longevity. Are there tractable mechanisms for securing decentralized DVEs? 
This dissertation provides answers for each of these three questions.  
In chapter 3, I analyzed network traffic and avatar movement in a subset of the world’s most 
popular DVE, World of Warcraft (WoW). I characterized the movement of player avatars in a highly 
interactive scenario, player-vs-player battles in battlegrounds. I compared my findings to assumptions 
earlier research has made about avatar movement in DVEs, and found those assumptions to be 
inconsistent with observed avatar behavior. I found that a waypoint model is not sufficient to 
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characterize avatar movement. To my surprise and despite clear incentives for players to group when 
moving, I found they did not generally do so. Finally, I found that hotspots are a factor in avatar 
movement and clustering, though additional research is required to employ this as a basis for DVE 
evaluation. 
In chapter 1, I extended my instrumentation and data processing, and captured data for the five 
main scenarios in WoW. I wrote a simulator which honored upload and download bandwidth 
limitations and node latency. I modeled TCP windowing behavior between nodes to take into account 
stream contention and latency impact on data throughput. I parsed the WoW captures, attributed the 
majority of messages in my captures to avatars, and determined the positions of those avatars. I used 
the avatar positions and their messages to drive simulation of an area of interest message propagation 
scheme for each of the five WoW play scenarios. I created node bandwidth and latency models based 
upon published real-world measurements of ISPs serving 90% of the UK’s population.  
I evaluated two models for message propagation: the existing client-server model, and an ideal 
P2P model with zero overhead and perfect knowledge.  Simulated client-server traffic was consistent 
with my in-game measurements, as expected. I found to my dismay that despite the relative efficiency 
of the WoW network protocol (less than 10 Kbps up and down on average for a client in the client-
server architecture), even an idealized P2P implementation could not keep up with peak – and in some 
cases, average – bandwidth requirements for most scenarios. I concluded that to be deployable in 
today’s Internet, decentralized DVE solutions must implement either a client-server or hybrid model, 
not a pure peer-to-peer model. 
In chapter 5, I examined the security needs of DVEs, and proposed the auditing system Carbon to 
meet those needs. Carbon is predicated on the existence of trusted auditor nodes within the DVE, but 
requires no trust between participant (player) DVE nodes. Transactions between DVE participants can 
be handled efficiently, without being gated on real-time trusted third party interaction. Participants 
locally store a log of their activities, periodically submitting log summaries to trusted auditors. They 
can request audits of other participants whom they suspect of cheating, and must honor audit requests 
made by the trusted auditor by providing requested log excerpts.  
Carbon’s architecture is comparable to the more general PeerReview system (the two are 
contrasted in section 5.4.2), but has been tuned using assumptions relevant to DVEs. This tuning 
reduces overall security in ways I believe are not significant for the DVE scenario, and dramatically 
reduces overhead requirements. When analyzed against WoW’s attributes, Carbon is able to offer 
exhaustive auditing with only 27% client bandwidth overhead, and 4% client storage overhead. If it is 
acceptable to have a 99.9% chance of catching an occasional cheater sometime in their avatar’s 
lifetime rather than on a single instance of cheating, Carbon can operate with 7% client bandwidth 
overhead. Carbon’s overall resource requirements are at least an order of magnitude less than those 
required by PeerReview. 
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Finally, chapter 6 proposes a “Pairwise Random Protocol” (PRP) to allow untrusted adversaries to 
resolve probabilistic events fairly between themselves. Most DVE auditing and security proposals 
assume deterministic behaviors in the DVE. For example, behavior similar to chess where the same 
move always yields the same immediate result. These systems do not support transactions where the 
outcome is probabilistic, e.g. a 25% chance of one avatar successfully tickling another. PRP is a 
simple extension of an established technology called secure coin flipping. PRP allows adversaries to 
fairly determine probabilistic events by generating a reproducible pseudo-random bit stream. I provide 
analysis showing different ways PRP can be used, from a three-way handshake to determine each 
single bit, to generating a random seed which both sides will use in a pre-agreed manner.  
These four contributions provide insight into each of the three questions posited earlier as follows: 
1. Applicability of evaluation. Previous evaluation models do not correlate well with the DVE I 
examined, WoW. I believe WoW is generalizable to most broadly deployed MMOGs. I 
recommend using real-world data captures, or proving a given evaluation model is consistent 
with these real-world captures. 
2. Deployability. DVE architectures can be divided into client-server, peer-to-peer, and hybrid 
(client-server with some peer contribution). Peer-to-peer is not a deployable architecture for 
DVEs in 2010s Internet. DVE providers developing DVEs for release in the near future should 
continue to focus on client-server architectures, or investigate hybrid architectures. 
3. Security. I provide two security contributions which I believe can enhance security and 
fairness of decentralized DVE solutions. 
In reviewing the contributions of this dissertation, I believe I have substantially added to the 
community’s knowledge of DVE scalability, and to the options available for securing DVEs. Three of 
my four chapters have been peer-reviewed and published. The fourth – Carbon – has been available as 
a technical report for more than a year. 
There are many directions which should be explored for future work.  
World of Warcraft has been used as the exemplar for much of this research. It would be interesting 
to evaluate other DVEs to see whether findings hold true for all goal-oriented DVEs. For example, do 
distributed military simulations follow similar avatar movement patterns? I expect not, but then, 
results from WoW were surprising as well. What about the latest generation of games, such as Aion 
Online? These appear similar to WoW, but are newer with higher system-wide demands, and may have 
different play characteristics as well. 
For decentralized systems, understanding the state of residential broadband worldwide, and then 
identifying trends in improvement and potential growth would be useful for determining when we 
might hope to see P2P DVEs be deployed on a broad scale. Mitigations for dealing with peak demands 
in avatar density could bring that time closer to the present. Creating “peer assisted” hybrid solutions 
where centralized resources can opportunistically shift load to peers would allow an architecture to be 
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deployed and slowly “turned on” as network resources improve, and seems a very promising and 
relevant direction for research. 
For auditing, a deeper security analysis would be welcome. Can automated examination of audit 
results guide audit targets, providing a way to enable partial auditing to provide security guarantees 
similar to those exhaustive auditing provides? Can social networking and player reputations suggest 
ways to allow players to request audits without creating a new attack vector? What is the social and 
commercial tolerance for time and correctness in identifying and punishing cheating? 
 
Distributed virtual environments enable productivity and provide enjoyment to millions of people 
worldwide. I hope this dissertation contributes to bridging the gap between research results and the 
lives of those people, and that research continues so we can do bigger and better things moving 
forward! 
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